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Various academic authors have analysed the implementation, the causes and the 
impact of the permanent campaign strategy by political executives in presidential and 
parliamentary systems, notably the United States and United Kingdom. This study 
builds on this literature and extends the research on the permanent campaign in the 
European parliamentary majoritarian context by examining contemporary Greece as a 
national case study. In particular, the study addresses three questions. First, did 
contemporary Greek Prime Ministers adopt the permanent campaign strategy? Second, 
why did they do so? Third, what impact did the implementation of the permanent 
campaign have on their public approval? The research focuses on the cases of three 
successive Prime Ministers in Greece: Costas Simitis (1996–2004), Kostas Karamanlis 
(2004–2009) and George Papandreou (2009-2011). Simitis and Papandreou were 
leaders of the centre-left PASOK, while Karamanlis was the leader of the centre-right 
New Democracy. 
 
The study finds that all three Prime Ministers undertook the permanent campaign 
strategy in order to maintain public approval, aligning themselves with their British 
and American counterparts. They established new communication units within the 
primeministerial apparatus, consulted with communication professionals to form a 
coherent communication strategy, used private polling to shape political strategy, 
policy and presentation, used campaign-like messages as mottos to promote their 
policy plans and made public appearances to woo public opinion. In addition, the 
thesis indicates that the permanent campaign in Greece was a result of the 
modernisation of political communication due to political and technological 
developments, such as the decline of political parties, the rise of television and the 
proliferation of new political technologies that have appeared in other countries as 
well. However, the results drawn from the data analysis suggest that the 
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primeministerial permanent campaign hardly affected the primeministerial approval, 
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Time – line of events 
1965 Media: Public television launched 
1974 Politics: Restoration of the democratic regime in Greece -  
   ND wins general election 
1977 Politics: ND wins national elections 
1981 Politics: PASOK wins parliamentary elections for the first time   
1985 Politics: PASOK wins general elections 
1989 (June) Politics: ND wins national elections - Formation of Coalition      
Government between the ND and the Coalition of the Left 
Media: Deregulation of media sector - First Private TV network launched 
1989 (November) Politics: ND wins general elections - Formation of Coalition 
Government ND - PASOK - Coalition of the Left  
1990 Politics: ND wins general election - Formation of Single party Government  
1993 Politics: PASOK wins national elections  
1996 Politics: Andreas Papandreou resigns from the premiership - Simitis is elected 
Prime Minister in January - Simitis is elected President of PASOK in June - PASOK 
wins early national elections in September  
1999 Politics: ND wins elections for the European Parliament 
 Media: TV station of the Greek Parliament launched 
2000 Politics: PASOK wins parliamentary elections  
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2004 Politics: ND wins national elections 
2007 Politics: ND wins national elections 
2009 Politics: Prime Minister Karamanlis calls early elections - PASOK wins general 
elections 
2010 Politics: The Greek Parliament approves Memorandum - Greece is set under the 
supervision of the Troika (EC-ECB-IMF) 
2011 Politics: Papandreou resigns from the premiership - Formation of Coalition 

















The phenomenon of the campaigning style of governing appeared for the first time in 
the United States. From the late 1960s, all American presidents, motivated by the 
institutional, political and technological evolutions, have adopted the permanent 
campaign strategy to retain their popularity. To this end, the permanent campaign 
literature has largely been a US-focused one (Edwards, 1999; 2000; Kernell, 2007; 
Phillips, 2007; Smith, 2009; Tenpas, 2000). Nevertheless, executive leaders appear to 
have adopted the campaigning style of governing, not only in the United States, but 
also in the parliamentary systems of Europe and Australia, as well as in the 
presidential systems of developing democracies in Latin America. In particular, 
authors have analysed the permanent campaign strategy implemented by Prime 
Ministers Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair in the majoritarian parliamentary system 
of the United Kingdom (Cockerell et al, 1984; Foley, 2000; Nimmo, 1999; Scammell, 
2001); Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi in the consensual parliamentary system of 
Italy (Roncarolo, 2005); the Prime Minister of Australia John Howard (Van Onselen 
and Errington, 2007) and the President of Ecuador Rafael Correa (Conaghan and De 
La Torre, 2008). 
This research aims to extend the analysis of the permanent campaign process in the 
European parliamentary majoritarian systems by examining the national case of 
Greece. There have already been some indications that the permanent campaign has 
entered the Greek political arena. From 1990s onwards, various institutional, political 
and technological developments have gradually modernised the political 
communication environment setting the basis for the implementation of the permanent 
campaign (Demertzis, 2002; Negrine, 2008; Papathanassopoulos, 2007). In addition, 
modern premiers have adopted some forms of the campaigning style of governing. For 
instance, as some authors have observed, Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis, 
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centre-right (1990-1993), collaborated with pollsters, political marketing professionals 
and political journalists who were responsible for the analysis of polling data, 
primeministerial image-making and the formulation of the government’s 
communication strategy (Kurtsos, 2003: 50-52; Sotiropoulos, 2001: 140-141).  
Another example is Andreas Papandreou, the socialist premier (1993-1996), who 
established ministerial press offices by appointing journalists as managing directors 
and founded the Ministry of Press and Media, ‘with the Minister acting in most cases 
as the government’s spokesperson, rather than (..) a minister who tries to form and 
implement the government’s policy in the field of communication’ 
(Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 138). In general, as Papathanassopoulos has described it, 
‘professional advertising, polls and political consulting that were scarcely used before 
have become an indispensable means, not only for carrying out pre-electoral 
campaigns, but also with respect to the on-going communication strategy adopted by 
the government and opposition parties’ (2007: 129). 
However, academic literature on the subject of the permanent campaign in Greece has 
so far lacked a systematic analysis in terms of both its implementation by the Greek 
prime ministers and the factors that have contributed to its emergence. This thesis 
aims to address these identified gaps by concentrating on three successive Greek 
prime ministers whose permanent campaign strategy, to the best of my knowledge, has 
not been previously examined: Costas Simitis, centre-left (1996-2004), Kostas 
Karamanlis, centre-right (2004-2009) and George Papandreou, centre-left (2009-
2011). 
As it has been noted, executive leaders conduct forms of permanent campaigning with 
the intention of influencing public opinion and securing its overall support. American 
presidents, specifically, have undertaken the permanent campaign primarily to retain 
or even improve their own approval ratings. This is related to the notion that, as Welch 
notes, ‘presidential approval [is seen] as a barometer in evaluating the public’s support 
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for the president and his policies’ (2003b: 855). Several scholars have examined the 
impact of the permanent campaign with the help of quantitative methods. Some of 
them have provided evidence that the permanent campaign has significantly positive 
effects on presidential approval. Ragsdale has explored the impact of major televised 
speeches delivered by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, 
Ford and Carter in relation to their popularity, finding that presidential approval 
increased by 3 per cent (1984: 980). Brace and Hickley have found that the presidents’ 
major public appeals increased their popularity by 6 per cent (1992: 56).  
Nonetheless, most studies have indicated that the permanent campaign has had neither 
a significant effect nor even a negative impact on presidential popularity. Baum and 
Kernell found that the presidential radio addresses by Roosevelt slightly improved his 
public approval by 0.5 per cent (2001: 218). Welch indicates that President Reagan’s 
televised addresses from 1981 until 1984 had limited effect upon his popularity and 
sometimes even damaged it (2003: 871). Simon and Ostrom found that televised 
speeches and foreign travels had no influence on presidential public standing (1989: 
79). Brace and Hinckley have shown that, although major televised addresses have a 
positive impact, increasing presidential popularity by 6 per cent, presidential foreign 
travels made no difference at all and domestic travels had a negative effect (1992: 56). 
Especially Edwards has provided the most extensive empirical research on the subject. 
Having explored the impact of 107 presidential nationwide live televised addresses 
delivered from January 1981 up to January 2003, he has concluded that only 13 of 
them had a significant positive effect on presidential approval, 6 of them were 
negative, while 88 failed to change president’s ratings at all (2003: 29-32).  
Similar trends have also been observed in the parliamentary majoritarian systems of 
Europe, though quantitative analysis is quite limited. In those systems, party approval 
is the key measure of success, yet primeministerial approval ratings also constitute a 
significant variable (Clarke et al, 2004; Evans & Andersen, 2005). Premiers’ approval 
actually tends to be considered as the core political resource, allowing executive 
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leaders to maintain or strengthen their political authority or to achieve particular 
policy aims (Foley, 2000: 146; Heffernan, 2003: 353). In the UK, Blair’s permanent 
campaign, as a means to influence public opinion towards his favour produced poor 
results (Needham, 2005: 345-346). In Greece, no study has provided evidence on the 
impact of the primeministerial permanent campaign on primeministerial approval 
ratings so far. Apart from the examination of the permanent campaign strategy 
implemented by recent Greek premiers and the analysis of the factors motivating them 
to do it, this study aims to fill the research gap of exploring the impact of the endless 
campaigning on the primeministerial popularity. 
Overall, the purpose of the thesis is to examine the permanent campaign in 
contemporary Greece. In particular, the study addresses the following questions: 
whether and how recent prime ministers in Greece have implemented the permanent 
campaign strategy in order to sustain the approval of their constituents; what were the 
reasons that motivated them to apply the permanent campaign strategy during their 
term in office; and what was the impact that the implementation of the permanent 
campaign had upon their long term popularity. The research focuses on the terms of 
office of three successive prime ministers: Costas Simitis, leader of PASOK 
(Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα/ Panhellenic Socialist Movement), who served as 
Prime Minister from 1996 to 2004; Kostas Karamanlis, leader of the conservative ND 
party (Νέα Δημοκρατία/New Democracy), who governed the country from 2004 to 
2009; and George Papandreou, the successor of Simitis as leader of PASOK, who 
served as Prime Minister for two years, from 2009 to 2011.  
 
Hypotheses, methods and data 
Hypotheses 
This research has generated three working hypotheses. First, it is expected that the 
three Greek Prime Ministers have applied the permanent campaign strategy to retain 
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their popular appeal. Second, in line with other countries, institutional, political and 
technological developments have taken place in Greece motivating modern executives 
to adopt the campaigning style of governing. Third, it is expected that the impact of 
the permanent campaign of Greek Prime Ministers on their public approval is weak. 
The case studies of Simitis, Karamanlis and Papandreou have been chosen for two 
reasons. First, the modernisation of the Greek political communication environment 
began from 1990 with the emergence of private broadcasting (Papathanassopoulos, 
2000). Second, the development of private broadcasting was not fully developed until 
late 1990s. It should be highlighted that the electoral campaign of 1996 was seen as 
the first of a new period, during which television (primarily private) , the widespread 
use of televised political advertisements and the establishment of  the televised debate 
between political leaders played a decisive role (Deligiaouri, 2011: 63; 
Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 132). In addition, as Papathanassopoulos has suggested, 
‘with the dominance of the media in Greek society, the government especially since 
the late 1990s, has tried to adopt and implement a public relations and communication 
strategy’ (2007: 138).  
Hence, the cases of Konstantinos Mitsotakis and Andreas Papandreou who served as 
prime ministers in the beginning of 1990s could not be considered suitable to study the 
permanent campaign concept. Moreover, Andreas Papandreou was unable to actively 
participate in the political events of the time or follow the permanent campaign trend 
due to his ill health. Therefore, the cases of Simitis, Karamanlis and Papandreou are 
considered the most promising ones regarding prime ministers acting in a context of 
advanced political communication.  
 
Methods and data 
The study has used both primary and secondary data to analyse the permanent 
campaign strategy of prime ministers in Greece. However, due to the fact that the 
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academic literature on the Greek political communication is limited, the analysis of the 
permanent campaign relies mainly on primary data including press reports, official 
government documents, opinion polls and elite interviewing. Specifically, interviews 
constitute a major data source to examine and evaluate the causes and implementation 
of the endless campaigning, since they make it possible to address major key players 
inside the government. In addition, external interviews allow the verification of data 
found in official government documents, newspaper articles and various press 
releases.  
However, it should be mentioned that over-reliance on interviews as a data source can 
be problematic, due to the potential prejudice of the interviewer, the questions asked 
and the interviewee (Brenner, 1985: 157-8). To be more specific, interview bias refers 
to the inclination manifested by the interviewer on leading the interviewee towards an 
obvious direction or to the general personal profile of the interviewer, such as age, 
education, socio-economic status and sex (Brenner, 1985: 157). Question bias, as 
Brenner has suggested, refers to the formality of the questions asked, which 
consequently might affect the formulation of the response given (1985: 157). Finally, 
as Richards has illustrated, informant bias refers to the effect that the respondent’s 
personal characteristics may have upon his responses and potential errors in his 
responses which originate either from a memory loss on the particular issue discussed 
or from an attempt on behalf of the interviewee to present an improved image of his 
actions (1996: 201).  
The aforementioned sources of bias can be properly dealt with by setting three 
particular guidelines. First, the interviewing procedure is required to be conducted, as 
Benny and Hughes (1970) suggest, by using fair practices, in order to limit any 
negative effects. Second, the use of leading questions should be avoided as well as 
questions that give the opportunity to the interviewee to portray favourable or 
unfavourable aspects of him. Third, the only possible way for informant bias to be 
abated is via a proper interviewer behaviour and accordingly via a proper question 
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formulation. Additionally, the findings, which originate from the interview, should be 
compared to findings of other interviews, and to other already available data such as 
documents and speeches.  
Interviewing politicians and advisors in charge of the formulation and implementation 
of the government’s communication strategy is considered to be of the utmost 
importance. Three types of interviewees appear to be especially valuable in this 
respect: prime ministers, press spokespersons and communication advisors, since their 
position offers them the necessary insight into the workings of government 
communication. A semi-structured model of interviewing is used in this study, 
allowing for flexibility in the sequence of questions. At the same time, the open-ended 
question format enables us to collect valuable data on all relevant aspects of our 
research project, while imperceptibly allow interviewees to contribute their own 
experience and analytic viewpoints.  
For this study interviews have been conducted with former Prime Ministers, former 
Ministers accountable for the media management and former advisors responsible for 
the communication strategy of the government whilst in office. Yet it was not 
possible, despite efforts, to conduct interviews with all of the desired interviewees. 
Former Prime Ministers Karamanlis and Papandreou were unavailable. Also 
unavailable were the strategist John Loulis (though his books on the Karamanlis’ 
administration offer a detailed log of Karamanlis’ communication strategy) and the 
pollster Dimitris Mavros, both prominent advisers to Karamanlis, as well as 
Papandreou’s government spokesperson George Petalotis. In the case of the two 
premiers particularly, this study draws data by their public appeals and media 
appearances. This kind of data offers the advantage of being able to interact with 
actual data sources and therefore is considered a valuable supplement to the 
interviews.  
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Furthermore, the documentation used in the research has been selected based on 
whether they contain material on communication. Therefore, primeministerial 
decisions, ministerial decisions, internal government documents concerning the 
government communications and press reports have taken precedence over other 
material. In the case of Simitis, data has been collected from Simitis’ anthology of 
speeches, his official website (www.costas-simitis.gr) and the primeministerial e-
archive (http://web.archive.org). In the case of Kostas Karamanlis, data has been taken 
from the archive of the official website of the New Democracy party 
(http://www.nd.gr/web/press-office/archive). Relevant data for George Papandreou 
has been gathered from his official website (www.papandreou.gr). In addition, 
primary data includes press reports about government communication taken from both 
left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers in order to ensure balance of sources. In 
particular, data is gathered by the leading daily left-leaning newspaper To Vima 
(www.tovima.gr) (until 2010, when the daily edition shut down), the leading daily 
left-leaning (from 2010 onwards) newspaper Ta Nea (www.tanea.gr)  and its Sunday 
edition To Vima of Sunday
1
 as well as the leading daily right-leaning newspaper 
Kathimerini (www.kathimerini.gr) and the Sunday edition Kathimerini of Sunday. The 
aforementioned documents have also been used to verify and support the interview 
research.  
The analysis of primary and secondary data aims to identify the implementation of the 
permanent campaign strategy. As it is shown in Chapter one, the campaigning style of 
governing applied by premiers consists of five components. The creation and function 
of communication institutions; the collaboration with communication experts; the use 
of opinion polling to steer policy and presentation; the formulation of a central 
political message acting as a label of the government’s policy throughout the 
                                                             
1 It should be noted that the newspapers To Vima and Ta Nea belong to the same media group, 
Lamprakis Press. 
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governing tenure and finally the use of public appearances to disseminate political 
messages. In terms of the analysis of the political messages of Greek premiers 
specifically, almost only secondary data has been used. The main purpose was to 
identify and analyse whether these Prime Ministers formulated their central political 
messages in a campaign-like mode, using a single motto that would encapsulate their 
political goals throughout their tenures. For example, Simitis’ main pledge in the 
national election of 1996 was the entry of Greece into the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). Thus, it is explored whether Simitis managed to label this government 
plan and used it repeatedly in a campaign mode during his governing term.  
 
To measure the impact of the permanent campaign implemented by Greek executives, 
the study considers the public appearances of the prime ministers as an indicator of 
their permanent campaign strategy and compares the number of their public appeals 
aimed at maintaining or improving public approval with the primeministerial public 
approval ratings on a regular basis. Specifically, the study explores a correlation 
between two variables: the premiers’ appearances and the popularity of the prime 
ministers in Greece. In this case, the primeministerial appearances are the independent 
variable and the primeministerial popularity is the dependent variable. In particular, 
following Kernell’s typology (1986) the primeministerial public appearances are 
divided into major public addresses directed to a national audience and minor public 
addresses directed to special or local audience. In the first correlation, the major 
addresses are the independent variable and the premier’s popularity is the dependent 
variable. In the second correlation, minor addresses are the independent variable and 
the incumbent’s approval is the dependent variable.   
 
Pearson’s correlation measures the degree of linear relationship between two variables 
(Yfantopoulos & Nikolaidou, 2008). The Pearson r is a number between -1 and 1. A 
correlation number of 1 represents a strong relationship between two variables, while 
0 indicates no relationship between two variables. Whether the coefficient is positive 
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or negative, it shows the direction of the association. If both variables have positive 
signs, they change to the same direction. Particularly, a positive sign indicates that an 
upward change in one variable coincides with an upward change in the other variable. 
On the contrary, a negative sign indicates that as the value of one variable increases, 
the value of the other variable decreases. However, the correlation does not 
necessarily mean causality. Even in the case of a strong relationship between two 
variables, it is not valid to argue that the one variable has caused the change to the 
other variable (Chen & Popovich, 2002: 3). The association between two variables 
may occur by chance or there might be other intervening variables outside the 
equation that probably have an impact upon the two variables.  
 
Nonetheless, correlation at least means that changes in one variable are somehow 
related to changes in another variable. In other words, correlation indicates the extent 
to which two variables co-vary or vary together (Kazakos, 2006: 326-327). Therefore, 
having ensured that the hypothesis about a plausible relationship between two 
variables has been generated from theoretical frameworks, a correlation can be an 
indication of the potential effect of one variable to the other. 
 
The popularity is identified on the basis of poll data gathered in successive 3-4 month 
periods by the polling organisation Metron Analysis. This poll data is explored over a 
period of eight years (February 1997 to June 2003) for the case of Prime Minister 
Simitis; a period of five years (May 2004 to September 2009) for the case of Prime 
Minister Karamanlis and a period of two years (December 2009 - July 2011) for the 
case of Prime Minister Papandreou. It is true that the tenure, each of the three Prime 
Ministers under examination, varies and thus a question of how these cases are 
comparable is raised. However, the scope of the analysis is not to examine the pattern 
of change of the primeministerial approval ratings over time. The scope is to explore 
the impact of the permanent campaign on primeministerial popularity figures. Since 
the polling figures are examined in the same successive 3-4 month basis for all the 
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premiers, the difference on the duration of the respective primeministerial tenures 
hardly prevents the comparison of the cases.       
 
As it has been noted in the US case, presidential approval is usually measured in terms 
of job approval/ disapproval polling figures and based on the question ‘Do you 
approve or disapprove of the way President [name] is handling his job as president?’ 
(Edwards, 2003: 15). In the UK, primeministerial approval is usually measured 
according to satisfaction/ dissatisfaction polling figures and the question ‘Are you 
satisfied or dissatisfied with [name] as Prime Minister?’ (Clarke et al, 2004: 258; 
Needham, 2005: 345; Newton, 2006: 226). In Greece, no such questions are posed in 
opinion polls. Conclusions about the primeministerial popularity can be drawn from 
the outcomes of the positive/ negative opinion poll and the question ‘Do you have a 
positive or negative opinion regarding Prime Minister [name]?’. This study obtains the 
relevant polling data from the Metron Analysis polling company, which posed the 
question regarding primeministerial popularity in a period of 3 to 4 months during the 
tenure of Simitis, Karamanlis and Papandreou respectively and published this data.  
 
In order to identify and analyse the public appearances made by the Greek premiers, 
the study follows Kernell’s typology (1986) as revised by Corrigan (2000). Kernell 
(1986) has analysed the concept of the ‘going public’ strategy, which focuses on 
presidential public activities aiming to influence public opinion in favour of 
presidential policies and then use public support to exert pressure in Congress to 
approve presidential policy plans. Yet several authors have considered the going 
public as part of the permanent campaign and thus this study follows Kernell’s 
categorization with respect to the premiers’ public appearances (Edwards, 2003; 
Kenrell, 1986). As he has suggested, ‘major addresses are those in which the president 
speaks directly to a national audience over radio or television; minor addresses, by 
comparison, are those the president delivers to a special audience either in person or 
via some broadcast medium’ (Kernell, 1986: 85).  
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Although scholars have adopted this typology, recent studies have suggested that it 
should be revised. For instance, Corrigan has illustrated that public events, which took 
place at the White House and received coverage from all news networks, new 
technological tools like teleconferencing and the Internet, as well as issue advertising 
with the president as protagonist, should be considered as presidential public activities 
and as major addresses, since they reach the national audience (2000: 160). 
Consequently, for the purposes of the study, major addresses include public speeches, 
media interviews and press conferences that received coverage by national television 
networks, radio stations, teleconferencing, the Internet, as well as issue advertising 
with the prime minister as protagonist. Minor addresses include speeches given to 
special audiences inside and outside the capital.  
Based on Kernell’s typology, the research builds an approach that conforms to the 
Greek parliamentary context. Hence, some primeministerial public activities are 
classified as major addresses, some as minor addresses and some move from the 
category of major addresses to that of minor addresses. All Greek prime ministers are 
expected to make public appearances since they operate in a parliamentary context. In 
particular, they are due to deliver speeches in the Parliament and the party 
conventions, give press conferences in the International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki on 
annual basis, give press conferences after the meetings they hold with their 
counterparts in Athens or abroad. This study considers all these primeministerial 
addresses as part of the permanent campaign strategy because they receive live 
coverage by the parliamentary television channel (from 1999 onwards), the national 
TV networks both private and public, as well by radio stations and websites. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to be considered as major addresses. Another example is 
related to foreign political travels. When Greek prime ministers travel abroad to meet 
other executive leaders or to participate in the European Union summits in Brussels, 




Therefore, it appears reasonable to add these public appearances to the group of major 
addresses too. Furthermore, Greek premiers give newspaper interviews and publish 
signed articles to the national as well as the regional press. Thus, it is appropriate to 
equally consider press articles and interviews that were published in the national 
newspapers as major addresses, while those published in the regional press could be 
identified as minor addresses. Particularly, major public addresses include speeches or 
interviews on national TV networks, on radio and national newspapers as well as 
signed newspaper articles by the prime minister of more than 1,000 words. Minor 
public addresses cover public addresses to specific groups or community events that 
took place inside or outside Athens and include primeministerial statements more than 
1,000 words. Primeministerial statements or brief remarks in the press are not 
classified as public addresses. To be considered a public appearance for this research, 
the activity has to have taken place before the question on the positive/negative 
opinions on the Prime Minister was raised in the polls of Metron Analysis. In those 
cases where the activities took place after the question had been raised, these public 
appearances were included in the opinion survey that was carried out afterwards. 
 
In order to examine primeministerial campaign activities, data is obtained from 
different sources. In the case of Simitis, data was partially extracted from the archives 
available on the prime minister’s website 
(http://web.archive.org/web/19980115212116/www.primeminister.gr/allsp.htm) and 
the archives of the official website of PASOK 
(http://www.pasok.gr/portal/resource/contentObject/contentTypes/basicText/pressRele
ase/true/pageNumber/1/t/arxeiotypoy). In the case of Karamanlis, data was taken from 
the archives to be found on the official website of the New Democracy party 
(http://www.nd.gr/web/press-office/archive). In the case of George Papandreou, data 
was collected through his official personal website (www.papandreou.gr).   
 
 26 
Limitations of the research 
 
The analysis of the impact of the permanent campaign on the primeministerial 
popularity has faced two limitations. First, the campaign activities of prime ministers 
are not the only factor influencing the popularity ratings of prime ministers. There are 
also several factors that affect public opinion and electoral behaviour and 
consequently leadership’s evaluations and popularity ratings. A vast amount of 
studies, for example, has shown that the popularity of the American presidents has 
been influenced not only by campaign activities, but also by various factors such as 
domestic policy issues, the state of the economy, scandals, foreign policy issues, wars 
and major international events (Baum & Kernell, 2001; Hibbs, 1982; Kenski, 1977; 
Kernell, 1978; MacKuen, 1983; Mueller, 1970; Ragsdale, 1984; Shapiro & Con-forto, 
1980; Stimson, 1976). However, the aim of this study is not to explore the impact of 
all these factors upon the primeministerial popularity. The aim is to explore solely the 
effect of the primeministerial permanent campaigning upon the primeministerial 
public approval.  
 
Furthermore, the empirical studies in the US literature, which have examined the 
impact of the presidential campaign activities on the presidential approval ratings so 
far, have applied different methods. Some of them have explored only the effect of the 
televised presidential speeches and foreign travels upon presidential popularity (Simon 
& Ostrom, 1989). Some scholars have examined the influence of presidential major 
addresses, foreign and domestic travels (controlling for the conditioning effects of 
circumstances like the economy and events) upon pooled approval ratings in an effort 
to present a general model of approval within and across presidencies (Brace and 
Hickley, 1992). Other authors have explored the impact of various factors as multiple 
independent variables like speechmaking, the state of the economy, military activity 
and national events upon presidential approval ratings (Baum and Kernell 2001; 
Ragsdale 1984). Lastly, Edwards (2003) has assessed the effect of the presidential 
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permanent campaign by comparing the presidential approval ratings before and after a 
major live televised presidential address.  
This thesis has not replicated the methods of these studies for three reasons. First, this 
study has chosen the categorization of major and minor public 
addresses to measure the number of primeministerial public activities, which has not 
been adopted by the other studies in full. Second, the replication of some studies, like 
that of Edwards (2003), requires the use of extensive opinion poll data, which is not 
available in Greece. Third, some of the studies have examined the impact on 
presidential approval, not only of presidential public appeals but also of other 
independent variables like the state of the economy, military war and events by 
applying regression analysis. As previously mentioned, the use of multiple variables 
exceeds the scope of this research. 
 
The second limitation that this analysis has faced is about the role and function of a 
prime minister in a parliamentary majoritarian system compared to the role and 
function of a president in a presidential system. Presidents and prime ministers share a 
number of similarities since they operate in a political communication environment 
shaped by fluid voters, television, internet and sophisticated communication 
techniques, which reinforce the role of leaders, favour the personalisation of politics 
and motivate incumbents to engage in a permanent campaign process. Of course 
presidents and prime ministers share also a number of differences since they operate in 
different institutional contexts, presidential and parliamentary respectively 
(Hefferrnan, 2005: Lijphart, 1992). Nonetheless, the institutional constraints set by the 
features of the parliamentary system do not prevent the prime ministers to adopt the 
permanent campaign, but they influence its formulation and execution as well as its 
impact upon the primeministerial approval or in other words, they influence its 





The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter one reviews the relevant literature on 
the permanent campaign concept and explores its main components. In addition, it 
analyses the contributing factors of the permanent campaign process. Given that the 
literature on the permanent campaign is mainly US-focused and that the Greek case 
forms part of the European parliamentary system, the review includes literature from 
the United States and the United Kingdom.  
Chapter two focuses on the analysis of Simitis’ political background and campaigning 
style of governing. This chapter examines the communication units operating in the 
Office of the Prime Minister and in the governmental communication machinery, the 
role of communication professionals in Simitis’ staff, the use and impact of polling on 
government strategy, policy and presentation. In addition, it assesses the effectiveness 
of Simitis to promote his government plan in a clear and repeated way by using a 
motto and it discusses the public appeals of the former Greek Prime Minister as a 
means of delivering his message to the public. Finally, it measures and interprets the 
effect of Simitis’ major and minor addresses on his public approval rating.  
Chapter three discusses Karamanlis’ political background, examines the function of 
the government’s communication apparatus, analyses the role the communication 
professionals played in the Karamanlis’ communication team and studies the use and 
impact of polling upon governmental strategy and policy. Moreover, it outlines the 
public appeals of Karamanlis by focusing on his governmental efforts to label his 
policy plan in order to sell it to the public and the media. Lastly, it measures and 
interprets the impact that Karamanlis’ campaigning efforts had upon his public 
approval.  
Chapter four discusses the political background of Papandreou. It analyses the 
structure and function of the communication institutions of the PASOK government, 
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examines the role of communication experts and focuses on the use of private polling 
as a means to shape government strategy, policy and communication. Furthermore, it 
analyses Papandreou’s effort to communicate his government through a central motto 
and it outlines the public appearances of Papandreou as a means to vindicate his policy 
approach. Finally, it assesses and interprets the impact of Papandreou’s permanent 
campaign on his public approval ratings. 
Chapter five outlines the political communication context in Greece discussing to 
some extent the political communication of the Greek prime ministers before the 
emergence of the permanent campaign era, focusing on the factors that contributed to 
the emergence of the permanent campaign phenomenon from 1990 onwards. In 
particular, it analyses and evaluates the structure and operation of the political system 
in Greece, the role of political parties and party identification, the development of the 
media system and the rise of new political technologies. 
Chapter six contains the conclusions of the thesis. It compares the permanent 
campaign applied by the three political executives in Greece. Given the limited impact 
of the primeministerial campaign-to-govern style on the incumbents’ approval ratings, 
it explores to some extent which factors beyond the campaign activities shape the 
primeministerial popularity highlighting the role of issues such as the economy, 
domestic and external crises, scandals and major political events. Moreover, it outlines 
and evaluates the contributions of the study to the relevant academic literature. The 
thesis shows that, in line with the UK and US, modern Greek premiers have adopted 
the permanent campaign strategy motivated by political and technological 
developments, yet the effect of the non-stop campaigning on the primeministerial 
popularity has been weak. In other words, the study has confirmed that the 
components, the preconditions and effects of the permanent campaign, which have 
been identified elsewhere, occur in Greece as well, though the Greek premiers have 
not simply copied the permanent campaign practice but they have adapted it in the 
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Greek institutional, political and media context. Lastly, the thesis poses new questions 





























The Permanent Campaign 
 
The political communication literature has shared the assumption that the process of 
political communication is divided into a series of five steps: ‘who (the source) says 
what (the content) through which channel (the media) to whom (the audience) with 
what effect (the impact)’ (Lasswell, 1949; Lilleker, 2006; Norris et al 1999). The 
source includes both elective political officials like presidents, prime ministers and 
cabinets, national governments, local administrations, political parties, political 
leaders, candidates and non-elective political officials, such as business corporations, 
trade unions and interest groups. The content incorporates the messages that various 
sources or messengers disseminate through the channels. The channels in turn include 
print, broadcast and digital media, journalists, editors, broadcasters, news executives, 
as well as pamphlets, canvassing, speeches, paid ads, websites and group email. The 
audience includes citizens, constituents, voters and, in general, the infamous public 
opinion. The impact relates to the effects of political communication upon political 
knowledge, political attitudes, political behaviour and voting choice.  
The process of political communication is interactive, interrelated and interlinked. As 
Norris et al (1996) have put it ‘the process operates downwards from governing 
institutions towards citizens, horizontally in linkages among political actors, and 
upwards from public opinion towards authorities’. This study explores the political 
communication process from the point of view of the source and particularly, the 
elective political officials. It focuses particularly on the political communication of 
political leaders.  
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The latter employ campaign communications in order to get votes and win elections. 
The election campaign communications have developed over time due to social and 
political changes shifting from a traditional mode party campaigning to a more 
modernised mode of campaigning. The decline of party identification and the 
expansion of fluid voters, as well as the advent of radio, television and internet, have 
changed the form and conduct of election campaigning which is gradually dominated 
by communication professionals and political consultants (Lilleker, 2006; Norris et al, 
1996). 
Political communication literature that deals with the communication side of party 
election campaign activities in advanced democracies has provided various 
interpretations of the phenomenon. There is literature on political marketing and on 
how the parties have adapted their policies and, even their values, to the expressed 
desires of public opinion (Farrell et al. 2001; Lees-Marshment 2001; Lilleker & Lees-
Marshment, 2005; Newman, 1999; Norris et al, 1996). There is literature on the 
professionalisation of campaigning with the use of professional advisers, such as 
image makers, pollsters, advertising specialists and spin doctors, also literature on 
whether ‘the techniques have been borrowed from the private sector and are employed 
by communication experts’ (Gibson and Rommele 2001; Mancini, 1999; Negrine & 
Lilleker, 2002; Norris et al, 1996). There is literature on the Americanization of 
campaign communications (Holtz-Bacha et al, 1994; Negrine & Papathanassopoulos, 
1996; Norris et al, 1996; Swanson & Mancini, 1996) including ‘strategies that are 
deemed successful in the US [and they] are carefully observed by actors across the 
democratic world then copied, often with the support of campaign consultants 
imported from the US’(Lilleker, 2006: 31).  
Building on this literature Norris has offered probably the most complete typology of 
the evolution of campaign communications. She has argued that ‘changes in campaign 
communications can be best understood as an evolutionary process of modernisation 
that simultaneously transforms campaign organisations, the news media and the 
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electorate’(Norris et al, 1996). In particular, she has divided election campaigns into 
three forms: the premodern, the modern and the postmodern (2000: 137-140).  
The premodern campaign, originated in the mid-19
th
 century, had the party leader at 
the center of an organisation mainly run by a handful of the leader’s closest partners 
and relatively small concerning its size. This organisation relied heavily on local party 
volunteers, the partisan press media and from the 1920s onwards on the radio and less 
on a central guiding system, while the electorate was characterised by its strong party 
affiliations. 
The modern campaign is characterised by its cohesion. The party organisation 
operates under the control of the party leader, who is being advised by communication 
experts and political professionals like pollsters. In the area of the media, television 
holds the reins on a national level broadcasting all political events. As for the 
electorate, it becomes less party-driven and loyal to a certain ideology.  
The postmodern campaign is understood as that ‘in which the coterie of professional 
consultants on advertising, public opinion, marketing, and strategic news management 
become more co-equal actors with politicians, assuming a more influential role within 
government in a “permanent” campaign, as well as coordinating local activity more 
tightly at the grassroots. The news media fragments into a more complex and 
incoherent environment of multiple channels, outlets, and levels. And the electorate 
becomes more dealigned in their voting choices’ (Norris, 2000: 139-140). 
Departing from the postmodern campaign, this study focuses on the analysis of the 
permanent campaign as a campaigning style of governing adopted by contemporary 
elected political leaders to retain public support as a means to increase reelection 
prospects. Although Norris suggests that the permanent campaign has taken place 
from the 1990s onwards, there are indications that in the United States (where it first 
appeared) the emergence of the permanent campaign happened long before. Nixon is 
seen as the first president who undertook the permanent campaign in the late 1960s 
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(Blumenthal, 1982: 24; Brace & Hinckley, 1992; Lawrence & Shapiro, 1995). Merely 
as an analytical tool, the concept of the permanent campaign was first put forward by 
Pat Caddell, US President Jimmy Carter’s pollster. 
After the elections of 1976, Caddell provided Carter with a 10,000-word memo 
entitled Initial Working Paper of Political Strategy, in which he noted the following: 
‘it is important to recognize that we cannot successfully separate politics and 
government’. He further suggested that ‘governing with public approval requires a 
continuing political campaign’ and advised Carter to immediately create ‘a non 
publicized working group that would begin to plan the 1980 campaign’ (Blumenthal, 
1982: 56, 59). After all the term ‘permanent campaign’ is attributed to Blumenthal 
who wrote on the subject in a book with this very title and argues that the permanent 
campaign is a combination of ‘image-making with strategic calculation [which] 
remakes government into an instrument designed to sustain an elected official’s public 
popularity’ (1982: 23).  
The need for presidents to communicate with public opinion and their dependence on 
public support is anything but new. All presidents and in general, all governments 
across time and countries seek to communicate their messages, to gain or maintain the 
support of their citizens and to be re-elected (Lilleker, 2011: 4-5; Seymour-Ure, 2003). 
Τhe difference in the case of the permanent campaign is that the campaign tools, 
methods, techniques and personnel follow the elected leader in office in order to back 
his constant efforts to retain or even increase public approval as well as advance their 
re-election prospects (Blumenthal, 1982; Nimmo, 1990). According to Seymour- Ure, 
‘what changes (..) is not the scope for prime ministers and presidents to prioritize 
public communication but the apparatus and techniques involved’ (2003: 126). 
Yet the permanent campaign has been considered as something broader than just the 
permanent effort to maintain public approval to secure re-election. As Heclo has 
argued, ‘every day is election day in the permanent campaign. Such campaigning is a 
 35 
non-stop process seeking to manipulate sources of public approval to engage in the act 
of governing itself’ (2000: 17). Presidents tend to use campaign tools, methods, 
techniques and experts constantly in order to retain public approval for themselves and 
their policies, not only for being re-elected but also for influencing law-making 
(Edwards, 2003: 129; Jones, 2000: 202; Kernell, 1986: 1-2, 137; Tenpas, 2000). In 
addition, candidates for Congress as well as congressional representatives now are in a 
permanent campaign mode (Brady & Fiorina, 2000; Ornstein & Mann, 2000). Interest 
groups launch sophisticated advertising campaigns to shape important public policy 
debates (Loomis, 2000). Journalists employ campaign metaphors to frame their 
coverage of governing (Hess, 2000). As a result, the limits between campaigning and 
governing can hardly be maintained (Blumenthal, 1982: 26; Jones, 2000: 204).  
However, irrespective of the engagement of particular political and non-political 
actors, as well as the use of public approval either to improve reelection prospects or 
influence law making, this study examines the campaigning style of governing 
implemented by political executives to affect their popularity ratings. Specifically, this 
chapter examines how and why political executives in the presidential system of the 
United States and in the European parliamentary majoritarian system of the United 
Kingdom implemented the permanent campaign strategy. It identifies and discusses 
the key components and contributing factors of the permanent campaign in order to 
formulate a theoretical framework for the analysis and evaluation of the permanent 
campaign in Greece and particularly of the permanent campaign implemented by the 
modern Greek premiers.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section one discusses the permanent 
campaign concept adopted by political executives by analysing its major elements 
based on the US-literature, since the phenomenon originated in the US. Section two 
considers the causes of the creation of the permanent campaign first in the US. Section 
three shifts the study of the permanent campaign from the the US to the European 
parliamentary context and particularly to the UK majoritarian system of single-party 
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government. Both Britain and Greece are considered the most striking examples of the 
majoritarian systems (Gallagher et al, 2006; Lijphart, 1999), hence UK has been 
selected as the subject of research. Additionally, British premiers have undertaken the 
permanent campaign so the British permanent campaign is a starting point to assess 
the permanent campaign of the Greek PMs. Section four discusses the causes of the 
creation of the nonstop campaign in the UK. Last section concludes.  
 
1.1 The permanent campaign strategy in the US 
 
Since the permanent campaign is seen as the introduction and the continuity of the 
election campaigning into the governing of American presidents, it is expected that the 
key components of the election campaigning are reflected in the campaigning style of 
governing. The academic literature on the permanent campaign has identified various 
components of the endless campaigning and this study offers a theoretically informed 
analytic framework in order to understand and systematically analyse the permanent 
campaign of political executives. The components are the formation of public outreach 
institutions, the collaboration with communication professionals, the use of polling to 
steer policy and presentation, the formulation of labels to disseminate political 
messages and the use of public appeals to promote policies. 
The first element of the campaigning style of governing is the setting up of institutions 
with a mandate to shape and implement the government’s communication strategy. As 
Tenpas has argued, the communication machinery seeks to enhance ‘the president’s 
popularity among key constituents in an effort to gain support for a governmental 
program, policy, or campaign’ (Tenpas, 2000: 109). The contemporary election 
campaigns in the United States are run by campaign units created within political 
parties. In the era of the permanent campaign, those units have been transferred into 
White House exerting centralised control over government communications. Those 
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public outreach units, which were created over time by different American presidents, 
became permanent communication machinery. The Office of Communications, 
established by Nixon, was responsible for shaping long-term communication strategies 
and for cultivating relations with journalists sympathetic to the administration 
(Tenpas, 2000: 110). The Office of Public Liaison, set up by President Ford, was 
designed to approach ‘key constituencies to gather support for the administration’s 
legislative proposals’ (Tenpas, 2000: 111). In the 1980s, the Office of Political 
Affairs, formed by Reagan, was responsible for ‘maintaining and expanding the 
president’s electoral coalition by keeping in contact with party officials and key 
constituents across the country’ (Tenpas, 2000: 111). In the aftermath of George W. 
Bush’s election in 2000, the Office of Strategic Initiatives was created to monitor and 
analyse ‘the results of numerous public surveys by major networks and news 
organisations as well as the findings of private commissioned polls’ (Tenpas, 2003).   
The second element of the permanent campaign is the participation of communication 
professionals in the presidential communication staff. According to Ornstein and 
Mann, ‘campaign consultants move without pause from the campaign trail to work for 
the victorious elected officials and help to shape their policy messages and frame 
issues for advantage in the next campaign’ (2000: 220). Strategists, pollsters, 
campaign managers, media advisers, image-makers, spin-doctors and advertisers 
provide their different kinds of expertise and play a central role within the White 
House even though most of them are not officially members of the presidential staff. 
Nixon was the first President to expand his advisory network by hiring two 
communication experts, the academic David Derge and the pollster Robert Teeter 
(Tenpas, 2000: 112). Jimmy Carter continued his collaboration closely with the 
pollster Pat Caddell (Blumenthal, 1982: 45). Stuart Spencer and the pollster Robert 
Teeter offered advice to Ronald Reagan, while communication experts Teeter and 
Fred Steeper acted as consultants to President Bush (Tenpas, 2000: 112). Bill Clinton 
collaborated with media experts like James Carville, polling experts such as Stanley 
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Greenberg and campaign strategists like Dick Morris (Tenpas, 2000: 113). George W. 
Bush was in close cooperation with Carl Rove, campaign manager and senior advisor 
to the White House (Cook, 2002: 757), as well as the pollsters Jan van Lohuizen and 
Fred Steeper (Tenpas, 2003). Following this trend, President Barack Obama appointed 
his campaign manager David Axelrod as senior adviser to the White House (Smith, 
2009).  
The third component of the permanent campaign concept is the ongoing use of opinion 
polling and especially private polling not only to shape election strategy but also to 
shape political strategy, domestic policy, foreign policy and political messages during 
the governing period (Bowman, 2000: 55; Jacobs and Shapiro, 1995: 190; Heith, 
2004: 135; Tenpas, 2000: 116-118).  Richard Nixon seemed to turn ‘a public opinion 
apparatus into an institutional component (..) of the White House’s operations’ (Jacobs 
and Shapiro, 1995: 192). His successors in the post, Ford, Carter and Reagan further 
developed this practice. They increased the number of polling staffers spending more 
money on the conduct of opinion surveys and making more extensive use of private 
poll data (Beal and Hinckley, 1984: 72; Heith, 1998: 165; Eisinger, 2003: 170). 
Probably the most striking example of a poll-driven president was Bill Clinton.  His 
presidency was regarded as ‘a presidency based on a perpetual campaign to obtain the 
public’s support and fed by public opinion polls, focus groups and public relations 
memos’ (Edwards, 2000:27). More specifically, Clinton’s pollster, Greenberg, ‘did 
monthly tracking surveys and even met with the president about once a week for 
fifteen minutes during Clinton’s first year in office’ (Bowman, 2000: 67). With regard 
to George W. Bush, even though he pledged to stop using polls and focus group as a 
determinant of his governance, he eventually made use of numerous tracking polls and 
focus group data. As a matter of fact, Carl Rove, in his capacity as head of the Office 
of Strategic Initiatives, ‘outlined the campaign to pass President Bush’s policy agenda 
by constantly measuring the president’s job approval’ (Thurber, 2002: 3). Finally, 
President Obama also sought expert advice from pollsters with the intention to 
 39 
communicate his economic recovery plan more persuasively (Smith, 2009). To sum 
up, all recent presidents in the United States have applied opinion polling to shape 
policy, even though the extent and frequency of its application has varied across 
incumbents (Murray and Howard, 2002: 545) or different periods and political 
circumstances (Tenpas and McCann, 2007: 349).  
The fourth element of the permanent campaign is the design and delivery of 
campaign-like political messages. The message of the campaign is a short easily 
understood and memorable phrase, which is repeated frequently during the campaign, 
expressing  and symbolizing the political vision, the ideas, the values and policies that 
the political leaders want to share with the voters (Lilleker, 2006: 122-124). If elected, 
this message takes a new shape and then is used as this elected leader’s political motto 
for his tenure. This means that presidents continue to use and disseminate the same 
central election campaign message during the governing period or in general, they 
continue to use the method of formulating and communicating new messages, which 
are used as labels that express and symbolise their political strategy and policy 
initiatives (Morris, 1997). For example, Reagan announced a ‘War on Drugs’ in 1982, 
following concerns about the increasing crack epidemic. Another example Clinton in 
his 1998 State of the Union speech argued ‘we have moved past the sterile debate of 
those who say government is the enemy and those who say government is the answer. 
My fellow Americans, we have found a Third Way’ (Klein, 2002: 17). Moreover, 
President George W Bush after 9/11 announced a global ‘War on Terror’. 
 
The fifth element of the campaigning style of governing is leaders’ public 
appearances, including public speeches, media interviews, press conferences, town 
meetings and political travels. Modern American leaders who run for presidents as 
well as modern American presidents rely heavily on such activities to get their 
messages across (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2010: 1; Tulis, 1987: 4).  For example, Carter 
‘delivered four major televised addresses on the energy crisis’ (Kernell, 1986: 1). 
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Reagan made numerous direct appeals to the public through television and radio 
addresses, press conferences and public speeches in front of special audiences inside 
and outside Washington (Kernell, 2007: 175). President Clinton undertook 184 
political travels and made 259 public appeals across the country to promote large-scale 
reforms such as the economic plan, the Health Care plan and NAFTA (Jones, 1997; 
Phillips, 2007: 150-152). Following Clinton’s campaigning mode, George W. Bush 
made 119 domestic political travels during the first year of his first term (Cook, 2002: 
758). President Obama appears to have implemented this tactic more extensively. 
According to Mann (2009): 
 
‘Hardly a day goes by without his public presence, including speeches, press conferences, and 
meetings with members of Congress, CEOs, policy experts, and ordinary citizens; exclusive 
interviews with network anchors and the national press; new access to minority media and 
sympathetic bloggers; an appearance on Jay Leno and a return to 60 Minutes; weekly trips 
around the country, with extensive local and national news coverage; and an eight-day trip to 
Europe and Iraq jammed pack with news-worthy public appearances’.  
 
It should be noted that Obama was also the first sitting President who appeared on a 
television daytime talk show, called The View (Winnett, 2010). In addition, he makes 
extensive use of new media like YouTube. More than 1800 videos have been uploaded 
in the BarackObama.com site. As Heffernan (2009) has pointed out, ‘the White House 
new-media-operations team has supplied YouTube with Obama’s ‘Your Weekly 
Address’ videos, among other clips. The channel is regularly among YouTube’s most 





1.2 The contributing factors of the permanent campaign in the US 
 
Although lately political leaders in the United States insist on making use of the 
permanent campaign strategy once in office, it should be mentioned that this has not 
always been the case. In the past, campaigning and governing were considered two 
clearly distinct activities.  As Ornstein and Mann have argued, ‘for most of American 
history (..) political actors accepted as a matter of course that once the campaigns were 
over (..) campaign materials were put away (..) and the tools and personnel for 
governing emerged’ (2000: 222). As several scholars have suggested, what has 
changed relates to various political, technological and institutional developments that 
took place in the course of the 20th century, transforming the American political 
communication landscape (Heclo, 2000; Edwards, 2003; Kernell 1986; Jones, 2000; 
West and Loomis, 1999; King 1997). Thus, in order to properly understand the 
concept of the permanent campaign and to fully assess its impact on the underlying 
political dynamics, it is essential to examine those changes that proved to have such a 
major effect on shaping it.  
One of the major changes is the decline of political parties (Blumenthal, 1982; Heclo, 
2000; King, 1997). Parties have particularly weakened in the areas of recruiting and 
nominating candidates for office and also mobilising groups of people to vote for 
them. This development can be attributed to numerous variables, such as television, 
suburbanisation, decrease in public employment and electoral reforms (Heclo, 2000: 
19). The latter took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s. According to Charnock, 
‘the 1969-1971 McGovern-Fraser Commission made primaries “the preferred method 
of delegate selection” for the Democratic Party presidential nominating convention, 
and the Republican party soon followed suit. Also in 1971, the Federal Campaign 
Action Act (FECA) was passed, limiting campaign contributions and creating a 
system of federal “matching funds” for small donations raised by the candidates. Both 
of these reforms lowered the barriers to entry in the presidential race and undermined 
the power of the parties’ (2004: 19).  Moreover, the improvement of living standards 
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and the subsequent growth of middle class lowered the significance of class-voting, 
decreasing party identification and increasing the number of fluid voters, which in turn 
gave prominence to the role of leadership and leadership’s popularity as one of the 
crucial factors to influence electoral behaviour (Blumenthal, 1982; Dalton, 1996).   
These social and demographic changes have contributed towards the transformation of 
elections from party-centred to candidate-centred, turning politicians from members of 
a party into largely independent political actors in their own right, who have to keep 
engaging the public and run their personal permanent campaign in order to achieve 
this (Wayne, 1992: 109). In particular, these evolutions have also affected members of 
Congress. As Kernell has suggested, contemporary members of Congress seem to act 
as ‘independent members who have few group or institutional loyalties’ (1986: 23). 
Thus, presidents seem to abandon the traditional bargaining with congressional 
representatives to ensure the legislative approval of their policy initiatives. 
In contrast, they are motivated to engage in permanent campaign process to build and 
maintain public support as a device to persuade members of Congress to support their 
policy plans (Edwards, 2003: 8).The most important indication of public support is the 
president’s popularity, given that he constitutes the central political figure of the 
American political system. Not surprisingly, ‘the poll question “Do you approve or 
disapprove of the way President … is handling his job as president?” is seen as the 
most prominent question in the history of public opinion research’ (Edwards, 2003: 
15). Therefore, the tendency of presidents to constantly campaign becomes stronger 
especially when congressmen appear to respond to public opinion. As Edwards notes, 
‘the visibility of the “presidential popularity” measure has made it the subject of 
almost constant commentary among observers and participants in national politics. 
Due to high visibility and frequency of presidential approval polls, it is safe to assume 
that members of Congress are aware of the president’s standing with the public’ 
(2003: 15).  
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Another contributing factor towards the emergence of the permanent campaign is the 
rise of organised interests in the mid-twentieth century, as the political system started 
to become more inclusive (Heclo, 2000: 20-2; Loomis, 2000). The fact that the system 
was progressively opening up meant, in particular, that social groups previously 
excluded from politics, such as minorities, women, or even the civil rights movement, 
now became fully integrated into the political process. Interest groups campaign 
constantly during the governing period to promote their own agendas (Loomis, 
2000:175-179) contributing to the creation of politicians ‘subject to interest group 
pressures and more obliged to engage in continuous campaigning’ (Heclo, 2000: 21). 
For example, in the case of the health care reform promoted by Clinton with a policy 
campaign (Corrigan, 2000; Loomis, 2000) ‘the insurance industry countered with its 
own focus groups and TV commercials’ (Hess, 2000: 43). 
The need to mobilise public opinion leads to another change contributing to the rise of 
the campaigning style of governing. Exercising considerable influence on the political 
landscape and triggering the permanent campaign, the use of new communication 
technology raised the political process to completely new heights (Blumenthal, 1982; 
Heclo, 2000: 21-23; Kernell, 1986: 2; Peters, 2002). Originally, it included television, 
which stands in time as the breakthrough landmark for the new age, allowing political 
actors to give a direct and intimate tone in their communication with the public.  
The use of television by political actors had three implications. Firstly, politicians 
could deliver their messages directly to their constituencies in a constant campaign-
like mode, setting the public agenda and influencing the public view on various issues 
(Kernell, 1997). Secondly, television has become the central stage concerning the 
display of presidential candidates, instead of the parties, influencing their selection in 
the primaries and consequently reinforcing in general the mentality of candidate-
centered campaign (Patterson, 1993). Third, organised interests could orchestrate 
protests and media events in order to gain visibility and attract public attention to their 
cause (Loomis, 2000). 
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At the same time, it is also worth noting that the mass media intended to present 
politics in a campaign mode in order to add a sense of drama to developments, since 
this was expected to captivate viewers (Heclo, 2000: 22). As Patterson (1993) has 
pointed out, the horse-race coverage of political affairs has risen from 45 per cent to 
approximately 80 per cent based on the data over the years, while the coverage of 
stories framed in terms of policy have plunged from over 50 per cent in 1960 to less 
than 20 per cent. The presentation of the governing process as a ‘horse race’ similar to 
the presentation of an election campaign as a ‘horse race’ has resulted in blurred 
distinction between governing and campaigning (Hess, 2000: 49). In parallel, as some 
authors have suggested, the media tendency to cover the political process in a 
campaign mode focusing on who is winning and who is losing or on political 
strategies and tactics has contributed to the augmented political cynicism and 
disillusionment of the public (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Patterson, 1993). 
Apart from the role of TV, this kind of communication strategy grew side-by-side with 
new communication technology that today includes cable television shows, talk radio, 
the Internet, the infamous twenty-four-hour news cycle. As Thurber has observed, in 
the case of the terrorist attacks in 9/11 it became apparent that the coordination of 
government communications in a 24/7 news cycle was significant (2003: 7). In 
addition, the role of Internet has become ever more important since the advent of new 
on-line communication channels like blogging, YouTube, Facebook and Twitter from 
2004 onwards (Lilleker, 2011: 2). The latter have been seen as part of the Web 2.0 
giving voters, citizens, and users the opportunity, not only to consume passively 
political information, but also to actively participate in an interactive political process 
(Gibson, 2009; Jaeger et al, 2010; O’Reilly, 2005). Moreover, as Papacharissi has 
noted, ‘patterns of civic engagement online suggest selective uses of online media to 
supplement the representative model of democracy and mobilise subversive 
movements’ (2002: 8). These evolutions seem to exert influence to the conduct of the 
campaigning style of governing. According to Lilleker, ‘the nature of the permanent 
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campaign will be influenced by developments in the Internet, such as Web 2.0 
applications (..) because the permanent campaign has no end, participants are always 
striving for new means of dominating the political agenda’ (2011: 5).   
Another feature that seems to contribute to the creation of the permanent campaign is 
the advancement of new political technologies such as public relations and 
professional polling (Blumenthal, 1982; Wayne, 1992: 109). The media or 
professional political consultants apply opinion polling as a means of accurately 
depicting the political and social trends using ‘statistical sampling to produce 
representative surveys of public opinion’ (Heclo, 2000: 24). The broadcasting of 
polling results intensifies the feeling of a permanent campaign being pursued in the 
political arena (Bowman, 2000: 59-62; Hess, 2000: 59-62). In addition, the new 
political technologies include ‘the following services: poll and focus-group research, 
strategic planning, image management, direct-mail marketing, event management, 
production of media materials, “media buys”, opposition research against competitors, 
and orchestration of “grassroots’ citizen campaigns”’ (Heclo, 2000: 25). However, this 
polling data would be useless without people able to exploit it. Professional public 
relations consultants emerged and began to provide services in order to promote, to 
improve or even change the policies and the image presented by politicians. The 
services provided in order to assist their employers in engaging the public’s attention 
to the promoted policies or even to the politicians themselves resulted in the upgrading 
of their political status to a permanent basis. 
All of the aforementioned leads to an increasing need for political funds, which 
contributes to the rise of the permanent campaign era as well (Corrado, 2000; Heclo, 
2000: 26-27; Peters, 2002). Modern political marketing, including pollsters and public 
relations consultants, ultimately spends money on itself. A new demand emerged for 
politicians and interest groups to engage in constant fundraising activities, which 
target specific groups of the population (Fiorina & Brady, 2000; Corrado, 2000). As 
Heclo notes, ‘the new impetus was to hunt out support - concentrating resources to 
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search for narrowly targeted groups of predisposed sympathizers - rather than to 
gather support within general coalitions’ (2000: 27).  
Another factor leading to the appearance and consolidation of the campaigning style 
of governing is connected to the notion that ‘the stakes involved in activist 
government are what makes it worthwhile to pay out the money that keeps the 
permanent campaign going and growing’ (Heclo, 2000: 27). Since the 1950s, the 
nature of government has been fundamentally altered. Governmental actions and 
policies affect the public more than they did in the past penetrating into several 
political, economic and social issues (Foley, 2000: 131). As a result, ‘the more is done, 
the more can be criticised by opponents and so the greater potential for public support 
to be lost’ (Lilleker, 2006: 146). Opponents such as members of Congress and 
organised interests have strong motivation to campaign aimed at affecting public view 
on their favour. The last factor that appears to have contributed to the rise of the 
permanent campaign process is the development of transport, which has facilitated 
political travel around the country, allowing presidents to deliver their messages 
directly to key constituencies and special audiences (Charnock, 2004: 20; Kernell, 
1986: 2, 93-95). 
Most of these factors are interconnected. According to Ornstein & Mann:  
‘The rise of the modern interest-group system was shaped in large part by the growth of the 
federal government and the collapse of the parties as vital and consequential umbrella 
organisations that could act as interest-group surrogates at both the national and, in machine 
areas, the local levels. The new communications technologies led to the advent of modern 
polling techniques, modern commercial advertising approaches that could be applied to 
politics and policy battles, and modern fund-raising (such as direct mail). The 
telecommunications revolution also led to vast expansion of the avenues of communication 
and made it more difficult and costly to get a message across to a broad audience and to cut 
through the cacophony of hundreds of competing “narrowcast” messages - hence the need for 
more money by candidates and parties to communicate with voters’ (2000: 222). 
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However, the interrelation suggests that not all of these factors are of equal 
significance in exerting influence on the rise of the permanent campaign era. For 
instance, if the political parties had not declined in organisation and electoral terms 
and the number of fluid voters had not increased, political leaders would not need to 
constantly campaign in order to keep their electoral majority or they would not need to 
use opinion polling and focus groups to explore the views and preferences of 
undecided voters. Moreover, if the broadcast media did not exist, presidents would 
never need to make continual media appearances to get their message across. They 
would neither be in need to cooperate with public relations experts nor seek to raise 
funds to hire professionals and apply polling techniques.  
Lastly, without the rise of communication experts other political and non-political 
actors could not undertake policy campaigns exerting pressure on presidents and 
administrations to satisfy their policy demands. Furthermore, the expansion of the 
activities of the federal government would not have motivated so strongly the 
campaigning of organised interests to affect government’s decisions if mass media and 
especially television (and later internet) were not in place. Therefore, the decline of 
parties, the rise of television and the new political technologies are more important 
factors than the interest groups, the government activism or the need for political 
funding in contributing to the advent of the permanent campaign era. This observation 
facilitates the identification of the determinant factors of the permanent campaign in 
non-presidential systems across the world and particularly in the European 
parliamentary majoritarian systems on which this study focuses. 
 
1.3 The key elements of the permanent campaign in the UK 
The permanent campaign implemented for the first time by American presidents, yet 
prime ministers in the parliamentary majoritarian system of the UK appear to have 
adopted the concept as well. Margaret Thatcher was the first premier who seemed to 
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follow the permanent campaign trend declaring after her second consecutive electoral 
victory in 1983 that ‘the next election campaign starts now’ (Cockerell et al, 1994: 
189). More specifically, she reinforced the role of experts in British politics by 
collaborating with the well-known advertisers Saatchi & Saatchi, the TV producer 
Gordon Reece and the communication consultant Christofer Lawson (Cockerell et al, 
1988: 192,195; Scammell, 1995: 98, 274-275). She monitored weekly focus groups 
data and opinion polls (Cockerell and Walker, 1988: 197) and she did several media 
appearances to get her message across (Cockerell and Walker, 1988: 205).  
However, Thatcher’s campaign-like personnel, techniques and tactics were usually 
undertaken a year and a half before the national election took place. As a result, they 
fit with the ‘long campaign’ concept (Norris, 1998), not with the permanent campaign 
trend. According to Scammell, ‘if not yet the “permanent campaigns” of American 
presidential politics, the Conservatives have waged conscious and coordinated pre-
campaigns, most obviously in 1978/9, and 1986/7, and by 1992 all the mainstream 
parties followed suit’ (1995: 277). Additionally, British political leaders seem to have 
adopted pre-campaigns even before Thatcher in 1959 and 1964 (Scammell, 1995: 
250).  
The first UK premier who implemented the permanent campaign strategy in full was 
Tony Blair (Butler & Kavanagh, 2001: 22; Needham, 2005; Newman, 1994; Nimmo, 
1999; Seymour-Ure, 2003: 20-21, 62). According to Scammell, ‘Labour, more clearly 
than any of its post-war predecessors, is a permanently campaigning administration’ 
(2001: 510). Blair established new communication units within Downing Street 
exerting centralised control over government communications, collaborated with 
media experts, used private polling to formulate policy and presentation, 
communicated his policy through simple and repeated campaign-like messages and he 
adopted campaign-like tactics to get his message across. In the following paragraphs, 
the key elements of Blair’s permanent campaign are analysed in detail.  
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First, Blair brought into government the so called ‘Millbank model of command and 
control’ (Franklin, 2004: 58; Kuhn, 2007: 124-125), which had been built while New 
Labour was still in opposition and was used in the election campaign in 1997, running 
a tight media operation with carefully coordinated themes and messages (Riddel, 
2001: 28). This was done not only because of the effectiveness of this media 
apparatus, but also because the existing Number 10 communication approach was 
widely viewed as ineffective by prominent officials of New Labour. According to 
Seldon, Blair’s press spokesman Alastair Campbell ‘had formed a poor opinion of the 
Government Information Service (GIS) (..) He thought the GIS was insufficiently 
active in anticipating the demands of a twenty-four-hour news media’ (2007: 301).  To 
this end, the New Labour government set up an inquiry to examine the function of the 
GIS and formulate proposals for its reorganisation. The Mountfield Committee 
produced a report that offered the Prime Minister a series of recommendations (which 
seemed to reflect the communication philosophy and priorities of New Labour): 
‘to retain a politically impartial service and to sustain the trusted values of the service 
embodied in its rules of guidance; to improve co-ordination with and from the Centre, so as to 
get across consistently the Government’s key policy themes and messages: through a new 
strategic communications unit serving the whole Government, through a reformed Cab-E-Net 
system (AGENDA) and through clearer rules on attribution; to improve co-ordination within 
each Government Department so that Ministers, their special advisers, their Press Offices and 
their policy civil servants all play their part in the coherent formulation and communication of 
policy; to bring the practice and procedures of all Government Press Offices up to the 
standards of the best, geared to quick response round the clock with help from a new central 
monitoring unit; on the basis that communication is an integral part of policy formulation, to 
develop closer and better working relations between policy civil servants and Press Offices’ 
(Mountfield Report, 1997: 1). 
 
In addition, the report suggested that ‘all major interviews and media appearances both 
print and broadcast should be agreed with the Number 10 Press Office before any 
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commitments are entered into. The policy content of all major speeches, press releases 
and new policy initiatives should be cleared in good time with the Number 10 private 
office as well as the timing and form of announcements should be cleared with the 
Number 10 Press Office’ (Mountfield Report, 1997: 8). The implementation of the 
report’s proposals led to the revamping of the governmental communication 
machinery. In order to coordinate all government communications the GIS was 
renamed the Government Information and Communication Service (GICS) and was 
turned into a more professionalised communication institution, staffed entirely by 
political advisors and media experts exerting centralised control over government 
communications (Riddel, 2001: 29; Scammell, 2001: 520).  
Moreover, three new communication structures were introduced in Number 10. First, 
the Strategic Communication Unit (SCU) aimed at ‘ensuring that all departments were 
“on message”, in line with centrally produced themes’ and at ‘coordinating 
government news announcements across departments so that a clear, focused policy 
message was distributed to the media on any particular day’ (Scammell, 2001: 524). 
The SCU’s weekly schedule of media events, called ‘the grid’, was presented every 
Thursday during a meeting of the heads of information from the various departments 
of Whitehall in order to prevent clashes between them, to highlight positive 
developments in the government’s work and to sometimes ‘slip out’ any bad news 
when it had been in general a ‘good news’ day for the government (Franklin, 2004: 
60). Second, a Media Monitoring Unit was set up with the aim of preparing ‘a daily 
digest of news media content and to identify potentially problematic issues for 
consideration (“rebuttal”) at the morning communications meeting held prior to the 11 
a.m. lobby briefing’ (Franklin, 2004: 60). Third, the Research Information Unit, 
known as the rebuttal unit, was created in March 1999 to provide information to the 
Prime Minister and the SCU (Scammell, 2001: 521). In addition, the agency appeared 
to increase its activities immensely under Tony Blair’s administration in order to 
respond to the growing need for a solid communication strategy for New Labour and 
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to adapt to the technological advances in the media field with the introduction of web-
based services. In 2001 also the Central Office of Information’s (established by the 
Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee in 1946 to supply ‘publicity material, services 
and advice to departments upon their request’ [Jacobs, 1992: 215]) advertising income 
rose to an unprecedented £192,407,000 compared to £59,039,000 during Blair’s first 
year in government (Franklin, 2004: 78-79). Overall as Riddel has put it, ‘these 
innovations are the clearest illustration of how the “permanent campaign” has changed 
Downing Street’ (2001: 30).  
The second element of Prime Minister Blair’s campaign-to-govern style was that he 
continued to collaborate with the communication professionals he had been working 
as party leader while being in the opposition. Among his primeministerial staff was 
the pollster and strategist Philip Gould, who had previously been a marketing and 
advertising executive and co-head of a consultancy (Gould, 1998: Kuhn, 2007). Blair 
also collaborated with President Clinton’s strategy and polling aides, James Carville 
and Stanley Greenberg (Gould, 1998; Scammell, 2001: 527-528). In addition, he 
appointed the political journalist Alastair Campbell, who had previously worked for 
the tabloid newspapers Daily Mirror and Today and had served as party’s 
spokesperson, as primeministerial spokesperson. According to Kuhn, Campbell ‘put in 
place in No. 10 a highly centralised organisation [seeking] to coordinate governmental 
communications and [to impose] a single message from the top down’ (2007: 125).  
Blair also appointed media professionals (particularly former political journalists) to 
act as spokespersons of the Ministries and in particular to be responsible for the 
effective coordination of the governmental communication strategy, the adoption of 
extensive spin control as well as the simplification of the governmental message 
(Franklin 2004: 60; Kuhn 2007: 125; Scammell 2001: 517). For instance, ‘former 
journalists, such as David Bradshaw (Daily Mirror) and Philip Basset (The Times) 
were employed to ensure that it was a media rather than a bureaucratic mindset that 
informed the process’ (Kuhn, 2007: 125). Another prominent figure in both the New 
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Labour Party and Blair’s communication staff was Peter Mandelson. According to 
Scammel, Mandelson ‘as Minister without Portfolio, was authorized to put into 
practice some of his own recommendations (..) and establish clear links between 
policy and presentation’ (2001: 516). His communication skills tend to be attributed to 
his broadcasting experience, since ‘he was part of that talented generation which 
passed through London Weekend Television in the early 1980s, then fanned out into 
national politics and the commanding heights of the British media’ (Oborne, 1999: 
134).  
The third element of Blair’s permanent campaign was the ongoing use of private 
polling to steer political strategy, policy and presentation. For example, his pollster, 
Philip Gould, followed him in office. The Labour Prime Minister held weekly 
meetings with his private pollster in order to monitor his popularity ratings (Scammell, 
2001: 509). Even though all modern prime ministers in the UK had collaboration with 
pollsters, only Blair had collaborated with pollsters so regularly outside periods of 
election planning or crisis (Scammell, 2001: 528). Among other things, Philip Gould 
would use focus group evidence to test budget proposals (Franklin, 2004: 142). For 
instance in a memo that leaked to the press, Gould used focus group findings to argue 
that ‘the New Labour brand had been badly contaminated, [it had become] an object of 
constant criticism and had been undermined by a combination of spin, lack of 
conviction and, apparently, lack of integrity’ (Scammell, 2001: 517). However, in fact 
as Kavanagh points out ‘Tony Blair and Philip Gould were exchanging memos about 
the need for permanent campaigning long before Blair’s leaked memo in July 2000 
(2001: 15). 
The fourth element of the endless campaigning applied by Blair was the formulation 
and dissemination of  political messages in a rigid and coordinated way largely in line 
with the central message of the first election campaign in 1997 (Nimmo, 1999: 74; 
Franklin, 2004: 91). For instance, on his first day in office Blair stated that ‘we 
campaigned as New Labour, we will govern as New Labour’ (Foley, 2000; Rawnsley, 
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2000: 15; White & de Chernatony, 2002: 49). Another indication of Blair’s emphasis 
on message was his claim that ‘ideas need labels if they are to become popular and 
widely understood. The Third Way is to my mind the best label for the new politics 
which the progressive centre left is forging in Britain and beyond’ (Richards, 2004: 
187). Furthermore, he made an effort to frame the ‘modernisation project’ 
polarisedable terms as a means to communicate it effectively:  
‘The Third Way stands for a modernised social-democracy, passionate in its commitment to 
social justice and the goals of the center left, but flexible, innovative and forward-looking in 
the means to achieve them (..) it is a third way because of moves decisively beyond an old left 
preoccupied by state control, high taxation and producer interests; and a new right treating 
public investment, and often the very notions of “society” and collective endeavour, as evils to 
be undone’ (Richards, 2004: 187–188).  
 
With the general election of 2001 approaching, Blair set as his goal for the second 
term to develop ‘a narrative [according to which] the first term was merely laying the 
foundations for radical reform to follow after a historic second election victory’ 
(Seldon, 2007: 646).  
The fifth component of Blair’s permanent campaign was the use of campaign-like 
tactics to get his message across. In particular, replicating Clinton’s town hall 
meetings, Blair initiated ‘a series of regular unscripted “question and answer” sessions 
around the country (..) to explain government policy and to defend his 
administration’s performance in a televised format that would show members of the 
public directly engaging with the premier’ (Foley, 2000: 190). In addition, the New 
Labour Prime Minister gave several public speeches, media interviews and penned 
newspaper opinion articles in order to promote his economic and social reforms 
(Cockerell, 2001; Franklin, 2004; Gould, 1998; Kuhn, 2007: 127; Scammell, 2001). At 
this point, it should be noted that he was the first British PM who held regular press 
conferences. Until 2002, in line with his predecessors in the premiership, he was 
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giving ‘ad hoc conferences, notably on the petrol  blockade in 2000 and the New York 
attacks in 2001 were broadcast on television and open to a wider clientele’ while from 
the summer of 2002 onwards, he held regular monthly televised press conferences in 
Downing Street (Seymour-Ure, 2003: 180). 
He also made an effort to communicate his message in an unfiltered way by 
publishing numerous articles in women’s magazines and ethnic minority publications 
(Kuhn, 2007: 126). According to Scammell, ‘150 Blair’s by-lined articles were 
published in his first two years in office’ (2001: 517). Blair was also the first Prime 
Minister to broadcast regularly on the Internet. He inherited ‘open.gov.uk’ from 
former PM Major and expanded it significantly. Access to information about 
government activities and proposals [was] far more readily available, especially via 
the web, than ever before’ (Scammell, 2001: 526). Additionally, Blair ‘in February 
2000 (..) started weekly internet broadcasts on the Number 10 website’ (Seymour-Ure, 
2003: 40). At the same time, Blair, carrying out the tradition of his predecessors, made 
a number of public appearances receiving televised coverage. During his first term, he  
made several public addresses on issues such as the alcoholism among teenagers, 
vandalism, the protection of witnesses in criminal trials, public service reform, 
devolution and the 1998 Budget (Foley, 2000: 191; Seymour-Ure, 2003: 23; Riddel, 
2001: 35). He also gave occasional parliamentary speeches participating in the 
Question Time, though in general he avoided spending time making parliamentary 
appeals (Scammell, 2001; Seymour-Ure, 2003: 26). 
 
1.4 The contributing factors of the permanent campaign in the UK 
As it has already been illustrated, not all prime ministers of the United Kingdom have 
undertaken the permanent campaign strategy in order to improve their personal appeal. 
The phenomenon emerged in full shape from the mid-1990s onwards (Needham, 
2005; Norris, 1998; Scammell, 2001). Before then, the government and specifically 
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the primeministerial communication mainly operated in a different mode, yet the goal 
remains always the same. According to Seymour-Ure, ‘the essential quality and 
purpose of the prime minister’s public communication is its potential to convert his 
authority into power (..) his ultimate aim will be to protect his reputation, in order to 
maximize the chances of staying party leader and winning the next election’ (2003: 
51). 
 
The premiers relied primarily upon the press office and the press secretary, whose 
responsibilities were expanding over the time (Newton, 2006: 220-221; Seymour-Ure, 
2003: 123-127). Moreover, they made public appeals in the House of Commons 
delivering speeches, making statements, participating in the parliamentary debates, 
like the annual Queen’s Speech, passing important pieces of legislation or dealing with 
no-confidence debates and the Question Time which receives from 1989 onwards 
televised coverage (Seymour-Ure, 2001: 24-25). Other opportunities for public 
communication was the participation in domestic, European and overseas summits as 
well as visits to hospitals, schools, factories and conferences in order to launch a 
policy or mark some achievement by making a speech (Seymour-Ure, 2001: 22-23). In 
the same context, the British premiers also gave occasionally press conferences for 
domestic and foreign policy issues (Seymour-Ure, 2001: 169).   
 
So what changed? Which factors created the British permanent campaign era? In the 
United States, political, technological and institutional developments like the decline 
of political parties, the rise of television and the growth of the industry of new political 
technologies and communication experts, created the campaigning style of governing. 
The relevant literature suggests that similar developments have occurred in the UK, in 




The first change, which motivated party leaders and prime ministers to follow the 
permanent campaign trend, is the decline of political parties and their subsequent 
inability to mobilise support. This is evident on the membership of British political 
parties, which has been in decline in recent decades falling from 1.693.156 members 
in 1980 to 532.000 in 2006 (cited in Negrine, 2008: 61). In particular, the membership 
of the Labour party under Blair in first place rose significantly from 265.000 in 1994 
to 405.000 in 1997, but then fell sharply to 248.294 members in 2002 and 198.026 in 
2005 (Heffernan, 2007: 156-157). Moreover, the primaries for the election of party 
leadership strengthened further party leaders by weakening position of MPs, party 
officials and trade unions that traditionally dominated the party. In the case of Blair, 
New Labour were run ‘by a parliamentary leader (..) nominated from among the 
parliamentary party and first elected by an electoral college comprising MPs, party 
members and members of affiliated organisations’ (Heffernan, 2007: 147). 
 
In addition, the decline of political parties in the UK is evident in the ongoing fall of 
party identification (Dalton, 1999: 66; Schmitt & Holmberg, 1995: 107). In particular, 
the rising of living standards caused the shrinking of the working class and the 
respective expansion of the middle class, decreasing the role of class-voting, blurring 
the ideological cleavages, diminishing partisan ties and increasing the number of the 
middle-ground, fluid, undecided voters (Clarke et al, 2004: 41; Negrine, 2008: 60). As 
a result, British political parties, which seek to be electable, have to gain voting 
support not only of their traditional voters, but also the support of the middle ground, 
fluid, undecided voters. The latter have shifted their focus from ideology to the role of 
short-term forces like issues, election campaigns and political leaders (Clarke et al, 
2004: 35; Miller & Niemi, 1996: 179).  
Leaders, specifically, have seen their political significance to increase because they 
‘come to symbolise other, more abstract, entities such as their party’s issue positions, 
platform, and performance in the economic and other policy realms’ (Clarke et al, 
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2004: 257). In addition, the media and particularly television have contributed to the 
increase of the personalisation of the political process by focusing on the leaders’ 
personalities (Foley, 1993; Pryce, 1997; Swanson & Mancini, 1996). The 
personalisation of politics is evident especially in the changing nature of the election 
campaigns from a party-centered to a leader-centered mode, not only in presidential 
but also in parliamentary systems. In particular, ‘the media encourage the 
“personalisation” of electoral politics by focusing heavily on the leaders’ policy 
pronouncements, by conducting in-depth (..) interviews with them, and by monitoring 
their “comings and doings” on the campaign trail’ (Clarke et al, 2004).  
In this context, the increasing importance in recent decades of political leadership as 
influential factor in voting behaviour, not only in presidential systems, but also in 
parliamentary systems in combination with the emergence and the development of the 
role of television have given prominence to the notion of presidentialisation (Foley, 
2000; Mughan, 1993; Seymour-Ure, 2003: 63). In this notion, as McAllister has 
described it: 
‘the institutional arrangements within a country have comparatively little influence on what 
leaders do and how they behave in office. What matters are changes in the process of political 
communications and the nature of party organisations. Parliamentary systems were alleged to 
have become more presidential in style and character (..) by assuming that the fate of the 
leader and the fate of the government are inextricably linked’ (1996: 286).  
 
In the case of Blair, there are two elements that have marked the, British Presidency of 
Blair similar to the US-style presidency as Foley (2000: 230, 293) argues. First, the 
personal leadership style of Blair, which placed him further at the heart of 
government. It is characteristic that under Blair the communication entourage in 
Downing Street ‘resembled that of the White House’ (Seymour-Ure, 2001: 136). 
Second, the media-led phenomenon of personalisation increasingly spotlighted Blair 
while marginalising other political actors to the periphery of public attention. 
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According to Mazzoleni, ‘the traditional highly personalised premiership assumed 
new visibility with the victory of Tony Blair, a leader keen to implement shrewd 
communication tools’ (2000: 327-328). The latter was evident in the adoption of US-
style communication activities like the regular primeministerial press conference, in 
spite of the different institutional context. In the United States, a regular presidential 
press conference ‘has always included the simple argument that it is needed because 
the separation of powers removes the president from public scrutiny in the legislature. 
A press conference is thus the president’s ‘Question Time’ (Seymour-Ure, 2003: 198-
199). 
 
However, as Heffernan, argues the concept of presidentialisation of the premiership 
misleads because between prime ministers and presidents lies a number of differences 
that imposes limitations on the notion in the majoritarian parliamentary systems (2005: 
54). Apart from the fact that the prime minister is the leader of his party while the 
president is not (Heffernan, 2005), there are also three main distinctions according to 
Lijphart (1992): 
 
‘First, in presidential systems, the head of government has a fixed term in office. In 
parliamentary systems, the head of government is dependent on the confidence of the 
legislature. Second, presidents are elected (directly or via an electoral college), whereas 
prime ministers are selected by the legislature. Third, presidential systems have one-person, 
non-collegial executives, whereas parliamentary systems have collective executives’.  
 
Yet the leadership’s image, including popularity, remains an important factor in 
shaping voting behaviour along with other short-term factors, like popular at the time 
issues and election campaigns as well as long-term forces, like social class, region, 
employment status, religion, values and party identification (Dalton, 1996; Fiorina, 
1981; Miller & Niemi, 1996). The analysis of the existing data, gathered from 
empirical researches for more than twenty years shows that, the opinion of voters over 
 59 
the image of both the governing and opposing party leaders affects to a significant 
extent their choice upon the elections. A positive or a negative opinion could either 
favour or reduce the party’s support to its leader in inter-election periods (Miller et al 
1990; Stewart and Clarke 1992; Clarke et al 1997; 1998). Also leaders tend to use 
their own high approval ratings, a crucial political capital as it is, as leverage in order 
to be favoured by the media, to affect to some extent current or future political events 
and consequently to refuel their approval ratings (Neustadt, 1990: 73; Maltese, 1994: 
4; Ostrom and Simon, 1985: 335; Seymour-Ure, 2003). Thus, current British premiers 
have still the motive to engage in a permanent campaign process to retain their 
popularity ratings.  
Another contributing factor to the emergence of the campaigning style of governing in 
the United Kingdom is the development of new media technologies. Norris has argued 
that campaign communication in the United Kingdom has entered the era of the 
postmodern campaign which is characterised by ‘the emergence of a more 
autonomous and less partisan press, following its own “media logic”, the growing 
fragmentation and diversification of electronic media outlets, programmes and 
audiences, and, in reaction to all these developments, the attempt by the parties to 
reassert control through strategic communication and media management during the 
permanent campaign’ (1998: 117). The advent of broadcasting and particularly the 
advent of television have affected significantly the forms of political communication 
(Foley, 2000: 149; Seymour-Ure, 2003: 8). As a result, a number of evolutions marked 
the new media landscape: 
‘A relatively recent expansion in supply of radio and television services, driven by 
technological change and a more liberal public policy approach, following many years of 
highly restricted provision; the dominance  of a few free-to-air terrestrial broadcasters up until 
the last decade of the twentieth century; the comparatively modest impact of cable as a 
distribution system for programming; strong competition to terrestrial networks from satellite 
distribution from the late 1980s onwards; the roll-out and popular take-up of digital services on 
terrestrial, satellite and cable platforms in the early years of the twenty-first century; high 
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popularity of radio listening and television viewing among audiences; historically a highly 
regulated system underpinned by public service values; significant marketisation and lighter 
touch regulation of broadcasting since the late 1980s’ (Kuhn, 2007: 11).       
 
In addition, media increasingly concentrate on personalities in order to communicate 
information more easily and, consequently, cover the political process in a campaign-
like mode. Particularly, as McAllister notes, ‘the drama of horse-race journalism 
(who’s up, who’s down) is more vivid than detailed [policy] debates’ (1996, 287). The 
notion appears to have been reinforced by the televised coverage of parliaments and 
the parliamentary debates like the Question Time, between the prime minister and the 
leader of Opposition, which offer the viewers the opportunity to assess the leadership 
qualities of the two main contenders (Seymour-Ure, 2003; McAllister, 1996: 288). 
Additionally, the rise of the media has affected almost all public activities given that 
‘party conferences, visits to schools and hospitals, and even non-governing occasions 
such as holidays, are fitted with the same tripwire. The opportunities for broadcast 
public performance are limitless. They extend far beyond overtly political programmes 
to include such failures as gardening and children’s programmes’ (Seymour-Ure, 
2003: 61). 
 
Furthermore, the media landscape and consequently the political communication 
environment became even more demanding and pressing during Blair’s years. As 
Kuhn has illustrated: 
‘the UK political communication environment of the Blair era was characterised by the twenty-
four-hour news cycle, an explosion of media outlets, notably rolling news channels and internet 
websites, a phalanx of journalists hungry for insider information and a broad range of political 
actors, including parties and pressure groups, functioning in competition with the core 
executive as sources of the media’ (2007: 123).  
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Moreover, ‘at the beginning of the new millennium the internet had a similar effect 
like the broadcast media’ (Seymour-Ure, 2003: 8). To this end the mass media have 
exerted great influence on traditional party campaigns, weakening party-centered 
politics not only in presidential but also in parliamentary systems like the British one 
(McAllister, 1996: 281). Consequently, it is safe to assume that the new media 
environment has exerted pressures on Prime Minister Blair to adopt the permanent 
campaign in order to defend himself and promote his policies. In other words, as 
Seymour-Ure has noted, ‘when media change, in short, the premiership changes’ 
(2003: 9).  
 
In parallel, in line with the United States the development of broadcast media has 
boosted the growth of the industry of communication professionals. As Negrine has 
illustrated, ‘the examples of Philip Gould, Alastair Campbell and Steve Hilton in the 
British context (..) suggest that there is now a coterie of specialists that are becoming 
embedded in the political process (..) These are truly professionals and to the extent 
that they are professionals one could make a case for saying that what we see is a 
professionalisation of political communication and a realisation that no contemporary 




The endless campaigning arises as a broadly adopted communication strategy pursued 
by contemporary political leaders across a number of advanced democracies. The 
permanent campaign concept emerged primarily in the United States due to 
institutional, political and technological reasons, the most important being the decline 
of political parties, the advent of mass media and the growth of new political 
technologies. Assessing its implementation from the American presidents, five 
components have been identified including public outreach institutions, collaboration 
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with communication experts, the use of polling data to steer policy and 
communication, the use of campaign-like messages as labels throughout the governing 
term and various public appeals to promote themselves and their policies.  
Outside the US, the permanent campaign has been adopted by executive leaders 
around the world, for example in Latin America, in Australia and Europe. In Europe 
and specifically in the UK the permanent campaign process has been used from the 
mid-1990s. Blair is the first premier who adopted in full the campaigning style of 
governing in the British context motivated, similarly to the US, by developments 
including the decline of parties, the erosion of party identification, the rise of 
television and the growth in the industry of communication professionals. The next 
chapter discusses the implementation of the permanent campaign in another European 
















The permanent campaign of Prime Minister Costas Simitis 
 
As it has already been mentioned in chapter one, there are some indications that 
Simitis’ predecessors in the premiership had already adopted a few aspects of the 
permanent campaign. In this chapter Simitis’ permanent campaign is evaluated against 
five criteria: institutions, experts, polling, message and public appeals. It becomes 
apparent when compared to his predecessors that he pursued a fully permanent 
campaign strategy in order to retain his popularity. In fact, Simitis introduced new 
government communication units and collaborated systematically with communication 
professionals, even if some of them had no previous relations with the party. At the 
same time, he monitored polling figures, making important political decisions based 
on them. Additionally, the center-left premier formulated his central political message 
in a campaign-like mode, using a single motto that would encapsulate his political 
goals throughout his first term in office while he failed to do it in the second term. 
Furthermore, he adopted campaign-like tactics in governing, mainly using minor 
addresses and domestic travels to get his message across. Despite all this activity, the 
impact of Simitis’ permanent campaign measured by the number and frequency of his 
public appearances was weak on his public approval as Prime Minister. This suggests 
that other factors exerted greater influence on his primeministerial popularity. 
In the following sections, the implementation of Simitis’ campaigning style is studied. 
Before undertaking such an analysis, his path to political ascendancy should be 
examined more closely. To this end, section one discusses the political background of 
Costas Simitis. Section two examines the communication units operating in the Office 
of the Prime Minister and in the governmental communication machinery. Section 
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three considers the role of communication professionals in Simitis’ staff. Section four 
analyses the use and impact of polling on government strategy, policy and 
presentation. Section five assesses the central message of Simitis’ permanent 
campaign. Section six discusses the public appeals of the former Greek Prime Minister 
as a mean of delivering his message to the public. Section seven measures and 
interprets the effect of Simitis’ major and minor addresses on his public approval 
ratings.  
 
2.1 The political background of Simitis 
Simitis was one of the most prominent party officials: co-founder of PASOK, co-
writer of the party’s founding document, member of the senior party committee and 
member of the Ministerial Council of Papandreou’s administrations from 1981 to 1989 
and from 1993 to 1996 (Pretenteris, 1996; Simitis, 2005: 20-22). In particular, he 
served as Minister of Agriculture (1981-1985), Minister of National Economy (1985-
1987) and Minister of Industry (1993-1995) (Kazakos, 2001: 375; Simitis, 2005: 24-
26).  
However, as several authors have pointed out, Simitis was considered an outsider 
inside his own party. He was managerial and technocratic, representing the pro-
European modernising minority within the party, unlike Andreas Papandreou, who 
advocated anti-European socialist ideas (Featherstone, 2005: 226-227; Kazakos, 2001: 
335; Pretenteris, 1996: 80; Voulgaris, 2008: 127). As one of the founding members of 
the party and partly responsible for the formulation of the party’s original programme 
back in 1979, Simitis attempted to reconcile the party line with the European project. 
To this end, he published a political advertising poster, which carried the motto ‘Yes 
to Europe of the people, No to Europe of the Monopolies’ (Simitis, 2005: 25). Yet, the 
above initiative stirred significant unrest inside the party, especially from party 
officials who were arguing that it was deviating strongly from the anti-European party 
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line. The intra-party reaction led Simitis to resign from the senior party committee in 
1979 (Pretenteris, 1996; Simitis, 2005: 26).  
In 1985, Simitis was appointed Minister of National Economy with the mandate to 
implement the economic stabilization programme. However, he handed in his 
resignation from the cabinet at the end of 1987, after Papandreou decided to shift the 
economic policy course (Kazakos, 2001; Loulis, 2007: 272; Simitis, 2005: 24-26; 
Pretenteris, 1996: 31; Voulgaris, 2008: 102-103). During the last Papandreou’s 
government (1993-1996), Simitis served as Minister of Industry and Commerce 
setting out to modernise state-owned industries. Nonetheless, two years later he again 
decided to resign from office after clashing with the Prime Minister over the 
reorganisation of the state owned shipyard (Simitis, 2005: 26). For these reasons, 
Papandreou and his close associates eventually turned against Simitis, accusing him of 
being a conservative right wing or neoliberal (Pretenteris, 1996: 35). In other words, 
Simitis was viewed as a political outsider within PASOK to such an extent (Loulis, 
2007: 297) that his election as party leader ‘represented a major turning point in Greek 
politics’ (Featherstone, 2005: 226).    
In January 1996, Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou resigned from the premiership 
due to his failing health and the parliamentary group of PASOK elected a new Prime 
Minister (Nikolacopoulos, 2005; Pretenteris, 1996). On 18 January 1996, Simitis 
defeated his rivals for the post (Featherstone, 2005: 226; Voulgaris, 2008: 127). In the 
first electoral round, both Simitis and his main opponent Akis Tsochatzopoulos 
received 53 votes, with fellow candidates Gerasimos Arsenis and Yiannis 
Charalambopoulos securing 50 and 11 votes respectively. In the second round, Simitis 
won with 86 votes against 75 for Tsochatzopoulos (Fouskas, 1998: 134). 
Tsochatzopoulos and Arsenis essentially represented the traditional populist left-wing 
faction of the party. As Featherstone has noted, they ‘were probably closer to the 
party’s soul than Simitis, at least in recent times’ (2005: 226). Tsochatzopoulos 
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especially was seen as the leader of the ‘proedrikoi’ (leader’s faction), protecting the 
inheritance of Papandreou’ (Featherstone, 2005: 226).  
Six months later, in June 1996, Papandreou passed away and almost immediately the 
party called for a convention, in which the empty seat of the deceased founder and 
party leader would be filled. Simitis ran for party leader and again defeated 
Tsochatzopoulos. He became the new leader of PASOK, receiving 53.8 per cent of the 
votes to Tsochatzopoulos’s 45.7 per cent (Featherstone, 2005: 226; Loulis, 2007: 297; 
Pretenteris, 1996; Voulgaris, 2008: 127). Among Simitis’ supporters were the trade 
union leaders, who exerted great influence on the party (Pretenteris, 1996: 117), but 
also George Papandreou, ‘the ex-Premier’s eldest son who [had] courageously 
distinguished himself from his father’s legacy’ (Featherstone, 1997: 159).  
Although one can argue that the reasons behind Simitis’ victory in the elections for 
both posts - premiership and party leadership - are numerous, Simitis seemed to be 
elected party leader mainly because he was considered as the most capable candidate 
in terms of securing PASOK’s re-election. According to VPRC polls, published in a 
time span between January and May 1996, Simitis’ popularity was higher than that of 
his conservative opponent Miltiadis Evert. In January, Simitis’ rating was 84.6 per 
cent over Evert’s 38 per cent, in March Simitis enjoyed a popularity of 59.7 per cent in 
comparison to 32.3 per cent for Evert and in May, a month before the party congress, 
Simitis secured a 54 per cent over ND’s leader (opinion surveys cited in Pretenteris, 
1996: 261). Furthermore, in March the VPRC voting intention poll showed that 
PASOK had a lead over ND taking 29.3 per cent to 28.6 per cent (opinion polls cited 
in Pretenteris, 1996: 261-263).   
However, in spite of being victorious on two occasions, Simitis needed a fresh 
mandate in order to secure his position. Hence, in September 1996 he called for snap 
elections to exploit his advantage over his right-wing opponents of New Democracy 
(Featherstone and Kazamias, 1997: 158). He won the elections by taking 41.5 per cent 
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of the vote and 162 parliamentary seats, while the conservative party took 38.1 per 
cent and 108 seats (Featherstone, 2005; Nikolacopoulos, 2005; Pretenteris, 1996). 
Consequently, as Featherstone has argued, Simitis consolidated his position within the 
party and government (1997: 160-161).  
 
2.2 Government institutions of public outreach 
One of the criteria testifying to the existence of the permanent campaign is the 
establishment of communication units and this was quite evident within Simitis’ 
communication apparatus. Simitis transferred some functions of his campaign 
apparatus into the Prime Minister’s Office, which is located in Maximos Mansion in 
Athens, by creating new communication units: the Press Office and the position of 
Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister (Sotiropoulos, 2001: 130). The Press Office 
aimed at promoting the primeministerial image, managing relations with the press and 
the mass media, providing background information to journalists, framing political 
messages and monitoring and rebutting critical announcements made by the 
opposition and the media (Fanaras, 2010, interview with the author; Paschalidis, 2010, 
interview with the author; Pantagias, 2009a, interview with the author; Simitis, 2005: 
29).  
In contrast, according to Reppas who served as the government spokesperson from 
1996 till 2001, the government had no adequate media monitoring mechanism (2010: 
interview with the author). There were, however, some relevant agencies working 
inside the Ministry, but these were not adjusted to the developing situation. 
Furthermore, as documents obtained by the author show, George Pantagias, head of 
the Press Office from 1996 to 2003, was providing political communication memos to 
the Prime Minister regarding political strategy, political communication initiatives, the 
planning of public appeals for the Prime Minister in the short term and proposals for 
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the improvement of the performance of Simitis and his government in the long term 
(see Appendix G). 
The Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister played a key role as regards 
communications between the Cabinet and the PASOK’s parliamentary group. He ‘was 
responsible for the formulation of the communication strategy, the conduct of social 
dialogue and handling relations between the Cabinet and the governing MPs’ 
(Sotiropoulos, 2001: 129-130). However in practice, as Pantagias has noted, the 
Deputy’s main contribution to the communication strategy was one of intermediation, 
liaising between the primeministerial office and socialist parliamentarians, rather than 
directly shaping the broader strategy (2009a: interview with the author). An indication 
of the peripheral nature of the post comes from its being abolished altogether 
following the national elections in 2000, with its incumbent George Paschalidis being 
appointed Minister of Macedonia-Thrace (Simitis, 2005: 655).  
At the same time, Simitis maintained the Ministry of Press and Mass Media 
established by Andreas Papandreou (Papathanassopoulos, 2001: 138). Moreover, after 
the elections of 2000 he reinforced the Ministry, introducing the position of Deputy 
Minister of Press and Mass Media (Simitis, 2005: 655). Unlike the primeministerial 
Press Office, the Minister of Press and Mass Media focused on government 
communications rather than the Prime Minister’s image. According to Simitis, the 
head of the Press Office dealt only with the Prime Minister’s public relations while the 
Minister of Press and Media was mainly in charge of the formal briefing procedure 
and the handling of pressing issues (2011: interview with the author). Simitis also 
encouraged his ministers to take initiatives, promote policy plans and shape their own 
communication strategy. Hence, ministers were free to appoint their own associates in 
the press offices, regardless if the latter were journalists or party officials. According 
to Protopapas, serving as Minister of Press and Media from 2001 to 2004, ‘every 
minister was in charge of his own communication. I only partially assisted the 
ministers’ (2010: interview with the author).  
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The separation of the communication policy responsibilities between those of the 
Prime Minister and those of the government, as well as their allocation to distinct 
institutions may be attributed to Simitis’ need to distance himself (in political 
communication terms) from his government. After all, he had been elected to the 
premiership post with the backing of only a marginal 54 per cent of party members 
and, consequently, he understood that he could not be the ‘iron-fist’ kind of leader. As 
Featherstone has argued, Simitis had to accommodate his intraparty opponents, while 
keeping his own intraparty faction in his side (2010: 12). This was one of the reasons 
why Simitis, as Pantagias has suggested, ‘was obsessed with developing his own 
structures, to have his own group, which would be politically attached to him and 
would be responsible for designing and handling major issues’ (2009a: interview with 
the author).  
Another reason, as several scholars and close allies of Simitis have suggested, was   
his inability to modernise PASOK in the same way that he was modernising the 
country (Fanaras, 2009: interview with the author; Karzis, 2006: 227-229; Kousoulis, 
2009: interview with the author; Loulis, 2007: 304; Pantagias, 2009a: interview with 
the author). Since he became Prime Minister almost at the exact same time that he was 
elected party leader, Simitis argues, he could not have devoted considerable time to 
changing the political nature of PASOK, having had different priorities, such as  
securing Greece’s entry into the Eurozone (Simitis, 2005: 510).  
 
2.3 The role of communication experts 
The second marker of Simitis’ engaging in a permanent campaign was his 
collaboration with communication professionals, something that was evident judging 
by the composition of Simitis’ permanent campaign machinery. During the election 
campaign in 1996, Simitis collaborated with the pollster and head of the polling 
organisation Metron Analysis, Stratos Fanaras (Fanaras, 2009: interview with the 
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author; Spourdalakis & Tassis, 2006: 510; Pantagias, 2009a: interview with the 
author). Once he became Prime Minister, Simitis continued to cooperate with Fanaras 
who, as a prominent member of the primeministerial staff from 1996 to 2004, 
conducted and analysed opinion surveys and focus groups on a regular basis as well as 
offering advice on government strategy (Lakopoulos, 1999, 2001; Pantagias, 2009a: 
interview with the author; Papathanassopoulos, 2003: 131). As Fanaras has put it, ‘it 
was my responsibility to be in charge of polls and to observe the political and social 
climate, in order to conduct a meta-analysis, make suggestions and offer advice on 
political and strategic issues’ (2009: interview with the author).  
In May 1999, Simitis expanded the advisory staff by hiring Lefteris Kousoulis, 
strategist and owner of the political communication firm Saying and Doing 
(Kousoulis, 2007: 27; Lakopoulos, 1999, 2001; Papathanassopoulos, 2003: 131). 
According to Simitis, Kousoulis was in charge of providing him with long term 
strategic planning (2011: interview with the author). Simitis chose him in spite of the 
fact that until then Kousoulis had only worked with conservative politicians and 
candidates (Papathanassopoulos, 2001: 132; Yannas, 2001: 6).  
However, Simitis’ associates considered Kousoulis’s professional background as an 
asset rather than a handicap. As Pantagias suggests, ‘he saw things from a different 
angle, which was useful to us’ (2009a: interview with the author). It is possible to 
argue that the timing of Kousoulis’s appointment explains Simitis’ decision to select a 
professional with conservative links as his close advisor. In May 1999, a month before 
the elections for the European Parliament and a year before the national elections, 
Karamanlis and New Democracy had a clear lead in voting intentions in the polls 
(Loulis, 2011: 156). In an attempt to improve the party’s appeal to the median voters, 
Karamanlis had projected New Democracy as the party of the ‘middle ground’ 
(Loulis, 2007: 329), confronting Simitis on a political area, where the former was 
considered as having the advantage (Pappas and Dinas, 2006: 482). Hence, Simitis 
needed the consultancy of a communication expert who as a party outsider had a clear 
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view on the most appropriate strategy in order to win over the voters of the ‘middle 
ground’. Another media expert who joined Simitis’ staff in 1999 was Petros 
Efthimiou, political journalist of the leading centre-left newspaper Sunday Vima. 
Efthimiou participated in the speech writing team for a year (1999-2000) before being 
appointed by Simitis as Minister of Education in 2000 (Kousoulis, 2009: interview; 
Pantagias, 2009a: interview; Papathanassopoulos, 2003: 131; Simitis, 2005: 422).  
In spite of the increasing role of communication experts within the primeministerial 
apparatus of Simitis, communication professionals co-existed with government and 
party officials who played a significant role. Among them were George Pantagias as 
press advisor, Dimitris Reppas as Minister of Media and Press, Nikos Themelis as 
chief of staff in the Prime Minister’s office as well as Kostas Laliotis, Minister of 
Public Works and Environment (1996-2001) and party secretary (2001-2003) 
(Pantagias, 2009b: interview with the author; Reppas, 2010: interview with the author; 
Simitis, 2005). Pantagias and Themelis were close aides of Simitis while Reppas and 
Laliotis were parliamentarians and prominent figures in the party 
(Papathanassopoulos, 2001: 131).  
 
2.4 The use of polling 
As regards the third component of the permanent campaign, Simitis used private 
polling on a regular basis in order to monitor public opinion. As it has been mentioned 
he collaborated with pollsters and monitored opinion surveys and focus group 
evidence during the election campaign in 1996 and 2000 in order to steer electoral 
strategy (Papathanassopoulos, 2001; Spourdalakis & Tassis, 2006: 510). Simitis 
continued, as Prime Minister, to use private polling and qualitative data. Fanaras, 
Simitis’ pollster, conducted polls on political issues including the political and 
economic climate, government and opposition popularity, government and opposition 
popularity across specific policy domains, party preferences and voting intentions, the 
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leadership standing of the prime minister and the leader of the main opposition party 
as well as the political image of all party leaders (Fanaras, 2009: interview with the 
author). Apart from his own surveys Fanaras, as Pantagias has illustrated, was also 
analysing opinion polls published by the media (2009a: interview with the author). 
Polling data seems to have exerted a great amount of influence on the elaboration of 
the Prime Minister’s political strategy. For example, according to associates, Simitis 
relied on the opinion polls to choose candidates for the 2002 local elections (Fanaras, 
2009: interview with the author; Pantagias, 2009a: interview with the author). 
Furthermore, as Simitis has admitted, in the summer of 2003 based on focus group 
findings, he decided to reshuffle his government and his party in order to improve 
their performance (Simitis, 2005: 474-475). Another example that underlines this 
point was his decision to resign from the party leadership a few months before the 
parliamentary elections of 2004, handing over to Papandreou. As Simitis has noted, ‘I 
asked for three different polling firms to examine the impact of a prospective party 
leadership change in public opinion and especially on voting intention’ (2005: 592-
593). In particular, Simitis appeared to have collaborated not only with the polling 
firm Metron Analysis, but also with the polling company Kappa Research and the 
French opinion survey organisation Sofres. As Kroustalli (2007) has pointed out:  
‘in December 2003, Sofres conducted a poll asking the public ‘which candidate do you 
consider the best for the job of the Greek Prime Minister?’, in which  Papandreou scored 78 
per cent approval, while Simitis received 46 per cent. (...) In a nation-wide survey conducted 
by Metron Analysis, to the question ‘with whom of the following leaders do you think PASOK 
is more likely to win the next election?’, Simitis’ score was 35.9 per cent and  Papandreou’s 40 
per cent. In the voting intention section, PASOK, led by Papandreou, with a 33.9 per cent score 
was ahead of ND, which gathered 32.6 per cent (..) In the survey, to the question ‘with which 
of the following leaders do you think PASOK is more likely to win the next election?’, Simitis 
received 31 per cent and Papandreou 39.2 per cent’. 
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As a result, on January 7 Simitis announced his intention to resign from the post of 
party leader. In a ‘live’ televised address from the Office of the Prime Minister, he 
explained the reason for his decision to step down, stating that: 
‘A party and a government should be renewed. And the leader of the government and the party 
should be the bearer of renewal. With the renewal, a party gains force, dynamics, ideas and 
skills. A modernising party must seek more than any other its renewal and to apply in practice 
the promise of renewal (..) PASOK has prominent executives. It has executives with the 
knowledge, experience and ability: Leading executives, which are able to meet the challenges 
of the new era, to handle difficult situations. Up to now, they have handled difficult situations 
and have proven that they can do this very well. They have gained recognition in our society, 
and in the international public opinion. Proof of it is the Greek Presidency of the European 
Union’ (Simitis, 2004). 
Papandreou was finally elected leader of the Socialist party in February 2004, four 
weeks ahead of the national elections (Papathanasopoulos, 2007: 138; Simitis, 2005: 
592-593). 
In terms of the impact of opinion polling on policy plans, it seems that Simitis used 
polling data in order to shape the communication of those major policy initiatives, 
which he was most interested in. For example, during his first term, Metron Analysis 
conducted opinion surveys on the prospective Greek entry into the EMU framework 
and, during the second term, conducted polling about the European Presidency of 
Greece extending from January until June 2003. As Fanaras claims, ‘when [Simitis] 
took over in 1996, he asked me to conduct a poll on the question whether Greece 
should enter the EMU or not. The answers given by the public pointed to three 
different preferred time periods [for Greece to enter the EMU framework] and were 
classified accordingly’ (2010: interview with the author). 
However, Simitis did not use polling evidence to shape other policy reforms. This is 
because the model of leadership that he exercised was to some extent decentralised. 
Each minister was responsible for the formulation of his policy and communication 
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(Simitis, 2005: 455, 600-601; Kousoulis, 2009: interview with the author). As Fanaras 
has suggested, ‘the government did not operate as a whole entity. I conducted polls for 
the prime minister, but many other ministers had their own pollsters with whom they 
collaborated’ (2009: interview with the author). Yet, Fanaras adds that ‘Simitis 
monitored opinion polls on reform initiatives that caused widespread resistance among 
public opinion, organised interests, political opposition and rebel deputies of PASOK, 
because he needed to deal with the political crisis at hand (2009: interview with the 
author). Such was the case of the educational reform in 1999 or the big strikes 
organised by the trade unions against the social security reform. In general, as Fanaras 
claims, ‘in Greece even now pollsters are hired to conduct surveys on political rather 
than on policy issues. Sometimes, though, in the case of Simitis’ administration policy 
polls had been asked for. However, most policies would start to be implemented 
without prior [communicational] preparation’ (2009: interview with the author). 
 
2.5 The central motto in Simitis’ permanent campaign  
Simitis sought to modernise PASOK in an effort to formulate the Greek version of the 
‘Third Way’ to social democracy combining the seemingly contradictory concepts of 
social solidarity and market economy. As he stated in 1996: 
‘The future of socialism in the next century requires a great synthesis of the principles of 
equality, social justice and freedom (...) Belonging to the left does not mean to defend 
privileges. Left policy is all about struggling to modernise the economy in order to ensure 
that the country will be able to survive in the era of globalization. Left policy means to use 
market mechanisms in order to achieve social democratic goals like equality, social security 
and social cohesion’ (Simitis, 2002: 158-159). 
 
In particular, attempting to revise his party’s ideology Simitis sought to draw a line 
between the party’s present and its past, which was identical to the ideology of its 
founder Andreas Papandreou. According to Featherstone and Kazamias, ‘Simitis is 
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now redefining the party’s ideology along the lines of its counterparts elsewhere in 
Europe (...) struggling to reconcile social democracy with economic liberalization and 
global market challenges’ (1997: 163). Practically, Simitis’ ‘modernisation project’ 
was seen as a ‘package of economic, social and political reforms defined by their 
liberalizing character’ (Featherstone, 2005: 225). At the core of the plan was the idea 
that Greece has to dedicate itself to entering the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) and converging with the economic and social standards of the European Union 
(Kazakos, 2010: 79; Simitis, 2005: 39; Voulgaris, 2008: 128-129).  
 
Simitis expressed his political goal using the motto of a ‘Strong Greece which will be 
treated as an equal by the other European states (..) [and] will be turned into a modern 
state with sustainable growth, social solidarity and administrative efficiency’ (2002: 
159). The label of ‘Strong Greece’ was seen as the key message of Simitis not only 
during the election campaign of 1996 but also throughout his first term in the 
premiership (Kazakos, 2010; Reppas, 2010: interview with the author; Pantagias, 
2009: interview with the author; Voulgaris, 2008).   
 
Greece’s entry into the EMU was regarded as the primary goal during Simitis’ first 
term. As a result, he implemented a series of austerity measures, including spending 
cuts and tax increases, aimed at reducing the public deficit and inflation and meeting 
the Maastricht criteria as laid down in the European Treaty (Kazakos, 2010: 79, 83; 
Nikolacopoulos, 2005: 277). At the same time, he promoted partial privatisation 
schemes and large-scale reforms in local government and education, in order to 
modernise public administration and public services (Kazakos, 2010: 85-92; 
Georgiadis, 2005; Hlepas, 2003).  
 
This kind of innovative government policy caused an unprecedented reaction in its 
scope by vested interests, powerful social groups, trade unions, the opposition parties 
and even some parliamentarians of the ruling party. For example, in November 1996 
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farmers engaged in a four-month strike, accompanied by roadblocks, as they sought 
tax breaks and a rescheduling of their debt payments (Simitis, 2005: 324 - 329). In 
1998, Simitis faced the resistance of mayors, party officials, local organised interests 
and MPs of the ruling party who had turned against the plan for the restructuring of 
local government, the so-called ‘Capodistrias plan’. The promoted bill anticipated the 
merger of small municipalities into larger ones and the devolution of power from the 
central administration to local government institutions (Hlepas, 2003; Kazakos, 2010: 
87-88). Moreover, in 1998, teachers of the secondary-level education engaged in a 
two-month strike against the government’s austerity measures, while in 1999 teachers 
and students demonstrated for months against the upcoming reform of the educational 
system (Georgiadis, 2005: 8; Rapti, 1999). The social unrest and the political 
opposition appeared to cause significant political damage to the government. PASOK 
was defeated in the local government elections in 1998 (Simitis, 2005: 504) and the 
European elections of June 1999 to Kostas Karamanlis and the New Democracy party 
(Karakousis, 2006: 34; Loulis, 2007: 307).  
However, Simitis did not deviate from his policy course, managing to keep public 
attention focused on the goal of Greek entry into the Eurozone. For instance, in the 
case of farmers’ demonstrations, as Fouskas has argued, Simitis refused to satisfy their 
demands, ‘since any concession made on debts or taxes would have been at the 
expense of the state’s fiscal performance, and would hence further delay Greek entry 
into the EMU’ (1998: 135). In March 1999, during the fifth convention of PASOK, 
two months before the European elections, Simitis set the tone for the upcoming 
electoral debate by repeating that the goal of his party ‘is a strong PASOK for a Strong 
Greece. (..) That goal of ours, to succeed in creating a Strong Greece is being defined 
around a set of preconditions: A strong economy. A strong society. Social cohesion 
and social solidarity’ (2002c: 176). In addition, he put emphasis once more on the 
issue of getting Greece into the EMU as a prerequisite for the modernisation of the 
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country arguing that ‘our entry into the EMU is the first major step towards creating a 
strong Greece’ (2002c: 182). 
Similarly, the national objective of securing Greece’s entry into the Eurozone was 
regarded as the driving force behind the promotion of the whole reform package as 
well. For instance, according to Hlepas (2003), ‘modernising forces, supported 
through processes of Europeanisation, could overcome the resistance of traditionalist 
elements against territorial restructuring, mainly formed within the lines of 
conservative and communist parties, but also existing inside the ruling socialist party’. 
Simitis’ persistence on his policy course in combination with the high growth rate, 
thanks to public investment and the absorption of the European Structural Funds 
(Kazakos, 2001: 486; Voulgaris, 2008: 130), the effective management of the 
earthquake crisis in September 1999 (Loulis, 2004: 24-27) and the premier’s personal 
public approval, improved government performance. As a result, Simitis called for 
snap parliamentary elections on the 9
th
 of April 2000 (Loulis, 2007: 307). 
During the election period, Simitis placed himself at the centre of the campaign while 
the central slogan of the PASOK’s election campaign was ‘we are creating the new 
Greece, the future has begun’ (Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 131). PASOK managed to 
defeat the centre-right party of New Democracy by a margin of 1.1 per cent 
(Nikolacopoulos, 2005: 277). Simitis was re-elected Prime Minister by taking 43.8 per 
cent of the votes and 158 seats, while Karamanlis took 42.7 per cent and 125 
parliamentary seats (Featherstone, 2005: 227; Nikolacopoulos, 2005: 277). 
In the aftermath of the 2000 election, Simitis having achieved the entry of Greece in 
the EMU initiated a new modernisation plan to reform the labour market, the health 
care system and the social security in order to achieve the convergence of Greece with 
the European living standards (Kazakos, 2010: 99). Given the reform priorities, he 
appointed close associates of his as members of the Council of Ministers (the Greek 
Cabinet). Tassos Giannitsis, former economic advisor to the Prime Minister, was 
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appointed Minister of Labour and Social Security. The former Minister of Interior 
Alekos Papadopoulos, who had promoted the reform of local government, was 
appointed Minister of Health (Papadimitriou, 2005: 387-388; Simitis, 2005; 654-655). 
In addition, he attempted to promote the ‘Convergence with Europe’ (Loulis,2004: 
155) as his new vision as well as his new slogan for the second term stating that after 
four years of efforts ‘Greece is strong, The Greek economy is strong (..) Yet there is a 
lot to be done’ adding that ‘our primary goal is to improve the living standards of all 
Greeks in order to achieve the convergence with the European living standards’ 
(Simitis, 2000).  
However, Simitis’ government strategy in the second term was seen from most 
commentators and close associates as one lacking a clear goal and a clear message 
(Karakousis, 2006: 359; Karzis, 2006: 181; Loulis, 2004: 282-287). One of the reasons 
was that the reform initiatives were not implemented. There are several explanations 
for this failure, including: an intra-party rebellion, the resistance of powerful pressure 
groups which had strong links with PASOK, the reaction of the political parties of the 
opposition and the discontent of considerable segments of public opinion. All of them, 
to a more or lesser degree, rejected the proposed reform initiatives as neo-liberal 
(Kazakos, 2004: 909-912) and thereby achieved the framing of the debate in their 
favour. The labour market reform ‘was widely regarded as failing to address [its] key 
weaknesses’ (Papadimitriou, 2005: 382). The health care reform was modified largely 
(Mossialos & Allin, 2005: 431-432). The social security reform was completely 
blocked in the face of large demonstrations organised by the trade unions associated 
with PASOK (Kazakos, 2010: 98-107; Lyrintzis, 2005: 251; O’Donnell and Tinios, 
2003: 268-269). The only area in which governmental policy was considered to be a 
successful one was in the field of public security, with crime rates reaching a record 
low and the members of the infamous left-wing terrorist group ‘November 17’ being 
arrested after decades of trying (Karakousis, 2006: 399-408; Loulis, 2004: 141).  
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Nevertheless, in September 2003 a few months ahead of the 2004 national elections 
Simitis made an effort to reignite his plan to promote the convergence of Greece with 
the European standards. In a press conference held in Zappeio Mansion, he presented a 
new, solid political programme called the ‘Convergence Charter’, which would 
include specific economic and social policy targets for the next four years like high 
growth rates 2-3 per cent over the average growth in the European Union and the 
reduction of the unemployment at the 7 per cent up to 2006 (Kazakos, 2010: 124-125). 
Yet the ‘Convergence Charter’ failed to switch the agenda and to send a clear and 
convincing message to the public opinion, since it was seen as hardly credible 
(Kazakos, 2010: 125; Loulis, 2007: 313-314).  
 
2.6 Simitis’ public appeals  
The fifth component of the permanent campaign strategy consists of public appeals. 
The latter is a key component of the election campaign as well. As 
Papathanassopoulos has pointed out, ‘in the 1996 elections Simitis adopted new forms 
of campaigning like nationwide “bus-tour”, precinct walks, and televised debates with 
the main opposition leader, TV interviews and only one major rally in Athens (2007: 
130). Moreover, nationally televised debates are considered as significant as any other 
media event. The first, ever, televised debate between the party leaders of PASOK and 
ND, Simitis and Evert respectively, took place during the 1996 national election 
campaign, in September 1996. The second debate between Simitis and Karamanlis, 
Evert’s successor in the ND’s leadership post, was held during the 2000 general 
elections (Papathanassopoulos, 2002: 62-65). Simitis’ campaign tactics and especially 
his participation in these debates contrasted clearly with the political and 
communicative style of the late Andreas Papandreou who ‘had refused to participate 
in televised debates with his then opponents, citing personal dislike’ 
(Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 133). 
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Once in office, Simitis continued to use campaign-like tactics in order to get his 
message across. Following Kernell’s approach (1997), Simitis as Prime Minister 
delivered both major and minor public  addresses adopting new forms of campaigning 
(see Appendix B).  He gave two televised interviews that were broadcast ‘live’ both by 
the national broadcaster and simultaneously by private television networks. The first 
television interview was held in March 1997 and was conducted by journalists from 
the public broadcasting company EΡT and the private television stations Mega 
Channel and Ant1 TV. The second was given in the middle of the second term, in 
April 2002, to journalists from the public television network NET and the private 
television networks Mega Channel, Ant1 TV, Alpha TV and Star Channel. 
Furthermore, from January to June 1999 Simitis gave four televised interviews. He 
appeared twice on the political talk show Time of Truth on the Ant1 television network 
on the 25
th
 of January and on the 10
th
 of June; he also appeared on The Black Box talk 
show on Mega Channel on 25
th
 of February and on the public television network NET 
on the 1
st
 of June. In addition, Simitis appeared on The Protagonists talk show on the 
public broadcasting network on 5 June 2002. Moreover, among the major addresses of 
Simitis were interviews to the national press and magazines as well as signed 
newspaper articles mainly on European policy issues. 
Apart from major addresses, Simitis also devoted a considerable amount of time into 
making public appeals to special audiences and political journeys around the country 
for the promotion of his government’s policy (Mitropoulos, 2000; Simitis, 2005: 511). 
As Paschalidis notes, Simitis made public appearances at special events, prepared and 
organised by his communication staff, in order to make specific announcements on 
government initiatives, such as during the presentation of public works, visits to public 
services, schools and hospitals (2010: interview with the author). For example, in 2002 
Simitis went 24 domestic political tours outside Athens, delivering speeches in front of 
local audiences (see Appendix B). Some newspaper journalists regarded this tactic as 
an indication of a permanent campaign approach (Mitropoulos, 2000).  
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In the election campaign of 2000, Simitis was the first party leader who gave an online 
interview (Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 134). In the aftermath of the election, he was 
the first Prime Minister to make use of the new media, including the primeministerial 
website in 2002, in order to communicate his message directly to the people. The 
website imitated the form of a campaign pamphlet. It offered information on the 
activities of the prime minister and access to government services. It gave information 
about the Maximos Mansion where the Office of the Prime Minister is situated. It 
provided citizens with the ability to communicate directly with the prime minister via 
e-mail. It published a newsletter for children on the architecture of the 
primeministerial office and, finally it included a full list of primeministerial speeches, 
statements, articles, press releases and briefings. 
In spite of his frequent communication activity, it must be mentioned that the overall 
number of his major televised interviews was actually quite low. In the eight years of 
his tenure, he gave only eleven television interviews, four of which were during the 
election campaign of  2000, two during the second term and four during the first term 
(especially during the first half of 1999). The apparent unwillingness of Simitis to give 
more televised interviews may be attributed to his poor communication style. Simitis 
was never regarded as a telegenic politician with rhetorical skills (Featherstone, 2005: 
227; Loulis, 2007: 298; Pretenteris, 1996; Protopapas, 2010: interview with the author; 
Reppas, 2010: interview with the author). Another reason, why Simitis gave only few 
televised interviews is related to his own perception that this communication activity 
exerts a weak impact on public opinion, because it fails to shift the focus of public 
attention on the real issues and political substance (Simitis, 2011: interview with the 
author).  
A third reason is related to his intention to distance himself from the every-day 
process of communication. Αccording to Kousoulis: 
‘Simitis preferred to communicate his message in a more structured and complete way, and in 
my opinion, his preference was correct. He preferred giving speeches in Parliament and at 
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press conferences, and in general, he wanted to be part of a more elaborate communications 
frame. He would avoid the drop-in appeals and sound-bites. He wanted to keep his distance 
from the mass media and he achieved that. I think it was to his benefit’ (2009: interview with 
the author).  
 
Hence Simitis delivered several speeches at party conventions, made numerous 
parliamentary addresses,  especially during the so-called ‘Hour of the Prime Minister’ 
when he gave responses to specific questions posed not only from the leaders of the 
political parties that belonged to the opposition but also from members of all 
parliamentary groups (Simitis, 2005: 491). All of these public appearances received 
coverage both by public and private television and radio networks. At this point, it 
should be noted that from 1999 onwards the official television channel of the Greek 
Parliament covered the transmission of parliamentary speeches and debates
2
 as well.  
Simitis also gave several press conferences in several occasions, such as his address to 
the foreign correspondents corps in Athens, after each of the European Council 
meetings in Brussels as well as in the context of the annual International Trade Fair in 
Thessaloniki (Simitis, 2005: 511). Public and private television and radio networks 
broadcast the latter simultaneously. As Pantagias has pointed out, the press 
                                                             
2 The Television Station of the Hellenic Parliament is operating since 1999 as an autonomous 
television network, a non-profit mass medium. Administratively, it is an organic unit of the Hellenic 
Parliament placed hierarchically under the Speaker of the Parliament. (...) Within its mission the 
Station of the Parliament has as the main content of its Program the broadcasting of all the sittings of 
the Plenum, the Standing Committees  (previously recorded), the Recess Section of the Parliament 





conferences gave Simitis the opportunity to explain in plain and convincing words, his 
policy (Pantagias, 1998: document obtained by the author).  
In parallel, most of his advisors shared the view that the domestic political trips or 
visits (minor addresses) inside and outside Athens were the best tactic for Simitis to 
deliver his message and communicate his policies (Pantagias, 2009: interview with the 
author; Protopapas, 2010: interview with the author; Reppas, 2010: interview with the 
author). The travels across the country were usually planned in response to an event 
such as opening hospitals, highways and public works in general. In this way, Simitis 
strengthened his image as the one of an effective leader who produces work while 
being close to the people, since he even visits them in their homes (Ηitiris, 2010: 
interview with the author; Pantagias, 2009: interview with the author).  
 
2.7 The impact of Simitis’ permanent campaign  
In terms of the impact of Simitis’ campaigning style of governing on his popularity, a 
review of the primeministerial public appearances demonstrates a considerable and an 
extensively consistent attempt on his part to woo public opinion. According to 
empirical evidence (see Table 1), Simitis delivered both major and minor addresses. 
Yet, it appears to have put more emphasis on minor addresses, including speeches 
delivered in front of special audiences inside Athens, as well as political trips 
throughout the country. In this section, the study explores the effect of Simitis’ 
intensive campaigning throughout on his public approval his tenure. It is achieved by 
examining whether a correlation exists between the number of cumulative major 
public addresses and the popularity ratings, as well as between the number of minor 
public addresses and the primeministerial popularity ratings on regular basis. The 
major and minor primeministerial appearances are considered the independent 
variables, while the primeministerial popularity is considered the dependent variable. 
As it has already been mentioned, correlation does not imply causation. Even if very 
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strong relationships occur between two variables, their observed relationship might be 
attributed to a third, unknown intervening variable. However, correlation means that 
changes in one variable are related to changes in another variable or that variables co-
vary together and as a result it is possible to infer about the impact between them on a 
theoretical basis.  
 
In this case, the findings suggest that both major and minor addresses constituted the 
weakest strategy to persuade the public. In particular, the results indicate that there is a 
negative and little, if any, association (Pearson: - 0,018) between major addresses and 
primeministerial approval, which is also statistically insignificant (sig.: 0,927). Yet, 
between the minor addresses made by Simitis and his popularity there is a weak-
moderate positive correlation (Pearson: 0,433) which is also statistically significant 
(sig.: 0,024). Although there is no relationship between the major appeals and the 
Simitis’ popularity, it can be concluded that there is a relationship between the number 
of minor public appeals made by Simitis and his public approval ratings and this 
finding is not just the result of chance alone since it is statistically significant. 
However, the strength of the relationship is weak - moderate. Furthermore, although 
the impact of minor addresses appears to have been stronger than the impact of major 
addresses on Simitis’ approval ratings, the overall effect of the permanent campaign 
on his approval is weak. 
Consequently, Simitis’ campaign activities mostly failed to influence positively his 
public approval ratings. Moreover, it failed to sustain public approval given that the 
latter was not consistent over time. From February to October 1997 Simitis’ popularity 
was over 55 per cent. In February 1998 it dropped to 50 per cent and until May 1999 it 
remained below 50 per cent. Nevertheless, in September 1999 it started climb again, 
reaching 58 per cent and remaining close to the level of 60 per cent up to the 
parliamentary elections of April 2000. From the election day until October 2000 the 
primeministerial public approval rating showed a slight fall (54 per cent) until its sharp 
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decline in March 2001 (48 per cent), staying at a level below 50 per cent until 
September 2001. Yet, as of November 2001, his public approval rating rose again 
exceeding the 50 per cent and remaining at that level until Simitis’ resigned from the 
party leadership in January 2004. Given the weak effect of primeministerial appeals to 
the public, the ups and downs of Simitis’ personal approval may be attributed to other 
factors, in line with the relevant empirical studies in the US and UK literature. Hence, 
it is apparent that other independent variables or other factors affected and predicted 
the primeministerial popularity. Even though the examination and analysis of other 
factors influencing the primeministerial popularity exceeds the scope of this study, 
chapter six discusses to a certain extent possible explanations for the evolution of 
Simitis’ public approval. Among the contributing factors are the issues dominating 
public agenda, the state of the economy, internal or external crises and government 
performance. 
 




Overall PM Approval 
(%) Major Minor 
Feb '97 55 11 3 
Apr '97 59 6 9 
June '97 55 3 4 
Oct '97 61 8 2 
Feb '98 50 8 2 
 Apr '98 45 3 0 
Jun '98 46 8 2 
Nov '98 47 9 18 
Feb '99 45 6 5 
May '99 46 11 2 
Sep '99 58 10 16 
Nov '99 54 2 6 
Feb '00 63 6 14 
Mar '00 59 3 8 
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Apr '00 58 14 14 
Jun '00 51 10 6 
Oct '00 54 3 3 
Mar '01 48 8 5 
May '01 42 3 0 
Jul '01 45 9 0 
Sep '01 48 3 3 
Nov '01 54 7 1 
Feb '02 52 13 3 
Jul '02 49 23 9 
Nov '02 52 7 6 
Mar '03 52 5 0 
Jun '03 51 5 1 
 
Sources: Metron Analysis polls and Prime Minister’s webpage 
 
 
Table 2: Simitis’ popularity ratings 1996-2004 
 







Prime Minister Simitis followed the permanent campaign trend. He expanded the 
political communication structures of the Prime Minister’s Office and collaborated 
with communication experts, mainly pollsters and strategists, even if some of them 
were not affiliated to the party. He used polling data in order to shape his political 
strategy rather than to formulate his government policy and presentation. He used a 
campaign-like message as a motto of his government policy during his first term; 
however, he failed to formulate a label for his policy plan in the second term. Apart 
from the use of traditional public appeals, such as parliamentary addresses and 
speeches at party events and press conferences, Simitis exploited television and the 
internet in order to get his message across and mobilise public support, although he 
did not rely on this kind of communication quite so often. He preferred to give minor 
addresses while on (numerous) domestic political trips. Finally, despite his continuous 
effort to woo public opinion, his public appearances hardly affected his 
primeministerial approval ratings, something that suggests that other factors exerted 












Chapter 3  
 
The permanent campaign of Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis 
 
Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis followed the permanent campaign strategy more 
clearly than his centre-left predecessor did. He sought to enhance the efficiency of the 
communication machinery in order to ensure the smooth coordination of government 
communications. Political journalists and strategists dominated not only his election 
campaign staff, but also his government communication staff. He relied heavily on 
opinion polls and especially on focus groups in order to make political decisions. He 
made several direct public appeals, particularly live televised addresses from the 
Primeministerial Office, to get his message across. During his first term he applied the 
technique of formulating campaign-like message, which was used repeatedly as a 
motto to promote his government plan, while he failed to do so during the second 
term. In addition, as findings suggest, even though he delivered several public 
addresses in an effort to influence public opinion in his favour, he failed to exert 
considerable influence on popularity ratings. Consequently, it may be appropriate to 
consider that other factors affected his primeministerial popularity.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section one discusses Karamanlis’ political 
background. Section two addresses the function of the government’s communication 
apparatus. Section three analyses the role that communication professionals played in 
the Karamanlis’ communication team. Section four examines the use and impact of 
polling upon governmental strategy and policy. Section five explores the extent in 
which Karamanlis used campaign-like messages throughout his tenure. Section six 
outlines the public appeals of Karamanlis. Section seven measures and interprets the 
impact that Karamanlis’ campaigning efforts had upon his public approval.  
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3.1 The political background of Karamanlis 
 
Karamanlis is a member of a political dynasty. He was the nephew of the founder of 
the New Democracy party and former Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis, who 
governed the country for seven years from 1974 to 1980 before being elected 
President of the Hellenic Republic. Karamanlis junior served in the ideological sectors 
of the party from 1984 to 1989. In the general election of 1989, he was elected 
Member of Parliament for the Thessaloniki district. In the aftermath of the second 
consecutive defeat of ND by PASOK in the parliamentary election of 1996, 
Karamanlis put forward his candidacy for the party’s leadership, backed by the 
traditional, conservative, right-wing faction of ND, which represented the majority of 
the party’s MPs.  
He managed to get elected president of the party, defeating his rivals who were 
prominent and experienced party cadres, such as the former leader of the party 
Miltiadis Evert, the moderate George Souflias who was backed by the liberal faction 
within the party, and the ultra-conservative Byron Poludoras (Loulis, 2011: 148-150). 
The decision of the party’s electorate to vote for Karamanlis was seen as related to his 
personal image (Loulis, 2011: 152). More specifically, as Pappas and Dinas have 
noted, ‘at election time, Karamanlis was young (in his forties) and inexperienced 
(never having held any ministerial post); on the other hand, he was not personally 
burdened by the negative aspects of his party’s past’ (2006: 421).  
On taking over as leader, Karamanlis saw himself confronted with two crucial 
challenges: to repair the damaged image of New Democracy and to unify the party in 
order to overcome the divisions brought about by the intra-party election process. 
Restoring the party’s image meant in concrete terms that Karamanlis would embark on 
an effort to open up New Democracy to the centre of the political spectrum so as to 
attract the median voter needed to secure victory in a new parliamentary election. At 
the same time, Karamanlis while being in opposition appeared to have implemented a 
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form of permanent campaign strategy. First, soon after his rise to the party leadership 
in 1997, he created ‘a small, in-house team of communication experts and political 
analysts to whom he entrusted the planning of ND’s future strategy (...) [and] the 
party’s electoral campaigns in both 2000 and 2004’ (Pappas and Dinas, 2006: 489). In 
addition, in the aftermath of 2000 national elections, Karamanlis appointed the 
political journalist Rousopoulos as party’s spokesperson who reorganised the whole 
communication apparatus of the party, setting up a mechanism of media monitoring 
and a digital archive (Kottakis, 2011: 327). More specifically, as Rousopoulos has put 
it: 
 
‘I formulated four communication groups. The first group, consisting of 7-8 people, was 
responsible for the creation, management and function of the digital archive of the party. The 
archive was filled with statements and speeches of the PASOK’s government officials that 
could enable the Leader of the New Democracy party and ND’s deputies to counterattack 
governmental arguments easily. The second group consisted of 7-8 people as well and was 
acting as the media-monitoring unit of the party’s communication apparatus. It monitored all 
TV and radio news broadcasts and the collected material was categorized based on specific 
coding, allowing for the issues to be identified as relating either to the New Democracy party 
whilst being in Opposition or to the respective Ministries whilst Karamanlis and ND were in 
power. The third group comprised of speechwriters and former journalists, responsible for the 
elaboration of communication documents entailing the party’s policy positions on all issues. 
These documents were written in a journalistic language, yet with a political logic, and were 
sent to the ND’s deputies in the Greek Parliament, ND’s MEPs, party officials around the 
country and political journalists. Thus, everyone was aware of the party line. The fourth 
group, consisting of two people, was placed in the Press Office. These officials were 
responsible for reading the newspapers early in the morning and writing summaries of the 
press (press reviews)’ (2012a: interview with the author).  
 
In parallel, Karamanlis sought to exert centralised control over party’s 
communications, coordinating the message communicated by party officials. As 
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Rousopoulos explains, during the period of opposition, he organised a seminar in 
Athens for the party cadres in the region in order to inform them of the communication 
policy of the party and the way this would work (2012a: interview with the author). 
According to the new communication policy, all of the party organisations around 
Greece would receive daily communication material with the positions of New 
Democracy concerning all possible issues. The material was also given to all MPs and 
all Members of ND in the European Parliament and to all reporters. In a way he 
ensured that most, if not all of the party members, were transmitting the same message 
(Rousopoulos, 2012a: interview with the author).  
Second, Karamanlis collaborated with communication professionals. A striking 
example of a communication expert assisting him was the strategist John Loulis, who 
is perceived as the architect of the middle-ground strategy applied by Karamanlis in 
order to modernise his party’s image (Yannas, 2001: 7). Loulis was political analyst 
and communication strategist as well as co-owner of the consulting firm STR (Chiotis, 
2007c; Loulis, 2004: 15). Additionally, Loulis he was a political columnist in the 
leading Greek economic daily Imerisia and centre-right daily Eleftheros Typos, while 
between 1981 and 1996 he published articles in the Wall Street Journal. He has also 
published several books, analysing Greek politics and particularly the political 
strategies applied by the main Greek parties PASOK and ND as a means to take over 
and maintain power. He derived the empirical material from opinion surveys and 
mostly focus groups he had himself conducted. 
Even though he had served as director of the centre-right think tank, Center of 
Political Research and Information, which appeared to have links with the New 
Democracy party, presented himself as an independent expert. In his book The end of 
a dominance: How and why PASOK lost the elections (published in 2004), he states 
that ‘my participation as a technocrat in the strategic communication of ND is well-
known. However, it is also well-known that I have never been a party member and I 
do not seek to involve myself in party politics’, adding that he had analysed Greek 
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politics ‘from a centrist political perspective which represents [my] views’ (2004: 15). 
Moreover, in a 2007 interview to the newspaper To Vima, Loulis noted that ‘I am an 
independent political analyst and technocrat in the communication sector. I am trying 
to express my views freely and soberly’ (Chiotis, 2007c).    
Another example of communication professional in Karamanlis’ staff was, as it is 
said, the political journalist Theodoros Rousopoulos serving as party’s spokesperson 
for four years (2000-2004). Rousopoulos was a prominent and experienced political 
journalist who had worked for 17 years in leading national newspapers, such as the 
centre-right Mesimvrini and Sunday Kathimerini and the left-leaning Sunday 
Eleftherotypia, at the radio station Athens 98.4, on the national television network 
Mega Channel, presenting the weekly talk show 7+7, and on the national television 
network Star Channel (Ravanos, 2008a; Rousopoulos, 2012a: interview with the 
author). Rousopoulos was also regarded as a party outsider given the fact that he 
became a party member in 2001, a year after taking over the ND’s press office 
(Ravanos, 2008a). This is one of the reasons, why his appointment gave rise to 
widespread criticism from right-wing cadres, partisan press and pro-conservative 
political journalists. The latter saw him as a ‘foreign body’ within ND, accusing him 
of having criticised the government of ND in the period 1990-1993 in his capacity as a 
journalist as well as of having left-leaning affiliations (Kottakis, 2011: 329). Another 
reason might be related to the fact that Rousopoulos assumed a prominent post within 
the party, exercising power next to Karamanlis, without being a ND deputy or even a 
party figure.  
However, Karamanlis insisted on his choice. According to George Kurtsos, prominent 
journalist and editor-in-chief of the conservative newspaper Eleftheros Typos, 
Rousopoulos was in fact a choice of Vardis Vardinogiannis. The latter is a powerful 
entrepreneur – owner of oil industries, banks, shipping companies and media, such as 
the national newspaper Mesimvrini, the nationwide television network Star Channel 
and main stakeholder of the nationwide television station Mega Channel, who 
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appeared to have close ties to the New Democracy party (2003: 231-233). However, 
even though Rousopoulos had worked for the media owned by Vardinogiannis, it is 
hard to claim that he was suggested or selected by the media baron for the position of 
party’s and government’s spokesman. The most probable scenario is that Rousopoulos 
was chosen, as Loulis has suggested, because he fitted in with the middle-ground 
strategy since he was considered a moderate personality, appealing to the centrist 
voters who Karamanlis needed in order to increase his electoral prospects (2004: 320). 
Given that the majority of the Greek media were left-leaning, it could well be assumed 
that Karamanlis needed a professional journalist with work experience in those media 
in order to improve ND’s relations with media owners and ensure a positive or at least 
less negative coverage.  
The third component of Karamanlis’ permanent campaign as opposition leader was the 
use of opinion polling and focus groups to formulate party strategy. Based on an 
analysis of opinion polls and focus group findings, Karamanlis’ strategist, Loulis 
argued that from the 1990s onwards a large part of left-leaning voters had abandoned 
socialist and statist policies and had shifted to the centre of the political spectrum, due 
to the collapse of ‘real socialism’, the subsequent erosion of ideologies and the 
weakening of party identification (2001: 57; 2007: 280). However, as Loulis adds 
(2007: 344, 349-357), middle-ground voters are not liberals. They are pragmatists who 
reject traditional ideological cleavages between right and left and/or liberalism and 
socialism. In addition, they disapprove of partisan polarisation and verbal extremities 
and they advocate policies that combine free market principles with social cohesion. 
They put emphasis on the leaders’ personality, assessing them according to their 
efficiency and credibility and favouring a moderate political and rhetorical style. Since 
that ND was perceived by public opinion as a right-wing and socially insensitive 
party, it had to radically change its image in order to appeal to the middle-ground 
voters and become electable after having suffered two consecutive electoral defeats in 
1993 and 1996 (Pappas and Dinas, 2006: 482). As Loulis put it, ‘ND was a faded 
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product’ (2007: 307) that had been tested during the past 20 years and was rejected in 
most cases.  
 
In line with his consultants’ suggestions and the insights obtained through the analysis 
of polling data, Karamanlis put in place a middle-ground strategy aimed at 
modernising the party’s image and reaching the median voter. He projected ND as the 
party of the ‘middle ground’ standing above the left-right cleavage, abandoning the 
loaded terms ‘right-wing’ and ‘centre-right’ and putting emphasis not only on policies 
of economic efficiency, but also on a number of social issues, such as healthcare, 
education, social security and public security (Pappas and Dinas, 2006: 484). His 
attempt was to renew ND’s political platform and to achieve the necessary synthesis of 
liberal and socialist policies. According to Loulis:  
 
‘Acting strategically, Karamanlis implemented his own triangulation (like Clinton and Blair), 
at the same time abandoning the Right-Left continuum and moving towards a moderate and 
pragmatist middle ground. As a result, both the terms ‘Center-right’ and ‘liberal’ were 
abandoned (...) The triangulation of Karamanlis, avoiding all ‘-isms’, allowed him to credibly 
combine a socially conscious profile with free market principle’ (2007: 330-331).   
 
Karamanlis also attempted to deliver a consistent with his strategy message, which 
was repeated throughout his tenure as opposition leader. At the 7
th
 National 
Convention of ND in December 1998, for the first time he stated that, ‘New 
Democracy is the party of the middle ground (..) having distanced itself from the 
ideological cleavages of the past and the old-fashioned political labels’ (quoted in 
Bratakos, 2002: 795-795). At the Extraordinary Congress of Principles and Positions 
of March 2000 he repeated that ND is ‘the calm power of the middle ground that 
represents liberalism with a human face (..), [it] can embrace all citizens and through 
dialogue, it can produce a synthesis of divergent positions’ (Bratakos, 2002: 863). 
Furthermore,  in the run-up to the 2004 general election in an interview with the 
Financial Times, Karamanlis sought to strengthen the centrist image of the party by 
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making a bold statement that ND is ‘definitely not a right-wing party’ (cited in Loulis, 
2004: 316).  
 
Consistent with the ‘middle ground’ strategy and his effort to alter ND’s negative 
right-wing image were Karamanlis’ public appearances, the fifth element of non-stop 
campaigning. In particular, he portrayed himself as a human and sensitive leader, who 
cares about real people and is willing to solve problems related to people’s everyday 
lives, in order to persuade the electorate that ND is a moderate party more sensitive 
than PASOK (Loulis, 2004: 317; Pappas and Dinas, 2006: 491). As a result, in his 
public addresses, Karamanlis focused on issues like healthcare, education, social 
security, unemployment and public security. Especially, after the 2000 election, he 
made sudden visits to hospitals and public agencies in order to attract media and 
public attention to their problems, as a way to dominate the media agenda and thus 
generate negative publicity for the government (Kottakis, 2011: 327; Loulis, 2004: 
131).  As Rousopoulos has illustrated: 
‘A few months after assuming duties as party spokesman, around December, I realised that 
whatever we did, whatever political initiative, we were taking, the national TV and radio 
networks, except for the public broadcasting, did not pay any attention, probably due to the 
fact that the PASOK’s government enjoyed high popularity. So I suggested an alternative 
communication strategy to Karamanlis that aimed at bypassing the big media and at 
promoting our messages. First, we sought to have meetings and contacts with regional media. 
Second, we planned sudden visits to hospitals, schools and public agencies in order to set the 
media agenda by focusing public attention on the problems of everyday life, emphasizing the 
‘human face’ of both the party and Karamanlis as well as generating negative publicity for 
the Simitis’ administration’ (2012a: interview with the author). 
 
Another communication tactic applied by Karamanlis, during the 2004 election 
campaign, involved town hall meetings. As Rousopoulos notes, Karamanlis conducted 
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meetings with various social groups like youth, women, farmers and entrepreneurs in 
an attempt to come closer to the citizens (2012a: interview with the author).   
At this point, it should be noted that the ‘middle ground’ strategy produced results, 
given that ND won both the local elections of 1998 and the European elections of 
1999. In addition, even though it lost the 2000 general election by 70,000 votes, it 
managed to increase its vote share by 5 per cent, gaining 7 per cent of the middle-
ground voters (Loulis, 2007: 307-308). In the aftermath of the election, Karamanlis, 
staying true to the same course, altered ND’s image by persuading public opinion – 
according to opinion surveys and focus groups – that the party had shifted to the centre 
(Loulis, 2004: 126-127). As a result, ND won the local elections of 2002 and the 
national election of 2004, taking 45.4 per cent of the vote to 40.5 per cent secured by 
PASOK and 165 seats compared to 117 for the socialists (Kassimeris, 2004: 943; 
Nikolacopoulos, 2005).  
 
Once in office in 2004 Karamanlis continued to implement the permanent campaign 
strategy. As Pappas and Dinas have pointed out: 
 
‘Whereas electoral campaigns were previously seen as last-ditch efforts to enhance an already 
tarnished party image, now they simply became the peak points of a continuous strategy 
designed both carefully and a long time ago. Today, with ND in government, the core of the 
same team is still in place, and coordinates the party strategy with a view to the next elections, 
and beyond’ (2006: 490). 
 
 
3.2 Government institutions of public outreach 
Once in government, Karamanlis continued to use party’s communication apparatus. 
The latter continued to function in an auxiliary capacity to government communication 
including four communication groups: the group of people responsible for the 
management of the party’s digital archive, the unit of media monitoring, the group 
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consisted of speech-writers and former journalists responsible for the elaboration of 
communication documents entailing the government’s policies in order to provide all 
party and government officials with the government line on all issues and the group of 
former journalists members of the Press Office responsible for the preparation of the 
daily press reviews (Rousopoulos, 2012a: interview with the author).   
In parallel, Karamanlis put emphasis on the function of the primeministerial 
communication apparatus. He retained the Press Office inherited by Simitis while he 
reorganised the communications machinery aiming to impose a centralised control and 
coordination across the different ministries resembling the centralised control having 
imposed in party’s communications as opposition leader. An indication of centralised 
communication was the dissolution of the Ministry of Press and Media and the 
establishment of the General Secretariat of Information as well as the General 
Secretariat of Communication under the supervision of the Primeministerial Office 
and particularly the Minister of State (Law No. 3242/ 2004).  
Another indication of centralisation was that the Minister of State, replacing the 
Minister of Press and Media, acted not only as governmental spokesperson, but also as 
primeministerial spokesperson taking also responsibilities of the Press Office. He took 
on activities such as coordinating government communications collaborating with 
ministers on communication issues, doing the daily media briefings, providing 
background information to the political correspondents, handling the relations of the 
Prime Minister with the press and media owners, preparing the major communication 
initiatives of the Prime Minister, participating in the political planning and acting as 
the link between the Prime Minister and ministers (Chiotis, 2004a ; 2007a; Kottakis, 
2011: 326; Rousopoulos, 2012a: interview with the author). Also, Karamanlis 
strengthened the primeministerial communication apparatus by creating the position of 
Deputy Minister of State, who would act as government spokesman towards the 
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foreign press and media, mainly on European policy issues (Antonaros, 2012b: 
interview with the author; Ravanos, 2007a).  
After the 2007 national election, Karamanlis appointed another Deputy Minister of 
State as second government spokesperson in charge of the daily press briefings on 
minor governmental issues (Ravanos, 2007a). However, following the autumn 2008 
government reshuffle, Karamanlis abolished the posts of Deputy Ministers of State, 
retaining only the Minister of State in his double capacity as primeministerial and 
government spokesman (Antonaros, 2012b: interview with the author). The 
competences of the Secretary General of Information and Communication were 
transferred to the Minister of Interior (Ravanos 2008a). At the same time, Karamanlis 
kept in place the Press Office, mainly responsible for supporting the communication 
initiatives of the Prime Minister.   
Centralised control over governmental communication was held to be a prerequisite 
for ensuring the effective coordination of government policy across departments. The 
effort to achieve this goal was evident in the functioning of the communication 
machinery. Every day at 07.00 a.m. the Minister of State, the Deputy Minister of State 
and the Secretary General of Information held a meeting with the heads of the 
ministerial press offices in order to shape the government communication agenda of 
the day and to coordinate the public statements of each ministry so as to ensure that 
none would be off-message. 
 In addition, government ministers were encouraged to appear on the morning news 
programmes on television and radio in order to defend the position of the government 
on issues related to their ministerial responsibilities. According to Rousopoulos, 
mainly these programmes were influencing the public agenda, so if the government 
managed to get its own messages into those programmes, it could influence public 
debate for the rest of the day (2012b: interview with the author). Moreover, Prime 
Minister Karamanlis had instructed ministers to avoid media appearances that were 
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irrelevant to their responsibilities in order to ensure that the government transmitted a 
coherent public message (Antonaros, 2012b: interview with the author; Kottakis, 
2011: 327; Rousopoulos, 2012a: interview with the author).  
After this meeting, the Minister of State worked with his own communication advisory 
team on shaping communication policy and on developing ways of presenting 
government policy. The team consisted of the Deputy Minister of State, the Secretary 
General of Information, the Secretary General of Communication, government 
officials and party cadres with communication experience in day-to-day politics 
(Rousopoulos, 2012a: interview with the author). Following this meeting, at 10.00 
a.m. Prime Minister Karamanlis had a meeting with his communication staff, 
composed of the Minister of State, the Deputy Minister of State, and the Head of the 
primeministerial Press Office and the Chief of Staff of the Maximos Mansion. The 
meeting’s goal was to form the communication tactic of the day as well as to plan the 
long-term communication strategy of the administration.  
During the Olympic Games, Karamanlis had established the so-called Crisis 
Management Committee, which included the Minister of State, the Deputy Minister of 
State, the Secretary General of Information, the Secretary General of Communication, 
the press officer of the Foreign Affairs Ministry as well as the aides of the Ministers of 
State (Ravanos, 2007a). The Crisis Management Committee was summoned one more 
time during the election period of 2007 in order to handle the Peloponnese forest fires 
crisis (Ravanos, 2007b).  
At this point, it should be noted that the centralisation of government communication 
seemed to be feasible due to Karamanlis’ dominance within his party and the 
subsequent lack of powerful intra-party opposition (Loulis, 2004: 125). He became 
party leader at the party congress of 1997, taking almost 70 per cent of the votes, 
although he faced three strong rivals – Evert (ND party leader up to 1996), Souflias 
(prominent and experienced party figure backed by the liberal wing of ND) and 
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Poludoras (representing the ultra-conservative faction within the party) (Kottakis, 
2011; Voulgaris, 2008: 248). Moreover, the electoral victories in the 1998 local 
elections and the 1999 European elections as well as the marginal defeat of 2000 
reinforced Karamanlis’ position within the party. As a result, he managed to impose 
not only party discipline, but also communication discipline upon the party cadres 
(Loulis, 2004: 125).     
 
3.3 The role of communication experts 
Turning now to the second element of Karamanlis’ permanent campaign, the 
communication professionals who dominated the Karamanlis’ staff in opposition years 
and the 2004 election campaign, followed him into office dominating the 
primeministerial staff as well. Loulis, strategist of Karamanlis in opposition, followed 
him in office conducting and analysing focus groups in order to provide consultancy 
services on matters of political strategy, policy and presentation (Chiotis, 2007c; 
Loulis, 2004: 15). According to Karamanlis’ close aides, Loulis did not attend the 
communication staff’s meetings, instead had private meetings with Karamanlis on a 
weekly basis, during which he mainly presented focus group findings and suggested 
political initiatives (Antonaros, 2012b: interview with the author; Rousopoulos, 2012a: 
interview with the author). Apart from Loulis, Dimitris Mavros, pollster and general 
director of the polling organisation MRB, continued to provide Karamanlis with 
opinion surveys and analysis of focus group throughout the primeministerial tenure 
(Kottakis, 2011: 176, 304).    
Rousopoulos, who was appointed as Minister of State and government spokesperson 
in March 2004, was forced to resign from his ministerial post in October 2008. The 
reason was that  he appeared to have been involved in a scandal over a shady land-
swap deal between a Mount Athos monastery, called Vatopedi, and the Greek state 
(Roussopoulos seems to have been somehow connected to the head of the monastery 
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Mr. Efraim) (Chiotis, 2009a ; Ravanos, 2008a). Other former political journalists who 
joined the primeministerial communication apparatus were Evangelos Antonaros 
serving  as Deputy Minister of State (2004-2008) and Minister of State (October 2008-
September 2009) as well as Kostas Gioulekas, Deputy Minister of State (September 
2007-October 2008) and Deputy Minister of Interior responsible for the media issues 
(October 2008-September 2009) (Chiotis, 2009a). Antonaros was employed for many 
years as a foreign correspondent in Europe, the Balkans and the Middle East on behalf 
of the media organisation Axel Springer Verlag AG. In addition, he served as President 
of the Correspondents of Foreign Press from 1994 to 2004. Gioulekas was a political 
journalist for 27 years working for the newspapers Vradini, Macedonia, Thessaloniki, 
the local radio station FM 100 and the local television network TV 100 (Ravanos, 
2007a).  
Rousopoulos, in his capacity as Minister of State, was considered to have been highly 
valuable to Karamanlis. The communication management of an environmental and 
state crisis, which occurred during the election campaign of 2007, serves as an 
indication of the significant role Rousopoulos played within the primeministerial staff. 
On the 24
th
 of August, seven days after Karamanlis had called early elections, 
protracted forest fires broke out in the Peloponnese (Southwestern Greece), burning 
half-a-million acres of land, destroying numerous villages and causing more than 70 
deaths (Dinas, 2008: 603; Gemenis, 2008: 97). Not surprisingly, the Prime Minister 
faced heavy criticism and came under scrutiny over his response to the fires, given that 
the public discussion focused on the state’s incapacity to reduce the extent of the 
catastrophe, something that brought about fury and disappointment among the 
electorate.  
At the time of the crisis, Rousopoulos was not in charge of the election campaign as he 
had been back in 2004, having resigned from the spokesperson’s post. His resignation 
was attributed to the electoral law, according to which election candidates are allowed 
to make only a limited number of media appearances, and unlike in 2004 Rousopoulos 
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was now putting himself forward as a candidate for the Greek Parliament. However, 
once the crisis occurred, Karamanlis asked Rousopoulos to resume his position as 
government spokesman, asking him to take over news management and shifting him 
to the so called ‘ballot of State’ in which, under the electoral law, candidates are 
allowed to make an unrestricted number of media appearances (Kottakis, 2011: 180).     
Once back in office, Rousopoulos replicated the model of the Olympic Games, doing 
daily press briefings and calling all the heads of the ministerial press offices to attend 
them (Ravanos, 2007b; Rousopoulos, 2012a: interview with the author). In addition, 
he convened on a daily basis the Crisis Management Committee in order to coordinate 
government communications across ministerial departments. The daily briefing 
received ‘live’ coverage from national television networks, radio stations and 
websites, dominating the news agenda. Moreover, Rousopoulos made numerous 
public appearances on television channels and radio talk shows, defending the 
government’s management of the crisis, promoting policy initiatives aimed at helping 
the victims of the forest fires and contributing to the improvement of the government’s 
performance. Consequently, it is safe to assume that he managed to improve the 
government’s image after the chaos that followed the forest fires (Kottakis, 2011: 
180).  
Loulis has also been considered as exerting significant influence on Karamanlis’ 
political strategy. For instance, at the beginning of Karamanlis’ first term in 2004, 
Loulis came to realise that prime ministers should form their governments very 
carefully in order to avoid frequent and sweeping reshuffles, which would damage 
rather than improve the government’s image (2004: 327). Moreover, Loulis argued 
that ‘in case one or more ministers perform poorly, they must be replaced without an 
overall reshuffle taking place. We know that, every reshuffle confirms to the public 
that the government has failed in bringing about “impressive changes” and “new 
beginnings” ’ (2004: 328).  
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Karamanlis appeared to have followed Loulis’ advice, since he reshuffled his 
government only twice during his five-year tenure (2004-2009). The first reshuffle 
happened in February 2006, introducing changes to the top echelons of five 
departments, including Foreign Affairs, Defence, Labour, Public Order and 
Macedonia-Thrace, leaving,  however, the rest of the ministerial posts unchanged. The 
second reshuffle took place in January 2009 and even though it was more extensive 
than the previous one, it was marked by targeted changes in the Ministries of Finance, 
Development, Education and Public Order (Loulis, 2011; Triantafillou, 2009). In 
addition, even in the Karamanlis’ administration, which was formed after the 2007 
elections, ministerial changes were limited and targeted at particular departments, 
while retaining the same political executives in the Ministries of Finance, Interior, 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Public Works.  
Another example of Loulis exerting considerable influence is related to the decision of 
Karamanlis to call snap elections in 2007. In an interview with the newspaper To Vima 
on 22
nd
 of April 2007, a year before the scheduled national elections of 2008, Loulis 
pointed out that:  
‘the upcoming elections must be related to the state of the economy in which public opinion is 
mainly interested. Thus, it is the PM’s responsibility to decide to call for elections before or 
after the budget’s approval by Parliament [according to the Greek Constitution, the government 
budget receives parliamentary approval in December] (..) yet I have to stress that if the 
elections are taking place in October or November, this will not be seen as a sign of early 
elections by public opinion’ (Chiotis, 2007a). 
 
After all, on the 17
th
 of August 2007 in a live televised address from the Maximos 
Mansion Karamanlis stated that ‘formulating the new budget (..) requires a fresh and 
strong mandate, a strong parliamentary majority’ (Karamanlis, 2007). As a result, the 
early elections were set for the 16
th
 of September 2007, ahead of the budget approval 
vote (Gemenis, 2008: 96).   
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3.4 The use of polling 
Just as Simitis had done, Karamanlis monitored and used opinion surveys extensively, 
not only in Opposition and the election campaigns, but also during his governing 
tenures, in order to steer strategy, policy and presentation. Monitoring included not 
only polls published in the media, but also private polling. In collaboration with the 
polling firm MRB and the pollster Mavros, Karamanlis was informed in a systematic 
and regular way about the polling figures regarding voting intentions, expected 
electoral outcomes, views on current affairs, the preferences of the electorate and 
which leader would make the best Prime Minister (Chiotis, 2004b; 2006a; 2009b; 
Kottakis, 2011: 304). Karamanlis and his aides appeared to put great emphasis on the 
polling figures for primeministerial popularity, primeministerial job approval and 
suitability for the premiership post. The focus on those particular aspects was 
connected to the belief of Karamanlis’ advisors that the Prime Minister was the most 
important political asset of New Democracy. As Loulis has suggested, voters make 
their decisions based mainly on leaders’ personalities and Karamanlis had been 
evaluated as better qualified for the job than Papandreou, according to the leadership 
assessment poll figures as well as polls regarding the performance of the economy 
(Chiotis, 2007c: Loulis, 2007: 342-344).   
Yet, unlike Simitis, Karamanlis also relied heavily on focus groups. In cooperation 
with the polling firm MRB, the consulting firm STR and the strategist Loulis, 
Karamanlis monitored on a weekly basis the focus group data as well as analysis 
concerning government image, primeministerial image, policy initiatives and 
particular issues like the impact of scandals on government’s image (Antonaros, 
2012b: interview with the author; Kottakis, 2011: 148, 176). Furthermore, as 
Rousopoulos has noted, Karamnalis used polling evidence to assess of the candidates 
for the post of the President of the Hellenic Republic. In addition, Karamanlis appears 
to have used focus groups in order to shape political strategy, to make policy decisions 
and to decide the timing of political initiatives and public statements as well as to 
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frame messages to be communicated to the public (Chiotis, 2007b; Kottakis, 2011: 
304). For example, as Rousopoulos has put it ‘we often use the findings of the focus 
groups in order to create policies, especially for those social groups where New 
Democracy had a low popularity rate, for example women’ (Rousopoulos, 2012a: 
interview with the author). 
The emphasis placed on focus groups dated back to the opposition years. As it has 
been previously stated, Karamanlis attempted to modernise his party’s image by 
shifting it to the centre of the political spectrum in order to make it electable. The 
centrist strategy was largely based on the analysis of the undecided voters’ electoral 
behaviour through the conduct of focus groups (Loulis, 2001: 2007). It is therefore 
reasonable to claim that, given Karamanlis’ intention to follow the same centrist 
strategy once in office with the aim of increasing his prospects of re-election, he had 
to rely on the focus group mechanism. Furthermore, it is possible to argue that the 
Karamanlis administration, more clearly than any of its predecessors, was a poll-
driven government. As Dinas has put it, ‘ND under Karamanlis’ leadership was 
probably the only government in the Third Greek Republic that systematically devoted 
so much of its resources to retaining its primacy in public opinion (..) this was a 
government that was more concerned with getting re-elected than with governing. 
Although this might seem a somewhat cynical argument, it is based on ND’s excessive 
use of opinion polls during all this period’ (2010: 397). 
The impact of polls and focus groups was evident in various cases of government 
policy and presentation. First, the selection of candidates for the local elections of 
2006 was based on voters’ preferences as indicated by various polls. Second, the 
selection of the next President of the Hellenic Republic was based on opinion surveys 
as well. Karamanlis tested the appeal of potential candidates from the centre-right and 
the centre-left of the political spectrum by exploring the features that the suitable 
nominee should possess (Rousopoulos, 2012a: interview with the author). Opinion 
polls indicated that Karolos Papoulias, senior party figure in PASOK, former Foreign 
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Affairs Minister and close ally of PASOK’s founder Andreas Papandreou, enjoyed 
high public approval ratings (Chiotis, 2004b). At the same time, focus group data 
suggested that Karamanlis had to insist on the middle ground strategy and for this 
reason to avoid a partisan nomination. Instead, he should opt for a politician that 
would represent national unity. In the end, Karamanlis chose Papoulias as his 
nominee, gaining the support of the main opposition party PASOK in the process 
(Loulis, 2008: 83-85). Third, it seems that Karamanlis, taking the focus group analysis 
into consideration, decided to put forward the economic policy applied in 2004 in 
order to reduce the fiscal deficit in the form of a ‘mild fiscal consolidation’, since 
voters of the middle ground who had backed New Democracy in the previous 
elections disliked harsh austerity policies (Loulis, 2007). 
Fourth, according to Kottakis, in the case of the reform of universities during the first 
term of Karamanlis’ government, the National Council of Education initiated the 
discussions on the reform plan in January 2005. Giannakou, Minister of Education, 
promoted the policy plan in Parliament in July 2006, which brought reactions from 
students’ unions and, to some extent, university staff unions (2011: 142). At that point, 
Karamanlis decided to postpone the plan until March 2007, not only because of the 
reactions, but also due to the fact that the focus group data indicated that public 
opinion did not think that a broad exchange of views between government, political 
parties, academics and students had taken place. Therefore, the necessary societal 
consensus on carrying out the reforms was lacking (Loulis, 2008: 186-187). 
 
However, it should be noted that poll findings and focus groups did not always 
determine governmental policy. For example, towards the end of 2005, at a time when 
the government sought to privatise public corporations, over 60 per cent of public 
opinion backed the privatisation scheme. Yet, privatisations were not carried out in 
large part. As Loulis has suggested, most of the government officials and party cadres 
claimed that trade unions in the state-owned companies were well-organised 
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coalitions, controlling large groups of voters that would act according to their 
interests; therefore, if ND were to turn against them, it would lose thousands of votes 
(2007: 262). Even if this is true, the majority of public opinion was still polarised of 
privatisations. Thus, the expected electoral benefits of carrying out the reforms could 
compensate by far the anticipated electoral losses. Consequently, Karamanlis had 
good reasons to stick to it.  
 
Nonetheless, he did not proceed with the reforms, due to six particular reasons. First, 
the political cost of clashing with organised interests, like public employees’ unions, 
was highly certain and immediate. On the contrary, the potential political benefits in 
the long term appeared, according to the opinion polls, to be uncertain. The majority 
of public opinion, which may favoured the reforms, does not form a solid pressure 
group or, to put it in Olsonian (1982) terms, constitutes a poorly organised majority. 
The second reason is related to the nature of trade unions, which, as it is said, are 
powerful, and well-organised pressure groups, able to organise demonstrations, resort 
to strike action and disrupt everyday life. In addition, unions tend to deliver a populist 
left-leaning rhetoric in order to defend their interests. A populist left-leaning rhetoric 
in a populist left-leaning country is quite popular. Trade unions are, therefore, capable 
of influencing or changing voters’ views about privatisations once a government 
decides to promote such schemes. Third, the former New Democracy administration 
(1990-1993) under Prime Minister Mitsotakis had attempted to promote privatisations, 
but had come up against widespread resistance from interest groups in the public 
sector, trade union leaders associated with PASOK and the majority of the Greek press 
(Kazakos, 2001: 473; Pagoulatos, 1994). The political costs suffered due to this 
struggle were largely perceived to have been one of the main reasons for the political 
defeat of ND in the national elections of 1993, with the party staying out of office for 
11 consecutive years until 2004 (Loulis, 2007: 282-284). Thus, the party’s past 
suggested the avoidance of a confrontational strategy against trade unions.  
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Fourth, New Democracy, in spite of being a centre-right party, had cultivated strong 
links to the trade union movement. Many MPs had secured their election thanks to the 
support of trade union members. They therefore had a stake in defending their 
constituencies. Fifth, the conservative, populist and statist wing of ND was 
majoritarian within the party, as compared with the liberal minority. Finally, as 
Antonaros noted, several party and government figures questioned the poll findings, 
expressing doubts over their credibility (2012b: interview with the author). 
Sometimes, as Wenzelburger has put it, ‘what counts instead is the way political actors 
perceive the risk of being punished and this perception might well be irrational’ (2011: 
1156). 
 
3.5 The central motto of Karamanlis’ permanent campaign     
During the 2004 national elections, Karamanlis communicated messages, which were 
used as labels in a repeated way throughout his campaign. For example, the central 
slogan of his advertising campaign was ‘the country needs political change’ 
(Alexandrou, 2007:10). Similarly, Karamanlis as Prime Minister sought to use 
messages, which had been formulated in campaign-like style, in order to symbolise his 
policy initiatives. The view of his close advisors was that he should communicate 
simple and short messages, which would be understood by all citizens (Rousopoulos, 
2012a: interview with the author). For the same reason obviously, according to 
Antonaros, Karamanlis’ speeches consisted of short sentences (2012b: interview with 
the author).  
In particular, in the aftermath of the election, he announced that he intended to 
reexamine the public finance figures. The move was seen as an effort by Karamanlis 
to reveal hidden spending, which added to the fiscal deficit and the public debt; but at 
the same time, he seemed to abandon some of his electoral promises (Dinas, 2008: 
602). In addition, it is safe to assume that by implementing the review on public 
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finances, the new government attempted to undermine the argument of the previous 
government, which had projected the country as a ‘Strong Greece’ (Kazakos, 2010: 
137). The financial audit revealed that the previous Simitis’ government had 
underestimated the fiscal deficit and the public debt. The deficit in 2003 had reached 
to 5.7 per cent and in 2004 had climbed to 7.5 per cent instead of the 1.7 per cent and 
1.2 per cent estimated by the previous government respectively (Kazakos, 2010: 138). 
As a result, the European Commission activated the process of excessive deficit 
supervision, coercing the Greek government to take fiscal measures in order to bring 
down the deficit to 3 per cent of GDP (Gemenis, 2008: 95). Karamanlis then sought to 
formulate a plan of gradual fiscal consolidation, avoiding fierce austerity measures, 
which would generate acute social discontent. To this end, he promoted his policy by 
using the label ‘mild fiscal adjustment’, which marked his first term (Kazakos, 2010: 
140-141; Loulis, 2008: 94-95). 
However, Karamanlis’ government was seen as lacking political direction. Opinion 
polls showed that he needed to define a coherent policy agenda and set a clear political 
goal beyond that of the consolidation of public finances (Loulis, 2008: 101). To this 
end, Karamanlis needed to promote a plan of widespread changes in the state and the 
economy. Based on polling data and focus groups evidence, Karamanlis used the term 
‘reforms’ in order to label his new policy plan. According to Loulis: 
 
‘Karamanlis needed a motto that would give him the advantage in political communications 
terms (..) Focus groups suggested that public opinion was in favour of changes yet with the 
minimum social cost (..) Public opinion wanted moderate and sensible changes (..) [In this 
context] the term ‘reforms’ was regarded as the most suitable instead of the term ‘structural 
changes’ or the term ‘cuts’ (2008: 108-109).    
 
Using this motto throughout his first term in office, Karamanlis put in place a reform 
plan. The latter included tax policy reform to reduce corporation taxes, tax breaks for 
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employees and pensioners, the privatisation of public corporations, the restructuring of 
public organisations, the deregulation of the labour market so as to encourage 
flexibility and reduce labour costs as well as the reduction of  bureaucracy to ensure 
the efficient operation of public administration (Kazakos, 2010: 146-149). Moreover, 
at the beginning of 2006 Karamanlis began the process for reforming particular 
articles of the Greek Constitution in areas such as education, the judicial process, the 
protection of the environment, the protection of ownership and the quality of public 
services and finally transparency in public life. The cornerstone of the plan was the 
amendment of article 16, which prevented the foundation of private universities in 
Greece
3
 (Kottakis, 2011). In the aftermath of the local elections, Karamanlis sought to 
keep public opinion focused on his reform initiatives. Hence, at the beginning of 2007 
he put forward to parliament the plan for the reform of Greek universities, which was 
passed in March 2007 amidst widespread student demonstrations (Loulis, 2008: 192-
193). Overall, Karamanlis managed to a certain extent to promote his reform 
initiatives and stick to his message, in spite of various corruption scandals that broke 
out throughout his first term generating negative publicity for the government and 
himself. (Dinas, 2008: 602; Gemenis, 2008: 95; Loulis, 2008: 133, 159-160). 
Therefore, towards the summer of 2007 he was about to set the terms of the election 
campaign by focusing public attention on the issue of reforms which was seen by his 
advisors as the strong card of the governing party (Loulis, 2008: 232).  
However, a few days after Karamanlis had decided to call early elections, an 
environmental crisis broke out with fires raging in the Peloponnese, devastating 
forests and villages and causing more than 70 human casualties. The immense 
environmental, financial and human devastation dominated the agenda and forced 
                                                             
3 Karamanlis promoted the idea of setting up and running under the supervision of the State- non-
governmental and non-profit universities as well as the establishment and operation of branches or 
departments of foreign State Universities or other recognized foreign institutions, in the same context 
and with exactly the same conditions (Kazakos, 2010: 150). 
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political parties to postpone their campaign activities (Dinas, 2008: 603). Initially it 
seemed that the political consequences of the crisis would be a fatal blow on 
government’s re-election prospects. Yet, the implementation of the restoration plan 
helped Karamanlis to switch the agenda, maintaining the lead of ND over PASOK. 
Eventually, he managed to win his second consecutive election by taking 42 per cent, 
4 percentage points ahead of PASOK. Due to the electoral system, ND enjoyed a 
marginal parliamentary majority of 152 out of 300 seats (Pappas, 2010). 
In the aftermath of his electoral victory, Karamanlis sought to continue the promotion 
of reforms using the same motto as the first term. In particular, he concentrated on the 
promotion of reform initiatives like the privatisations of state-owned corporations and 
the social security reform (Loulis, 2011: 208). Yet, he failed to keep his policy 
direction and stick to his core message due to a series of corruption scandals which  
attracted public attention and the need to take new austerity measures to bring down 
the deficit since the gradual fiscal consolidation strategy proved to be as unsustainable 
(Kazakos, 2010: 163; Loulis, 2008: 209-213).  
In addition, the breakout of the international financial crisis generated negative effects 
for the Greek economy deteriorating the banking system and consequently leading the 
economy into recession. In an effort to avert the deeper economic downturn, the ND 
government increased public spending (Kazakos, 2010: 165). Moreover, apart from 
the scandals and the financial crisis, the shooting and killing of a schoolboy in 
downtown Athens by a police officer initiated widespread riots throughout December 
2008. Quickly, riots spread to cities all over Greece and caused the destruction of 
public buildings, banks and retail shops while there were also extensive looting and 
violence against police officers. 
As a result, Karamanlis lost by 4 per cent the elections for the European Parliament in 
June 2009. On 3 September, Karamanlis called again for snap elections. He justified 
this action on two counts: the ongoing financial crisis and PASOK’s public pledge that 
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it would cause automatic elections in early 2010 by blocking the re-election of Karolos 
Papoulias as President of the Republic (Dinas, 2010: 390; Loulis, 2011: 230-232). 
Although these two reasons were plausible, it is safe to assume that another reason 
why Karamanlis pursued early elections was that his administration lacked the 
political capital to apply painful austerity measures and bold structural changes and 
furthermore he was afraid of causing huge political damage on his party. 
Karamanlis presented himself as the only one capable of dealing with the economic 
crisis by committing his government to three initiatives. Firstly, drastic reduction in 
public expenditure which included (among others) freezing the hiring of public 
employees for 2010, strict limitation of hiring for additional 2 years, freezing pensions 
and public sector wages, trimming for 2 years of the paid-overtime by 30 per cent. 
Secondly, the limitation of tax evasion and thirdly the application of large-scale 
structural changes (Pappas, 2010: 277). Karamanlis, eventually, lost the elections to 
PASOK and Papandreou by a wide margin of 10 per cent, taking only 33.5 per cent of 
the vote, the lowest in the party’s history in national elections. He thereafter resigned 
from the post of party leader (Dinas, 2010: 394; Loulis, 2011).  
 
3.6 Karamanlis’ public appeals 
During the election campaign of 2004, Karamanlis participated in the televised debate 
with his rival, leader of PASOK George Papandreou. Also, he gave TV and radio 
interviews, press conferences, campaigned around the country delivering speeches and 
he participated in town meetings, receiving media coverage (Alexandrou, 2007: 10-15; 
Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 133; Rousopoulos, 2012a: interview with the author). 
However, as Prime Minister, Karamanlis gave few media interviews and press 
conferences to get his message across with the exception of the campaigns in the 
national, local and European elections.  
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Rather he focused mainly on the use of unfiltered public appeals. Karamanlis preferred 
the live televised addresses, mainly on crucial domestic and foreign policy issues, 
from the Maximos Mansion to contact the Greek people. The live televised addresses 
were transmitted at 8 pm at a time that all television broadcast news in Greece is 
programmed and thus he could reach the largest possible audience. Αs Antonaros has 
put it, ‘the properly prepared statements from the Prime Minister’s Office can 
highlight the leader’s specific weight’ (2012b: interview with the author). 
Additionally, he delivered speeches in parliament, to the parliamentary group of the 
New Democracy party and the various party conventions, which received ‘live’ 
coverage from the television network of the Greek Parliament, from the public 
broadcasters as well as by the national television networks of the private sector. 
On the other hand, Karamanlis gave only those interviews that were imposed by 
institutional rules or political tradition. For example, the press conferences that 
European Heads of State and prime ministers usually give after the summits of the 
European Council or those that are given after the meetings of the Greek Prime 
Minister with other leaders during foreign travel. Another example is the annual press 
conference that traditionally follows the speech of the prime minister at the annual 
International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki. In terms of media interviews, Karamanlis 
gave very few, most of them during the election campaigns in the national and 
European elections (see Appendix C).  
One reason why Karamanlis preferred to make direct appeals to the electorate rather 
than mediated addresses to the public is based on two assumptions that he and his 
advisors shared. First, the political capital of government was dependent on 
Karamanlis’ image. As long as Karamanlis maintained his positive image, the New 
Democracy party could improve its chance to win re-election. As a result, the main 
goal of the government’s communication strategy was to protect the image of 
Karamanlis. Thus, he had to avoid media interviews and journalists’ pressing 
questions, while at the same time pursuing well-prepared and targeted public 
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appearances (Dinas, 2010: 397). As Antonaros has claimed, ‘appearing relatively 
infrequently helped Karamanlis to protect his credibility. Moreover, a prime minister 
expresses his views via his spokesman or through speeches in Parliament or through a 
handful of targeted public addresses because in that way he can better amplify his 
message’ (2012b: interview with the author).  
The second assumption was that some of his aides were seeing the political 
communication environment as centre-left leaning and thus hostile for a centre-right 
administration (Rousopoulos, 2012a: interview with the author). Therefore, following 
this communication tactic Karamanlis was able to control better the public agenda, 
avoiding the questions of political journalists who put more emphasis on politics and 
personalities rather than on policies and arguments. Thus, given the emphasis of 
Karamanlis on his public addresses to influence public opinion, a question is raised 
about the effectiveness of such strategy and more specifically the impact upon his own 
popularity.  
 
3.7 The impact of Karamanlis’ permanent campaign 
Similarly with Simitis, Karamanlis devoted great amount of time and energy to 
influence public opinion. Empirical evidence indicates that he did both major and 
minor addresses to get his message across, though data suggests he relied more on the 
former than the latter (see Table 3). As it is said, parliamentary speeches, public 
addresses to party conventions, press conferences, media interviews and public 
appearances to special and local audiences were among primeministerial public 
appeals. In this section, the research considers the public appearances of Karamanlis 
as an indicator of his permanent campaign strategy and compares the number of his 
public appeals with his popularity ratings on a regular basis. Therefore, the study 
particularly explores whether a correlation exists between the permanent campaign 
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and the primeministerial public approval. Certainly, the correlation does not indicate 
necessarily causation. Yet in the case of a weak correlation between the two variables, 
it would be apparent that other factors have exerted influence on the primeministerial 
popularity. 
 
The results from the analysis indicate that the continuing and consistent efforts of 
Karamanlis to affect public opinion through major and minor addresses failed to exert 
significant influence on his popularity. In particular, the findings show that there is a 
little negative, if any, relationship (Pearson: - 0,062) between the major addresses and 
Karamanlis’ public approval which is also statistically insignificant (sig.: 0,813). In 
parallel, there is a negative weak association (Pearson: - 0,296) between the minor 
addresses made by the centre-right premier and his popularity. The latter indicates that 
there is a relationship between the number of minor addresses and Karamanlis’ 
popularity ratings, yet this association is weak and statistically insignificant (sig.: 
0,248), namely it occurred by chance.  
 
As a result, Karamanlis’ permanent campaign mainly failed to sustain public approval, 
given that the latter was not steady over the years. From May 2004 to February 2005 
Karamanlis’ public approval was between 60 and 69 per cent. In June of 2005 it 
declined to 57 per cent and remained below 60 per cent for six months. In March 2008 
primeministerial approval ratings decreased to 48 percent, while by the end of 2008 
they rose again to 52 per cent. However, from November 2008 to July 2009 they 
dropped sharply to 43 per cent before increasing again at the beginning of the election 
campaign of September 2009.  
Since the permanent campaign has hardly affected the primeministerial popularity of 
Karamanlis, it is likely to claim that other forces shaped the premier’s approval 
ratings. As stated, exploring these forces is beyond the goal of this study, despite an 
effort to examine the case of Karamanlis from this point of view. Assuming that the 
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popularity of Karamanlis was affected more by the content of his communication 
activities, the issues on which he made statements and the frame he used rather than 
his communication activities themselves, it is possible to offer some explanations 
related to the government initiatives and the issues, which dominated the public 
agenda. 
 
Table 3: Public approval of Karamanlis and primeministerial major and minor 
addresses to the public 
Date 
Overall PM 
Approval (%) Major Minor 
May '04 69 12 0 
Nov '04 66 19 12 
Feb '05 60 16 8 
Jun '05 57 16 9 
Nov '05 55 21 5 
Mar '06 55 11 5 
June '06 54 10 8 
Dec '06 57 20 5 
Mar '07 53 3 4 
Jun '07 52 8 11 
Dec '07 52 25 22 
Mar '08 48 9 3 
Jul '08 48 21 9 
Nov '08 52 11 3 
Mar '09 42 26 7 
Jul '09 43 15 23 
Sep '09 51 1 1 
 
Sources: Metron Analysis polls – Webpage of ND 
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Table 4: Karamanlis’ popularity ratings  2004 -2009 
 
Source: Metron Analysis and ND’s webpage 
 
Conclusion 
In line with his predecessor in the premiership, Karamanlis pursued the permanent 
campaign strategy. He sought to restructure the communication apparatus in order to 
ensure centralised control over government communication and to impose coherence 
in the content of messages across government departments. He appointed 
communication professionals to the posts of press spokespersons and consulted 
frequently with strategists and pollsters. Karamanlis also relied on polls and 
particularly focus groups to make important political decisions. He successfully 
labeled his government policy during his first term, ye he failed to do so in the second 
term. Finally, Karamanlis delivered public addresses to get his message across, mainly 
through ‘live’ televised appeals and unfiltered major and minor appearances rather 
than media interviews. However, as findings indicate, the primeministerial public 
addresses barely affected primeministerial popularity, which suggests that other 
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factors exerted influence on his popularity. Next chapter analyses the permanent 





















Chapter 4  
 
The permanent campaign of George Papandreou 
 
In line with his predecessors, George Papandreou, who served as Prime Minister for 
two years from October 2009 until his resignation in November 2011, adopted the 
permanent campaign strategy with the intention of sustaining his personal popularity. 
Papandreou attempted to reorganise the communication units of the Primeministerial 
Office in order to improve the coordination of government communications. He 
collaborated with communication professionals like journalists and pollsters who had 
strong political affiliations with PASOK. He used private polling to steer government 
policy and its presentation, which was conducted by the party apparatus. He made a 
modest attempt to formulate and use campaign-like messages as mottos throughout his 
tenure. In the beginning of his tenure, he continued to use his election campaign motto 
and even though from February onwards he diverted into a complete different policy 
course, he still made an effort to use the same communication technique. Papandreou 
also made numerous public appeals, especially major ‘live’ televised addresses and he 
gave several interviews to foreign media. However, his public appeals failed to exert 
significant influence on his popularity ratings meaning that other factors may have 
affected the primeministerial approval figures.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section one discusses the political 
background of Papandreou. Section two examines the communication institutions of 
the PASOK government. Section three addresses the role of communication experts. 
Section four focuses on the use of private polling as a means to shape government 
strategy, policy and communication. Section five analyses Papandreou’s effort to 
communicate his message in a campaign-like mode. Section six outlines the public 
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appearances of Papandreou as means to vindicate his policy approach. Section seven 
assesses and interprets the impact of Papandreou’s permanent campaign on his public 
approval ratings.  
 
4.1 The political background of George Papandreou 
As in the case of Kostas Karamanlis, George Papandreou is a member of a political 
dynasty. His father, Andreas Papandreou, was the founder of PASOK and Greece’s 
Prime Minister for eleven years, from 1981 until 1989 and from 1993 up to his 
resignation in 1996. Moreover, the grandfather of George Papandreou, Georgios 
Papandreou, also served as Prime Minister in 1944 and from 1963 until 1965. George 
Papandreou entered Greek politics in 1981 as a PASOK deputy in the Achaea district. 
From 1981 onwards, he held several ministerial posts. He served as Deputy Minister 
of Culture in 1985, as Minister of Education in 1988, as Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, as Minister of Education in 1994, as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (for 
the second time in 1996) and, finally, as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1999 to 
2004.  
Although a son of the founder of PASOK, on more than one occasion he expressed 
opinions deviating from and sometimes being even at odds with the party line. For 
example, Papandreou declared himself polarised of private radio stations and non-
public universities that would operate on a non-profit basis. He also defended minority 
rights, he was polarised of the decriminalization of the use of soft drugs and supported 
the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey as the only viable route towards 
securing peace and prosperity (Pappas, 2010: 77; Lakopoulos, 1999). Another 
example of Papandreou distancing himself from his father’s legacy is related to his 
stance in the party congress of 1996, which elected the new leader of PASOK after the 
death of Andreas Papandreou. Papandreou backed Costas Simitis, even though the 
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latter was largely perceived as being the most prominent intra-party rival of his father 
(Featherstone, 1997: 159; Pretenteris, 1996: 117). 
In January 2004, Simitis resigned from his post as party leader announcing that he 
would not run for Prime Minister for a third consecutive term, backing instead George 
Papandreou as the new president of PASOK (Kassimeris, 2010: 944). Although 
Papandreou faced no internal rivals during the intra-party election process, which took 
place in February 2004, he introduced the process of open primaries for the election of 
party leader. One million people, members and friends of the party, participated in the 
process that would culminate in the election of the new leader of PASOK (Pappas, 
2008: 181; Spourdalakis & Tassis, 2006: 503). In the election campaign, Papandreou 
sought to project himself as a new leader, not hesitating to clash with the negative 
aspects of the recent past, to transform his party and to promote radical changes in the 
whole country (Kassimeris, 2010: 945).   
However, a combination of reasons weakened the image of Papandreou and PASOK, 
including financial scandals that occurred at the beginning of the election race, 
accompanied by the apparent failure of Papandreou to send a clear message to the 
electorate regarding his policy plans (Loulis, 2004: 240-253). Moreover, the structure 
of the ballots added to the notion of confusion within the electorate. The reason was 
they included politicians originating from the neoliberal right like Stefanos Manos and 
Andreas Andianopoulos (former Ministers of ND’s governments under Mitsotakis’ 
premiership) as well as the post-communist Left such as Mimis Androulakis and 
Maria Damanaki (fierce opponents of Papandreou’s father, Andreas Papandreou in the 
past) (Loulis, 2008: 265-270). The image of the party was largely negative due to the 
eleven years in government, marred by persistently high unemployment and inflation. 
As a result, the personal appeal of Papandreou was undermined (Kassimeris 2010: 
946-950) and he did not manage to reverse the nationwide electoral trend. He lost the 
general elections to the New Democracy party under the leadership of Kostas 
Karamanlis by approximately 5 per cent (ND: 45.4 per cent; PASOK: 40.4 per cent). 
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In the aftermath of the election, Papandreou continued to lack a clear political strategy 
to deal with the ND government and Karamanlis. As Dinas has suggested: 
 
‘from an early period of ‘friendly opposition’, combined with the appointment of new people 
in the party’s key positions, he gradually resorted to a polarising strategy which needed the old 
generation of the party’s political staff in order to be  implemented properly. Neither strategy 
was very successful, and in combination with his rather evident deficiency in rhetorical skills, 
especially by comparison with his relatively charismatic, in these terms, opponent, it comes to 
no surprise that during the whole inter-election period the lead of ND was never seriously 
challenged’ (2008: 602-603). 
 
Hence, on the 16
th
 of September 2007, Papandreou was defeated for the second 
consecutive time by Karamanlis taking 38.1 per cent of the vote to 41.8 per cent for 
ND. On the night of the elections, Papandreou accepted responsibility for the second 
consecutive electoral defeat, though preparing the ground for the organising of an 
open primary and going public with his intention to ask the members of the party to 
renew their mandate for him. A few minutes after Papandreou’s statement, Evaggelos 
Venizelos, prominent party figure as well as former Minister in Andreas Papandreou’s 
and Costas Simitis’ governments, immediately declared that he would put forward his 
candidacy, thereby challenging Papandreou’s leadership. Two weeks later, another 
prominent party figure and former Secretary of PASOK, Kostas Skandalidis, also put 
forward his candidacy for the post of party leader (Gemenis, 2008; Loulis, 2011: 223-
226).  
As Dinas has noted, ‘early opinion polls among PASOK voters showed that Venizelos 
was in an advantageous position. Initially, important members of the party, who had 
been marginalised during the previous period, declared their support for the new 
candidate. Venizelos had also secured the support of almost all party-friendly media as 
well as the discreet but meaningful backing of the previous PASOK leader, Kostas 
Simitis (2008: 606). However, Papandreou reversed the trend and managed to be re-
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elected as party leader. In the intra-party election set for 11 November 2007, 
Papandreou took 55.9 per cent of the votes, while Venizelos stood at 38.2 per cent and 
Skandalidis at 5.7 per cent (Dinas, 2008: 607-607; Gemenis, 2008: 99-100; Loulis, 
2011: 222-224).   
 
One factor accounting for Papandreou’s victory was related to the existing model of 
party leadership selection. In a recent study, Lehrer (2012) claims that political parties 
respond to the median voter when office-motivated party members dominate the 
leadership selection, while they respond to the core supporters when the policy-
motivated rank-and-file members dominate the leadership selection. Therefore, it is 
possible to argue that office-motivated members tend to vote for the candidate who 
appears to be the most capable of winning elections while the policy-motivated core 
supporters tend to vote for the candidate who appears to be the most capable of 
securing party unity and ideological clarity as preconditions for the return to power.  
 
In the case of the intra-party elections of 2007, PASOK had run open primaries; the 
members and friends of the party had directly selected i.e. the leader of PASOK 
(Gemenis, 2008: 99). During the intra-party election campaign, the demarcation line 
between the two main candidates was clear. Venizelos projected himself as the most 
able to beat Prime Minister Karamanlis and bring PASOK back to power, while 
Papandreou set as a precondition for PASOK’s return to power the ideological 
renewal of the party (Dinas, 2008: 607). Bearing in mind what has been previously 
stated, it may be appropriate to consider that Papandreou’s plan rather than Venizelos’ 
better reflected the intra-party electorate’s priorities. As Simitis has pointed out, the 
election process of the leader straight from the party-base always works polarised of 
the populist faction inside the party and polarised of its representatives, such as 
Papandreou; having that in mind, if your name is Venizelos then you have no chance 
of winning (2010: interview with the author).    
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In the case of PASOK, the party had been out of power for only three years. Yet, its 
percentage vote share had not only fallen since the 2004 national elections, but had 
been the lowest since 1989 (Nikolacopoulos, 2005). Thus, in spite of the particularity 
of the leadership selection procedure, Venizelos could have won the intraparty 
election given that, as opinion polls suggested, at the beginning of the race, he had a 
clear lead over Papandreou and he was seen as the most capable of defeating 
Karamanlis and restoring PASOK to power (Gemenis, 2008: 99). Venizelos failed, 
because Papandreou’s main argument in defence of his candidacy was that the causes 
of PASOK’s electoral defeat lay with certain party officials and the left-leaning media 
that had undermined his leadership.  
 
This approach was regarded as credible due to three reasons. First, Venizelos went 
public with his intention to be a nominee right after Papandreou announced his 
decision to renew his leadership mandate. Venizelos’s move, as well as the fact that on 
the same night certain prominent party cadres announced that they would back him, 
was seen as a premeditated act. Second, on 17 September, a day after the 
announcement of the nominations, the nationwide television network Mega Channel 
and the GPO survey organisation published an opinion poll showing that Venizelos 
trailed Papandreou by 20 per cent in the intra-party race. Papandreou and his aides 
disputed the poll as unreliable, because it was conducted only one day after the 
announcement of the candidacies for the leadership of the party. Third, on September 
18 the leading centre-left newspaper To Vima openly called in its front page for 
Papandreou to resign from the party leadership (To Vima, 2007).  
 
In response to this, Papandreou in a televised address on 18 September turned against 
the newspaper and the media, arguing that: 
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‘We are on a collision course with those who want to dictate policies or enforce certain 
persons, as if they can bypass the will of the Greek people. We aspire to be politically 
independent. I will be loud and clear. Noone can manipulate PASOK’ (Papandreou, 2007). 
 
A few days later, the leading columnist of the newspaper To Vima, John Pretenteris, 
answered Papandreou’s accusations in his article: 
 
‘Journalists, newspapers and the media in general are obviously not political parties in order to 
be able to elect leaders or to choose the type of the election process. Our obligation is to 
publish our opinions, our views, our analysis, our comments, with which each reader or viewer 
or listener could agree or disagree, but the content of these statements cannot always be in 
agreement with each reader/viewer/listener’ (Pretenteris, 2007). 
 
However, Papandreou managed to set the terms of the debate in his favour. As Dinas 
has put it, this incident seemed to offer Papandreou the opportunity to project himself 
‘as the candidate who will eventually reduce the influence of powerful media owners 
on the party’ (Dinas, 2008: 606). 
 
Having renewed his party leadership, Papandreou began to apply strong opposition to 
Karamanlis’ government concentrating on corruption scandals, economic 
mismanagement and the incapacity of Karamanlis to deal with the implications of the 
international financial crisis on the Greek economy (Loulis, 2011; Pappas, 2010; 
Dinas, 2010). He won the elections for the European Parliament in June 2009 and a 
few months later, he won the early national elections of October 2009 by taking 43.9 
per cent of the votes and enjoying a solid majority of 160 parliamentary seats. On the 
contrary, the New Democracy party suffered electoral defeat taking 33.5 per cent and 
only 91 seats in Parliament (Dinas, 2010: 394; Mavrogordatos and Marantzidis, 2010).   
 
In parallel, Papandreou had to improve his party’s communications. There are some 
indications that, while being in Opposition, he engaged in a permanent campaign 
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process. First, he set up a media-monitoring unit within the party. In addition, 
Papandreou is the first party leader to create a mechanism within the party for the 
conduct and analysis of opinion surveys. In 2008, Papandreou decided that PASOK 
should have its own polling unit and should conduct its own opinion surveys 
(Elenopoulos, 2012: interview with the author; Karaklioumi, 2012: interview with the 
author). As a result, he asked the pollster Maria Karaklioumi to organise the whole 
operation. As she claims: 
‘we used the call center of PASOK and we trained people in order to conduct telephone 
opinion polls. In addition, we established the appropriate mechanism to analyse the data. We 
were conducting two opinion surveys per week in order to monitor the trends of public opinion 
using samples of 300-400 people around the country. Under extreme circumstances, for 
example, in the case of of the Head of Governments Summits where important decisions about 
Greece were imminent, we would conduct extraordinary telephone polls’ (Karaklioumi, 2012: 
interview with the author). 
 
One of the reasons why Papandreou decided to create his own polling mechanism 
inside the party’s headquarters was his apparent lack of trust in the polling companies 
and professional pollsters. For example, PASOK had a strong dispute with 
Karaklioumi's former employer, the RASS polling company, but Karaklioumi was 
salvaged due to her partisanship. A second reason is related to the incidents that took 
place during the general election of 2007. His aides had convinced Papandreou that 
PASOK would win the election, so they disputed the poll findings, which showed that 
PASOK was 3-4 per cent behind ND a few weeks before Election Day. For instance, 
Nikos Athanasakis, the party General Secretary, had a fierce dispute with the pollster 
Dimitris Mavros, head of the polling firm MRB, because the latter published polls 
showing that Karamanlis would win, gaining an outright majority in parliament and 
forming a single-party government (Hasapopoulos, 2007; Kottakis, 2011: 181-182).  
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As the close aide of Papandreou, George Elenopoulos argues, the incident seemed to 
reinforce the notion that pollsters in Greece are easily influenced by political 
opponents, media owners and governments since they are financially dependent on the 
state (2012: interview with the author). Although the private sector and consequently 
the polling companies in Greece are financially dependent on the state (namely they 
may need to receive government contracts in order to survive), the polling data 
regarding the national elections and the intra-party elections was credible. For 
instance, in the case of the intra-party election, all the polling firms indicated that 
Venizelos trailed Papandreou at the beginning of the campaign, while Papandreou 
took the lead over Venizelos around a month before the poll took place (Loulis, 2011: 
224).  
The second indication of Papandreou’s permanent campaign was his collaboration 
with communication experts like the political journalist George Elenopoulos head of 
the press office and the pollster Maria Karaklioumi responsible for the functioning of 
the party’s polling apparatus. Elenopoulos had worked for twenty years in various 
newspapers and at the radio station Flash 96, with the job of covering PASOK 
(Elenopoulos, 2012: interview with the author; Kroustalli, 2009). For this reason, he 
was seen as capable of managing journalists and the press. A third indication was that 
Papandreou closely monitored public opinion trends and seemed to be influenced by 
them. For example, he selected the candidates for the local elections of 2006 relying 
on polling data (Tziovaras, 2010). Fourth, he made several public appeals, visited 
public agencies, hospitals and schools and participated in anti-government 
demonstrations aiming to highlight the problems of daily life and generate negative 





4.2 Government institutions of public outreach 
One of the indications of Papandreou’s permanent campaign as Prime Minister is that 
he retained the party’s communication apparatus. In particular, he continued to use the 
media monitoring unit and the opinion polling unit established in PASOK’s  
headquarters in the opposition period (Karaklioumi 2012: interview with the author). 
As Elenopoulos has illustrated, an online media monitoring unit which would 
immediately issue statements throughout the day answering on any given topic on 
behalf of the government (2012: interview with the author).  
In terms of the primeministerial communication institutions, Papandreou maintained 
the Press Office yet, in contrast with Karamanlis, he reinforced it by assigning the 
responsibility of handling the relations between the Prime Minister and the press 
(Elenopoulos, 2012: interview with the author). Additionally, Papandreou retained the 
post of Minister of State and his deputy, yet the role of government spokesman was 
exercised by the Deputy Minister of State while the Minister of State was responsible 
for coordinating the members of the Council of Ministers. Moreover, the Deputy 
Minister of State had under his supervision the Secretariat General of Information and 
Communication (which resulted from the consolidation of  the General Secretariat of 
Information and the General Secretariat of Communication) monitoring media content 
and updated all Ministries on issues that would occur (Koveos, 2009).  
The communication staff of the Prime Minister held meetings on a daily basis, 
focusing on the agenda-setting procedure and the communication tactics of the day. 
The team consisted of the Head of the political planning office and the press office, 
the Government spokesperson, the General Secretary of Information and 
Communication, the Minister of State who acted as a mediator between the premier 
and the ministers, the Head of the Political office of the Prime Minister, the Head of 
the Political Office of PASOK, the General Secretary of the parliamentary group of 
PASOK and the Director of the  parliamentary group of PASOK (Elenopoulos, 2012: 
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interview with the author; Koveos, 2009). The fact that several government officials 
and party figures participated in the primeministerial communication staff suggests 
that Papandreou sought to improve the coordination of government communication.    
However, a year after the establishment and functioning of this communication group, 
Papandreou admitted that government communication needed to be further improved 
(Guardian, 2010). This was one of the reasons, why Papandreou reshuffled his 
government in September 2010 aiming to ensure better coordination of the 
communication apparatus. To this end, he created the ‘Group of Political and 
Communicative Planning’ comprising certain members of the Council of Ministers 
(the Greek Cabinet). More specifically, the members of the Group were: the Minister 
of the Interior, Decentralisation and e-Government, the Finance Minister, the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Culture, the Government spokesperson and the 
Director of the PASOK’s parliamentary group (Elenopoulos, 2012: interview with the 
author; Kroustalli, 2010). The Minister of the Interior was appointed Head of the 
Group, taking up the following responsibilities: 
‘a. to plan the central, strategic, political and communicational tactics in order to promote the 
government affairs, which the Group is appointed with, and to observe their implementation, b. 
to call and participate, according to the PM’s order, in meetings between members of the 
government and Deputy Ministers and to committees and work groups which function under 
the PM’s supervision, c. along with the responsibilities mentioned above, the Minister of 
Interior, Decentralisation and e-Governance is also responsible for forming legislation, 
individually or in collaboration with other Ministers or Deputy Ministers, and participating in 
all parliamentary processes’ (Primeministerial Decision, 2010). 
Another reason for the creation of the Group was that its members were regarded as 
experienced and efficient in the political communication field, since they had planned 
and executed two successful election campaigns for the European elections in June 
2009 and the parliamentary elections in October 2009. More specifically, the Minister 
of the Interior, John Ragousis, had served as the party’s spokesman in the national 
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elections of 2007, as Papandreou’s spokesperson in the intra-party elections of 2007 
and as party secretary from 2007 to 2009; the Finance Minister, George 
Papakonstantinou, had served as press spokesman of PASOK between 2007 and 2009; 
the Minister of Culture, Paul Geroulanos, had held the post of Director of 
Communications of PASOK from 2007 to 2009; the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Dimitris Droutsas, had held the post of the Director of Public Relations of PASOK and 
was responsible for the foreign media. Even though PASOK won the local elections of 
2010, the Group of the Political and Communication Planning was gradually 
weakened due to disputes between the Minister of the Interior and the Finance 
Minister over the control of economic policy, which undermined the coordination and 
the effectiveness of the government’s communication policy.  
The weakening of the Group accelerated not only the revamping of the 
communication machinery, but also of the whole structure and function of the 
primeministerial office. The reforms relied on propositions made by the Committee 
for the Reform of the Government, which Papandreou had formed at the beginning of 
2010 and which comprised foreign experts, specialists, politicians and academics (Ta 
Nea, 2010). In particular, members of the Committee included: Kevin Featherstone, 
professor of Modern Greek Studies, holder of the ‘Eleftherios Venizelos’ chair and 
Director of LSE’s Hellenic Observatory; Richard Parker, assistant professor of Public 
Policy in Harvard’s Governance School; Roger Wilkins, general secretary of the 
General Attorney’s Office of Australia and Special Advisor to the Australian premier; 
Leaf Pagrotski, MP and former Minister of  Industry and Commerce of Sweden and 
Jeff Malgan, former head of Strategic Planning of the British Prime Minister’s Office. 
The issues on which the Commission would deliberate were: the introduction of 
structural reforms concerning the functioning of the office of the Prime Minister and 
the government; changing the legislation on the functioning of the government; 
changing the decision-making process and consolidating the public debate process; 
increasing the efficiency of government institutions; introducing a transition model for 
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the succession between administrations; introducing a code of conduct for the Council 
of Ministers; altering the Council of Ministers’regulation; evaluating and introducing 
processes concerning the placement of executives in political posts (Ta Nea, 2010).  
Acting on the suggestions of the Committee, Papandreou created the post of General 
Secretary to the Prime Minister. According to the respective Primeministerial Decision 
(2010), the General Secretary would have three responsibilities: first, he would be the 
immediate assistant to the Prime Minister on issues that apply to the General 
Secretariat; second, he would supervise all units and services of the Office of the 
General Secretary and execute the orders of the Prime Minister concerning these 
departments; third he would perform any other task according to the laws on the 
responsibilities of the Head of the General Secretariat in a Ministry. Within the 
Political Office of the Prime Minister and in order to assist him in his work and 
execute his orders, the following units were assembled: a) the Policy Making Unit; b) 
the Political and Communicational Planning Unit; c) the Unit for Observing the 
Performance of the Government and Assessing Policies; d) the Innovative Policies 
Unit; e) the Relations with Society Unit; f) the Management and Organisation Unit; 
and g) the Special Priorities Handling Unit. 
 
More specifically, the Political and Communicational Planning Unit would deal with: 
a) the Political Planning which would elaborate on initiatives on the promotion of the 
strategic goals of the government;  it would submit these initiatives to the PM and it 
would handle its execution; b) the Communicational Planning which would elaborate 
on and execute initiatives concerning the political communication, the planning and 
promotion of the message and the communicational handling of the affairs of the 
government under the approval of the Prime Minister; c) the Programming, that would 
elaborate and submit to the Prime Minister suggestions on planning his schedule, 
having the responsibility to run it in collaboration with the implicated Units and 
Offices, according to the orders of the Prime Minister; d) the Parliamentary Affairs 
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which track the course of government’s legislative action and the parliamentary action 
in general and it functions as the link between the Political Office of the Prime 
Minister and the Parliamentary Group and e) the Crisis Management which would 
elaborate and submit suggestions to the Prime Minister on crisis management, on 
preventive actions, on the creation of a strategic plan to face a crisis and would 
calculate its ramifications putting these suggestions into action.   
 
However, it seems that none of the communications structures that were created 
during the Papandreou administration functioned effectively. As Karaklioumi 
explains, ‘essentially there was no such thing as a communications command centre. 
Everybody wanted to talk to everybody, everybody wanted to have a major part and 
consequently this led to the absence of a common message’ (2012: interview with the 
author).    
 
4.3 The role of communication experts 
The second component of Papandreou’s permanent campaign involved cooperation 
with two communication experts who followed him in office. The first was the former 
political journalist George Elenopoulos, who served as head of the primeministerial 
Press Office. As head of the press office, he attended all the important meetings, 
enjoyed the trust of the Prime Minister and had an exceptional cooperation with all top 
executives. As Elenopoulos claims, on a daily basis, he would communicate, exchange 
notes and consult with the General Secretary of Briefing and with the spokesperson of 
the Government (2012: interview with the author). In parallel, he oversaw the unit of 
media monitoring on behalf of the government, which was established in the party’s 
headquarters (Elenopoulos, 2012: interview with the author).  
The other communication professional who joined Papandreou’s staff was the pollster 
Maria Karaklioumi who became the official pollster of PASOK in 2008 and from 
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2009 onwards she was acting as the pollster of Papandreou’s government 
(Karaklioumi, 2012: interview with the author). Karaklioumi had studied statistics at 
the University of Athens and later Mathematics at Trinity College Dublin. She also 
completed a Masters in Quantitative Political Science in the School of Government of 
the University of Essex and on European Affairs at Panteion University (Athens). She 
specialised on sampling and on methods of exploring public opinion at the University 
of Michigan. Since 2001, Karaklioumi had been an active executive in political 
analysis and polling. For example, she worked for the polling company RASS from 
2006 to 2008 conducting opinion surveys and exit polls. In 2008, Karaklioumi became 
the official pollster of PASOK and from 2009 onwards, she was acting as the pollster 
of Papandreou’s government (Karaklioumi, 2012: interview with the author). Ιn 
addition, Karaklioumi had the main responsibility of analysing and interpreting the 
polling data, as well as acting as an advisor to the Prime Minister on government 
strategy, policy and presentation. 
Unlike the aides of Simitis and Karamanlis, both of Papandreou’s communication 
advisors had strong political affiliations with the party. Elenopoulos was considered a 
member of the ‘traditional PASOK’, a strong supporter of the so-called ‘straight 
collision’ with the right and with intra-party opponents (Elenopoulos, 2012: interview 
with the author). Karaklioumi had been a registered member of PASOK since her pre-
graduate years. She held the post of the Secretary of Youth of AUEB (Athens 
University of Economics and Business). She was a member of the Institute of 
Education of PASOK and of the scientific team, which conducted the cross-partisan 
debate in the City of Amarousio. She was an active member on the board of directors 
of the Institute of Strategic and Development Studies-Andreas Papandreou (ISTAME). 
In 2008, she took on the role of Deputy Spokesperson of PASOK, which she held until 
2010 when she became the Secretary of Press and Media of the party (Karaklioumi, 
2012: interview with the author). 
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4.4 The use of polling 
Once in power, Papandreou continued to use private polling, both opinion surveys and 
focus groups, aimed at devising strategy, policy and presentation. However, as 
Karaklioumi claims, Papandreou put more emphasis on quantitative opinion polls 
rather than focus groups (2012: interview with the author). As head of the party’s 
polling unit, she conducted opinion surveys for the PASOK government, providing 
Papandreou with evidence on various polling figures. In particular, opinion surveys 
measured the government’s performance, the opposition’s performance, 
primeministerial approval, the leaders’ popularity ratings, voting intentions, the state 
of the economy, the impact of government initiatives and reforms on the image of the 
premier and the government, the number of viewers and the interest of people 
concerning the public appeals of Papandreou, as well as the impact of Papandreou’s 
political messages on public opinion (Karaklioumi, 2012: interview with the author; 
Kroustalli, 2010).  
One example of the impact the opinion polls had upon Papandreou’s strategy was the 
selection of candidates for municipalities and prefectures in the local elections of 
November 2010. Karaklioumi conducted various polls measuring the performance of 
different nominees in different areas around the country and Papandreou appeared to 
choose candidates based on these findings (Karaklioumi, 2012: interview with the 
author). Another example of the polling effect was identified in the electoral strategy 
of PASOK in the local elections of 2010. At the beginning of the campaign for the 
local elections, Papandreou sought to set the political agenda, arguing that what is at 
stake is to select the most suitable candidates to manage the municipalities and the 
new regional local institutions created under the Kallikratis plan (Verney, 2012: 204).  
Initially the governing party, according to the polls, seemed to win most of the 
municipalities and prefectures across the country. In an effort to reverse the negative 
polls, New Democracy (the main opposition party) and its leader Antonis Samaras 
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sought to reframe the electoral battle as a referendum on the government’s economic 
policy and particularly on the Memorandum (the bailout package) in which 
Papandreou had agreed with the so called Troika
4
 (Verney, 2012: 204). In parallel, all 
the opposition parties adopted the same anti-Memorandum platform. 
The result was that PASOK’s candidates, in the run-up to Election Day in November, 
were losing ground in the opinion surveys by the anti-Memorandum candidates. For 
example, in the region of Attica, which is seen as electoral and political barometer for 
the whole country (Nikolacopoulos, 2010) and whose registered voters are 2.7 million 
representing the 27 per cent of the total, the candidate of PASOK was trailing in the 
polls the independent anti-Memorandum candidate (Verney, 2012: 203). According to 
Karaklioumi, polling analysis suggested that PASOK should set the terms of the 
debate in a different way (2012: interview with the author). Hence, Papandreou, on the 
25
th
 of October two weeks ahead of the local elections of November 7, modified his 
party strategy. In a ‘live’ television interview, which received simultaneous coverage 
on all national television networks, he attempted to reframe the electoral battle by 
linking the support to the socialist candidates with the possibility of calling early 
national elections if the result of the local elections proved unsatisfactory (Verney, 
2012: 205). The dilemma was crucial, as a snap election would lead to political 
instability, increasing the likelihood of disorderly default, since the country’s salvation 
was dependent upon the disbursement of the next loan tranche as was foreseen in the 
EU-IMF bailout package. Eventually, in spite of the unprecedented percentage of 
abstention from the polls, PASOK remained the dominant party gaining the majority 
of big municipalities and 8 in 13 regions in the first round of the 2010 regional 
elections including the Attica region (Verney, 2012: 211).  
                                                             
4 The Troika consisted of the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
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Although the impact of polls was evident in these cases, it was not so influential in all 
cases. For instance, in the case of the privatisations or the policy of the opening-up of 
closed-shop professions, the government hesitated to carry these through, though 
public opinion in large part backed the government (Loulis, 2011). This kind of 
political behaviour can be attributed to three reasons. The first is ideological. Socialist 
deputies were traditionally against liberal policies such as privatisations and 
liberalisation of the markets. The second reason is political. Trade unions and those 
powerful pressure groups that were closely affiliated with PASOK opposed 
privatisations and liberalisation. Therefore, even though the majority of public opinion 
in general backed these reforms, political benefits from the implementation of the 
reforms were highly uncertain, while the political cost of the struggle with powerful 
and well organised social groups was certain and immediate.  
The third reason is related to the Greek electoral system. This system is termed 
preferential because voters alone decide which candidates are elected. Under such a 
system, there is an intra-party electoral competition, because candidates of the same 
party compete with each other for personal votes. In particular, voters choose the 
ballot of the party with all the candidates of the party and then vote for the candidate 
of their preference putting a cross next to their name. Thus, parliamentarians are 
electorally dependent upon their local constituencies and, as Karaklioumi observes, if 
the interests of their constituencies contradict with the interest of public opinion, then 
they will not hesitate to turn against the policy of their own government (2012: 







4.5 The central message of Papandreou’s permanent campaign   
In the national elections of October 2009, the dominant issue was the handling of the 
economic crisis. The origins of the Greek crisis lay in the international financial crisis 
of 2007/2008. The deterioration of the international banking system had influenced the 
function of the Greek banking system, limiting the financing of households and 
corporations and causing a fall in economic output. In an effort to prevent the total 
collapse of the economic system, to protect the banking sector and help the economy 
to escape recession, the Greek government put in place Keynesian expansionary 
policies including spending increases and tax cuts. The latter averted the total collapse 
of the economy and prevented a sharp fall in output, but increased the fiscal deficit, 
the public debt as well as the country’s borrowing interest rates (Kazakos, 2010: 166-
168).  
In this context, the two main parties offered the electorate two completely different 
policy plans. Karamanlis claimed that dealing with public debt and the fiscal deficit 
must be the primary governmental priority and consequently the next government 
needed to implement austerity measures and structural reforms (Kazakos, 2010: 171-
172). In contrast, Papandreou offered a radically different policy mix, prioritising the 
stimulation of the economy rather than deficit reduction. He stressed the need to 
implement expansionary policies of spending increases and tax cuts to stimulate the 
economy and reverse the recession, combined with an aggressive tax reform that 
would enable income redistribution. All of this, it was claimed at the time, would be 
adequate to restrain the deficit and keep Greece’s public debt viable (Kazakos, 2010: 
172-173). 
Papandreou was asked repeatedly where the funds needed for the success of such a 
plan would come from. He responded that the funding of the expansionary policy 
would not add to the fiscal deficit because it would be funded by the limitation of 
public spending waste, the fight against corruption and the fight against tax evasion. 
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Papandreou framed the whole concept with the motto ‘there is money’, which was 
being used throughout his election campaign as well as the first months of his tenure 
(Loulis, 2011; Pretenteris, 2012: 39).  It appears that this motto was so targeted to the 
pressing issues of Greek society and arguably to its deepest wishes, that it was enough 
to win him the elections. Eventually Papandreou managed to win by taking 44 per cent 
of the vote; having a 10 per cent lead over Karamanlis and gaining a solid majority of 
160 parliamentary seats (Loulis, 2011).  
In the aftermath of the elections, the new PASOK government revealed that public 
finances were far worse than previously announced (Kazakos, 2011: 17; Verney, 
2012: 212-213). The revelation gave rise to fierce criticism from the European 
Commission and the Eurogroup for the false statistics and attracted the attention of the 
international financial markets, which worried about the capacity of Greece to repay 
its debts and the willingness of the government to put its public finances in order. As a 
result, the Eurozone and the European Commission urged Greece to change its course 
by formulating a credible plan of fiscal consolidation and structural reform in order to 
bring the deficit down (Kazakos, 2010: 189-191). 
 However, Papandreou insisted that he would fulfil the promises he had made during 
the election campaign and hence in the budget plan anticipated substantial 
spending increases on education, on the wages of public employees as well as the 
distribution of various allowances to more than 2.5 million people (Kazakos, 2010: 
201). To this end, in a press conference in January 2010 Papandreou repeated once 
again, his central election campaign motto by saying that ‘there is money’ adding that 
‘when it was needed, we found it’ (Pretenteris, 2012: 59).  
On the 19
th
 of January, the European Council identified that Greece had not taken 
effective steps to reduce the deficit (Κazakos, 2011: 26).  In parallel, the spreads of the 
Greek bonds kept climbing, while the rating agencies continued to downgrade the 
Greek economy. As pressure mounted on the Greek government, Papandreou decided 
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to change course, announcing tough austerity measures in February and a second wave 
of measures in March. As a result, he abandoned the message of expansionary policies 
delivering a new message of the need to promote a package of austerity measures to 
avoid a disorderly sovereign default. In order to promote his policy he expressed his 
message with the motto ‘we save the country’ which was being used throughout the 
rest of his tenure. More specifically, Papandreou declared that,  ‘if we do not do what 
is needed to be done in order to save our economy, and the very existence of our 
future (..) if our country is unable to borrow on similar terms as those that usually an 
EU country borrows, then the consequences will be much more devastating’ 
(cited in Kazakos, 2010: 220-221).  
Nevertheless, the government was still failing to convince the markets, thus increasing 
the risk of downgrading Greek bonds to ‘junk’ status, which in turn would lead to the 
country declaring a default (Loulis, 2011: 278). Hence, the Greek government urged 
its European partners to create a bailout mechanism for those member-states, which 
are unable to borrow funds at reasonable interest rates from international markets. 
Eventually, the European Union launched the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) due to economic and political reasons. EFSF would be financed by the 
member states of the Eurozone and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and it was 
set to provide loans at low interest rates for Eurozone member-states being in trouble 
in return for the implementation of a credible policy plan of fiscal consolidation and 
structural changes (Kazakos, 2011: 29). 
 
As a result, Papandreou issued a statement to the press that he had instructed the 
Finance Minister to officially ask Greece’s EU partners to activate the support 
mechanism in order to avert a disorderly default. The Greek government managed to 
receive a loan of 110 billion euros in exchange for the application of the so-called 
‘Memorandum of Financial and Economic Policies’ and the ‘Memorandum of 
Understanding Specific Economic Policy Conditionality’ under the supervision of the 
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Troika of the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Memorandum was a policy package, which 
included austerity measures aimed at reducing the fiscal deficit and structural reforms 
aimed at increasing economic competitiveness (Kazakos, 2011: 33). On May 5, 
Papandreou introduced the Memorandum in Parliament repeating the message of the 
need to implement the Memorandum in order to ensure Greece would avoid default. In 
particular, Papandreou continued to use the same motto stating that ‘under the burden 
of the difficult living conditions of our country, we took responsible decisions, to save 
the country to save the wages and pensions (..) to save jobs, deposits, labor years, 
families, households [and] workers’ (Papandreou, 2010). 
 
4.6 Papandreou’s public appearances 
During the 2009 election campaign, Papandreou made tens of public appearances 
around the country; he gave numerous press conferences, press, media and web 
interviews while he also put emphasis on the use of the social media (Deligiaouri, 
2011: 65-66). After his electoral victory, hardly a day went by without Papandreou 
makes a public appearance on television, radio or in a website in Greece or abroad. He 
delivered numerous speeches in parliament, at the party convention and to special 
audiences inside or outside Athens. In addition, he put emphasis on making unedited 
appeals to the national electorate through ‘live’ televised addresses delivered from 
parliament, party events and the office of the Prime Minister. 
Moreover, Papandreou was the Prime Minister who introduced the innovation of the 
televising of Council of Ministers meetings. In particular, the speech delivered by the 
Prime Minister in the Council of Ministers was transmitted ‘live’ by the public 
broadcasting network (EΡT) and most of the time by the private television networks. 
According to Elenopoulos, Papandreou intended to symbolise the openness of his 
government to the citizenry (2012: interview with the author). Papandreou also tried to 
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highlight on the agenda a number of issues for which he was willing to undertake 
serious reform initiatives. For example, during the first session of the Council of 
Ministers, he invited the Greek Ombudsman, George Kaminis, to inform the members 
of the government about the persistent problems of Public Administration (To Vima, 
2009). In another Cabinet a few months later, on the 9
th
 of December 2009, on the 
occasion of the International Day against Corruption Papandreou invited to attend the 
session the president of the organisation ‘Transparency International-Greece’ Kostas 
Bakouris in order to highlight the need to address the phenomenon of corruption 
through the reform of the state.  
A few days later Papandreou invited to a meeting of the Cabinet for the first time in 
the political history of the country the Archbishop of the Church of Greece to 
underscore the need for cooperation between the state and the Church (Papachristos, 
2009). In addition, in March 2010 Papandreou invited to the Cabinet for the first time 
in the political history of the country the Head Justices of the Supreme Courts to 
discuss issues related to the functioning of the judiciary. At the same time, as noted by 
Karaklioumi, Papandreou could better control the message he wanted to send to the 
public (2012: interview with the author). In contrast, some authors saw Papandreou’s 
tactic as a sign of populism. According to Kazakos, ‘the Prime Minister and his close 
aides disliked the intermediary structures and gave the impression that there was a 
direct communication between the leader and the people’ (2010: 207). Another reason 
for Papandreou’s tactic, as Karaklioumi argues, was that he sought to appeal directly 
to the public, transmitting his political messages in an unfiltered way (2012: interview 
with the author). However, after the introduction of the Memorandum both the ‘live’ 
television coverage of the Cabinet meetings and the participation in them of non-
political actors stopped. This decision might be explained by the severity of the 
problems and the limited impact of this particular communication tactic. 
Apart from appeals directly to the public, Papandreou gave several interviews to the 
Greek media, though most of them were given to the newspapers rather than the 
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broadcast media, probably because the interviewee more easily controls newspapers 
interviews. In parallel, he avoided giving interviews during the regular governing 
period to the Greek television and radio networks for two reasons. The first is that 
Papandreou and his aides shared the assumption that the media, following the general 
trend of populism, were particularly critical and hostile to his administration 
(Elenopoulos, 2012: interview with the author). As Psycharis
5
 notes, in a meeting he 
had with Papandreou in Maximos Mansion, the Prime Minister expressed his intense 
discomfort about the political stance of the TV network Mega Channel and the 
criticism, which the network had directed against his government (cited in Pretenteris, 
2012: 129-132). 
The second reason is, as Papandreou’s associates have claimed, that 
political journalists in general seek to concentrate on political gossip, political fights 
between government figures, personalities and political horse races rather than 
policies, ideas and the real problems that citizens face in everyday life (Elenopoulos, 
2012: interview with the author; Karaklioumi, 2012: interview with the author). The 
only exception was towards the end of October 2010, a few days ahead of the local 
Election Day, when Papandreou gave a televised interview from the Maximos 
Mansion, which was broadcasted simultaneously on all national television networks, 
public and private, with one journalist from each television channel participating in the 
interview (Kroustalli, 2010). Through the ‘live’ interview, Papandreou wanted to 
stress his willingness to call an early general election if the outcome of the local 
elections was negative for the government and in parallel to ensure that, his message 
would receive maximum media coverage. 
At the same time, Papandreou appeared to put emphasis on the use of new 
technologies and particularly on the use of social media to amplify the effectiveness of 
                                                             
5 The publisher of the major centre-left newspapers To Vima and Ta Nea and co-owner of the private 
national broadcasting network Mega Channel. 
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his communication with the public, especially the youth. He created a department 
within the Office of the Prime Minister that was assigned to handle his Facebook and 
Twitter accounts and the uploading of YouTube videos with his speeches and 
statements (Hasapopoulos, 2011). In addition, he used YouTube videos in order to 
attack the opposition concerning the state of the economy, which PASOK had 
inherited from New Democracy after ND had left power (Koveos, 2010). 
In parallel, Papandreou engaged in a constant campaign process to woo European and 
international public opinion. He showed communication hyperactivity making 
numerous public appearances in the foreign media. For example, in 2010 Papandreou 
gave several interviews in foreign media, including the most well known leading 
newspapers such as the  Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, Guardian, Le Monde, 
radio stations, television networks such as CNBC, CNN, NBC, CBS, BBC and media 
outlets like Bloomberg and Reuters (www.papandreou.gr). This hyperactivity, of 
course, was the result of Greece being at the time in the spotlight of the international 
economic crisis and particularly of the Eurozone debt crisis (Karaklioumi, 2012: 
interview with the author). Moreover, as Elenopoulos has suggested, Papandreou 
needed to explain the Greek view on the crisis to the citizens of other countries, given 
that the latter provided loans to Greece in order to avoid a disorderly default (2012: 
interview with the author). This would provide him with sufficient time to put 
Greece’s public finance in order and promote the structural reforms aiming to boost 
competitiveness. 
Another explanation for Papandreou’s tactic to appear on foreign media rather than 
national ones might be that foreign journalists were interested in concentrating almost 
exclusively on the economic issues rather than on the intra-party or intra-government 
struggles. Given that Greek media transmitted parts of Papandreou’s interviews, the 
centre-left Prime Minister also had the opportunity to focus the attention of the Greek 
electorate on his own agenda, bypassing to some extent the critical national media. A 
third explanation can be found in the relations between Papandreou and the centre-left 
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media. Even though Greek media are for the most part left-leaning, they were hostile 
to Papandreou personally and treated him with immense scrutiny. This tension 
between the socialist leader and the media could be traced back to the intra-party 
leadership campaign, which took place right after the 2007 election. At the time 
Venizelos, Papandreou’s main contender, ‘had the support of almost all media 
sympathetic to the party’ (Dinas, 2008: 365). 
 
4.7 The impact of Papandreou’s permanent campaign  
The centre-left Prime Minister made numerous public appearances delivering both 
major and minor addresses despite the fact that he stayed in office for only two years. 
In particular, as evidence shows (see Table 5), Papandreou made more major 
addresses rather than minor addresses, probably because the severe economic crisis 
and the need to travel abroad frequently coerced him to rely more on televised 
addresses than delivering speeches to special audiences or making domestic political 
trips to get his message across. In terms of the impact of Papandreou’s campaigning 
style of governing upon his popularity, a review of primeministerial public 
appearances demonstrates a considerable and, to a large extent, consistent attempt to 
woo public opinion. 
However, Papandreou’s intensive campaigning appears to have barely influenced his 
popularity ratings. Specifically, results show that there is a moderate-strong 
relationship (Pearson: - 0,608) between the major addresses and primeministerial 
approval, which are negatively correlated, meaning that an upward change in one 
variable is accompanied by a downward change in the other variable. In particular, an 
increase in the major addresses may result in a decrease in the popularity ratings. 
However, the relationship is statistically insignificant (sig.: 0,200). There is also a 
negative, fairly weak association (Pearson: - 0,340) between the minor addresses and 
the primeministerial popularity which is also statistically insignificant.   
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Furthermore, it should be noted that Papandreou’s popularity ratings were not simply 
unstable with ups and downs throughout his two-year tenure. They were constantly 
diminishing from the beginning of his tenure until the end of his premiership. His 
popularity dropped sharply within two years, losing more than 30 per cent. In 
particular, Papandreou’s approval dropped from 62 per cent in December 2009 to 49 
per cent in March 2010 decreasing to 45 per cent in June 2010, falling to 39 per cent 
by the end of the year and finishing at below 30 per cent a few months before his 
resignation. It is apparent that this sharp fall is attributed to other factors. Even though 
the examination and analysis of other factors influencing the primeministerial 
popularity exceeds the scope of this study, chapter six discusses to some extent 
possible explanations for the developments in Papandreou’s public approval. 
 
Table 5: Public approval of Papandreou and primeministerial major and minor 
addresses to the public 
Date 
Overall PM Approval 
(%) Major Minor 
Dec '09 62 16 3 
Mar '10 49 16 2 
Jul '10 45 20 13 
Dec '10 39 26 14 
Mar '11 36 17 7 
Jul '11 26 23 6 
 
Source: Metron Analysis polls – Webpage of Papandreou 
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Table 6: Papandreou’s popularity ratings 2009-2011 
 
Sources: Metron Analysis polls 
 
Conclusion 
As his predecessors, Papandreou undertook the permanent campaign strategy. He 
created new communication institutions next to the existing ones and collaborated 
with communication professionals who also had political affiliations with PASOK. 
Furthermore, he used private polling to shape strategy, policy and presentation while 
he was the first Prime Minister to use his own mechanism to conduct opinion surveys 
within the party’s headquarters. Once being in the premiership, he tried to label his 
policy. In the beginning of his tenure he used his main election-campaign message as a 
motto of his government policy, yet a few months after the elections he was forced to 
change policy course and hence to formulate a new campaign-like message as motto 
of his new policy plan. Papandreou also made public appearances in ‘live’ television 
addresses and gave numerous interviews to foreign media in order to get his message 
across. Nevertheless, his public appearances did not influence his popularity ratings 
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meaning that other factors exerted impact on it. Having demonstrated that the recent 
prime ministers in Greece followed the permanent campaign trend, next chapter 
discusses the factors which contributed to the emergence of the campaigning style of 



















Chapter 5   
 
The Permanent Campaign in Greece   
 
As it has been presented, since 1996 modern Greek premiers, both center-left and 
conservative, have undertaken the permanent campaign strategy. However, this has 
not always been the case. Before the middle 1990s, in spite of some indications of the 
permanent campaign concept having been identified in Mitsotakis’ (1990-1993) and 
Papandreou’s premiership (1993-1996), the Greek prime ministers had not employed 
in office the election campaign personnel, tools and techniques. Of course, it is 
reasonable to argue that prime ministers in Greece, as in other countries, are always 
interested in influencing public opinion in their favour. However, from 1974 up to the 
mid-1990s they did not pursue this goal by engaging in a permanent campaign 
process. So far, there is quite limited relevant literature on primeministerial 
communication in order to provide empirical evidence of this argument. Nonetheless, 
there are some indications that can offer a view of the political communication of the 
prime ministers before the permanent campaign era emerges.  
First, until the mid-1990s prime ministers in Greece lacked a Press Office within the 
Office of the Prime Minister. As Sotiropoulos has pointed out in his study on the 
evolution of the Office of the Prime Minister, Simitis was the first premier who 
established communication apparatus within the Maximos Mansion (where the 
primeministerial office is located) (2001: 142-144). Second, the Greek premiers 
lacked distinct communication structures in the context of government 
communication. It is characteristic that the Ministry of Press and Media was 
established in 1994 (Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 138). Third, the prime ministers and 
in general the Greek politicians, in line with their British counterparts, used mainly the 
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Parliament (called the Vouli) as the official forum of politics and political 
communication (Papathanassopoulos. 2000: 57; Seymour-Ure, 2003). The prime 
ministers surely made public addresses and received media coverage by the public 
media exclusively, since privately owned media did not exist until the early 1990s. 
Yet, they did not follow the permanent campaign trend. 
So the question is what has changed in recent decades and motivated the Greek 
premiers to bring campaign staff, methods and tactics in office? This thesis argues 
that, in line with the cases in the US and the UK, political and technological 
developments explain the rise of the permanent campaign era in Greece as well. In 
particular, the chapter shows that the decline of political parties, the advent of 
television and the proliferation of new political technologies and experts have 
contributed, not only to the modernisation of the political communication and the 
election campaigning in Greece (Alexandrou, 2007; Demertzis, 2002; 
Papathanassopoulos, 2000; 2002; 2007), but also to the evolution of the campaigning 
style of governing. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section one outlines the structure and 
operation of the parliamentary majoritarian system in Greece. Section two outlines the 
key features of the Greek media system within the context of the Mediterranean media 
system. Section three analyses the contributing factors of the permanent campaign in 
Greece. It explores the causes and effects of the decline of Greek political parties in 
recent decades, the rise of television and its effects in the context of the modernisation 
of the political communication process in Greece and the development of new political 





5.1 The political system in Greece 
 
Following Lijphart’s typology, Greece belongs to the group of parliamentary 
majoritarian systems (1999: 248). The Greek electoral system is a form of advanced 
proportionate list using the D’Hondt electoral formula, which favours the main 
political parties, enabling them to form single-party governments (Gallagher et al, 
2006: 344, 352; Lijphart, 1999: 96-97). This is one of the reasons, why two large 
parties the centre-left PASOK and the centre-right ND dominate the political scene, 
even though the Greek political system is a multiparty one. Konstantinos Karamanlis 
and Andreas Papandreou founded both of them respectively, in the aftermath the 
collapse of the colonels’ dictatorship and the restoration of the democratic regime in 
1974 (Gallagher et al, 2006: 63; Pappas, 2003: 122; Voulgaris, 2008: 224).  
 
According to the election results from 1974 to 2009, the two major political parties 
together were receiving around 80 per cent of the vote (Nikolacopoulos, 2005; Loulis, 
2011). The center left PASOK party ruled Greece for much of the time since the 
restoration of the democratic regime. More specifically, it governed from 1981 until 
1989, from 1993 to 2004 and from 2009 to 2011 while the conservative New 
Democracy party ruled the country from 1974 until 1981, from 1990 until 1993 and 
from 2004 until 2009. The only exception took place in the years 1989-1990, when the 
PASOK government changed the electoral law a few weeks ahead of the national 
elections, making it purely proportional, in order to prevent its centre-right rivals from 
forming a single-party government.  
 
Indeed, the electoral law’s provision that a party could formulate a government with 
almost 50 per cent of the vote undermined political stability, generating short-lived 
coalition governments and leading to three successive parliamentary elections 
(Nikolacopoulos, 2005). Although PASOK was defeated, the New Democracy party 
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still did not have the parliamentary majority to form its own government and so it 
participated in a coalition government with the left parties in July of 1989. The latter 
coalition also failed, leading to the elections of November 1989. ND again did not 
gain a parliamentary majority and the result was the forming of a cross-party coalition 
government including PASOK and the left parties, which however proved to be short-
lived. Following the third consecutive national election of April 1990, ND finally 
gained a narrow parliamentary majority forming a single-party government, though its 
majority was marginal holding only 151 out of 300 seats in Parliament (called the 
Vouli) (Pappas and Dinas, 2006: 479;Voulgaris 2008: 106–110).  
 
Moreover, single-party governments have completely dominated the political 
landscape for two additional reasons. The first is related to the fact that the role of the 
President of the Republic as Head of State (elected by Parliament for a five-year term 
with the possibility of re-election for a second term) is mainly formal; the President 
has no real executive or legislative power. At this point, it should be mentioned that 
from 1974 until 1985 when the first constitutional revision took place, the President of 
the Republic had quite important executive and legislative powers and responsibilities 
among which the most significant were: his right to dissolve Parliament, to dissolve 
the government and to call for a referendum (Makridimitris, 2001: 23). However, 
based on an initiative taken by the then Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou during the 
constitutional revision of 1986, these powers were removed from the President in 
order to strengthen the position of the prime minister. The second reason lies in the 
role of the opposition, which has few powers to influence decision-making. As 
Gallagher et al have suggested ‘all Greek governments are single-party majority 
governments, and the opposition in parliament has been effectively powerless, with 
government taking no account of its views’ (2006: 63).  
 In this context the prime minister  exercises executive power as the head of a single-
party government and the same time as leader of the main parliamentary party in a 
 152 
unicameral parliament (called the Vouli) consisting of 300 seats, controls the majority 
of the parliamentary seats (Gallagher et al, 2006: 35; Lijphart, 1999: 248; 
Makridimitris, 2001: 23). In short, he appears to control both the executive and the 
legislative powers. In the majoritarian systems, like the Greek one, the influence of the 
prime minister in the legislative area is further reinforced by the notion that governing 
parliamentarians are expected to vote along party lines on all crucial issues either 
because of party loyalty or personal political calculations (Bowler et al, 1999; 
Gallagher et al, 2006: 57-58, 62). For instance, they might be interested to be members 
of the Council of Ministers (the Greek Cabinet) (Gallagher et al, 2006: 74; 
Makridimitris, 2001: 23-24). Another reason for the MPs to follow the party line is the 
fear of being suspended from their party’s parliamentary group or, even worse, losing 
the party label at the next national election (Gallagher et al, 2006: 74).  
Of course, in the parliamentary context the power of a prime minister faces 
limitations. The most important is that the premiers are dependent on the legislature 
since they need the confidence votes of the parliamentary majority to secure their 
position (Gallagher et al, 2006: 45; Makridimitris, 2001). However, in the Greek 
context the fall or resignation of a prime minister from office is a rare phenomenon. 
From the restoration of democracy in 1974 onwards, only two premiers the center-
right Konstantinos Mitsotakis and the center-left George Papandreou
6
 lost the 
confidence of the legislature (Voulgaris, 2008: 122). Therefore, it is safe to assume 
                                                             
6 Although Papandreou received a vote of confidence by the parliamentarians of his own party, 
he decided to resign from the post of Prime Minister in order to ease the possibility for the 
formation of a pro-euro coalition government with the participation of New Democracy and the 
right-wing party of LAOS (Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός/ Popular Orthodox Rally). In the 
lengthy negotiations that followed, the three political parties of PASOK, ND and LAOS 
managed to reach an agreement on forming a coalition government, appointing in the post of 
Prime Minister the former Vice-President of the European Central Bank Loukas Papadimos 
(Pretenteris, 2012: 149-152). 
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that the prime minister in the Greek context has emerged in recent years as the most 
powerful political figure in the Greek political system. 
 
5.2 The Mediterranean media context: the case of Greece 
The Greek media system has been considered as a striking example of the 
Mediterranean model of media system, which also includes Portugal, Spain and Italy 
(Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 2002; 
Papathanassopoulos, 2004). This model is characterised by ‘an elite politically 
oriented press with high politically parallelism, commentary-oriented and weak 
professionalised journalism, low newspaper circulation, external pluralism covering 
different opinions and perspectives within one media branch, a public broadcasting 
strongly influenced by the government and strong state intervention in the media 
sector (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 67).  
Within this context, the media in Greece specifically appear to be highly politicised, 
financially dependent (directly or indirectly) on the state and operating in an 
environment of clientelist relationships. As Hallin and Mancini have suggested, 
‘Greek newspapers have always been political instruments above all, rooted culturally 
in passionate ideological divisions, and often tied to the state and/or parties’ and the 
Greek journalists ‘tend to be strongly opinionated and politically engaged, and often 
run for political office’ (2004: 98). Moreover, most of them are subject to intervention 
noting that the ‘line taken by owners of media enterprises determined the image and 
politics of the mass media’ (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 2000).  
Hence, the Greek press is targeted to the well-educated elite with a keen interest in 
politics (Papathanassopoulos, 2004: 46). As a result, the level of readership as far as 
the circulation of the newspapers is concerned is one of the lowest in Europe. 
According to the World Association of Newspapers, the press circulation in Greece in 
2002 amounted to 90 copies per thousand inhabitants, while France had 164 and 
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Sweden more than 500 (cited in Papathanassopoulos, 2004: 38). Consequently, Greek 
newspapers appear to be unable to be financially self-sustaining and need to receive 
financial subsidies from the state mainly in the form of advertising. Yet, as many 
scholars have pointed out, the public budget’s financial support is ‘not governed by a 
clear legal framework, consistent with the clientelist nature of Greek politics (..) 
[taking] the form of “soft loans”, subsidies both overt and covert, and state jobs 
offered to many journalists’(Dimitras, 1997: 102-103; Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 121). 
Similar trends are also evident in public and private broadcasting. The public 
television and radio, which emerged in 1965 with the state, owned EΡT comprises 
three television channels, ET-1, NET, ET-3 and EΡA (Papathanassopoulos, 2004: 102). 
EΡT has been largely politicised since the single-party governments dominate it. As 
Hallin and Mancini have pointed out, ‘control is direct, with directors of the state 
broadcasting company EΡT under the authority of the Minister of Press and the Mass 
Media’  while the appointments of journalists ‘tend to be made on the basis of political 
loyalty than purely professional criteria’ (2004: 58). 
Private broadcasting, although commercial, profit-oriented and less politicised than 
newspapers (Papathanassopoulos, 1997, 2000; Doulkeri, 1999, 2002) appears to have 
political ties and alliances since it is to a degree connected with the state in financial 
terms. As Hallin and Mancini have illustrated ‘in all of the Mediterranean countries 
political logic tends to play a large role in broadcasting particularly - though not 
exclusively - in publicly owned media, and of course particularly in news’ (2004: 
109). The political logic of the private television networks can be identified in their 
ownership’s status as well. For instance, three of the owners of Mega Channel (one of 
the biggest television networks in Greece), Christos Lamprakis, George Mpompolas 
and Christos Tegopoulos are at the same time the owners of the most powerful centre-
left newspapers. Lambrakis owns Ta Nea and Sunday Vima, Mpompolas is the 
publisher of To Ethnos and Tegopoulos owns the newspaper Eleftherotupia. Another 
example is the owner of the television station Skai TV, Aristeidis Alafouzos who is 
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also the owner of the leading pro-conservative newspaper Kathimerini (Kurtsos, 2003: 
245-249).  
 
In terms of the financial subsidies provided by the government, these are distributed 
mainly according to clientelistic criteria. At this point, it should be noted that 
clientelism, as Fukuyama (2012) has suggested, ‘occurs when political parties use 
public resources, and particularly government offices, as a means of rewarding 
political supporters. Politicians provide (..) individual benefits like a job in the post 
office, an intervention on behalf of a relative in trouble with the government, or 
sometimes an outright payment of money or goods’. One example of this practice is 
the allocation of public sector advertisements. As Papathanassopoulos has illustrated: 
 
‘since the late 1990s, and the preparation of the Olympics, major construction work co-
financed by the European Union, lured the government to publicise its achievement directly 
through commercial adverts. These state adverts are a considerable source of revenue for the 
media, and it was noted that most of them (money) were directed towards “friendly” media’ 
(2007: 138).    
 
Furthermore, in a context of large-scale government intervention in the economic 
process (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 133) it is no surprise that several entrepreneurs 
seek to own newspapers in order to influence political decisions in favour of their own 
interests, such as obtaining government contracts and concessions including broadcast 
licenses. To this end, as Hallin and Mancini have observed, ‘industrialists with 
interests in shipping, travel, construction, telecommunication and oil industries 
dominate media ownership and a long tradition of using media as a means of pressure 





5.3 Why the permanent campaign in Greece? 
 
5.3.A The decline of political parties in Greece 
Greece is seen as an example of the Mediterranean or Polarised Pluralist Model along 
with Italy, Spain and Portugal. In Southern Europe, ‘liberal institutions, including both 
capitalist industrialism and political democracy, developed later. The forces of the 
ancien regime – the landholding aristocracy, the absolutist state and the Catholic or 
Orthodox Church – were stronger, and liberalism triumphed only after protracted 
political conflict that continued in many cases well into the twentieth century’ (Hallin 
and Mancini, 2004: 89). It is characteristic that Greece, Portugal and Spain were the 
last European countries, which made the transition from dictatorship to democracy 
during the mid-1970s (Loulis, 2007: 224; Papathanassopoulos, 2004: 35-36). From the 
restoration of the democratic regime in 1974 until the beginning of 1990s, political 
parties and notably the parties of government, the center-right New Democracy and 
the socialist PASOK have dominated, as it is said, the political scene. They were 
strong enough to mobilise voters, influence decisively voting behaviour and intervene 
in the economic and social life.  
The strength of the Greek political parties was evident on three levels. First, in the 
national elections held from 1977 onwards PASOK and ND together receive together 
over 80 per cent of the vote (Nikolacopoulos, 2005; Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 
2013: 524). Second, both PASOK and ND experienced comparatively high levels of 
party identification (Teperoglou & Tsatsanis, 2014: 224). Third, the Greek political 
parties are seen to exercise a highly intervening role in every aspect of the ecomomy 
and society. As Papathanassopoulos has put it, ‘the major political parties, especially 
when they come to office, not only drive the operations of most governmental 
institutions, but also influence the developments in most aspects of the social system; 
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from sports and arts to education and the Church’ (2007: 136). The phenomenon has 
been called partytocracy (Anthopoulos, 2008: 113; Mouzelis and Pagoulatos: 2002).  
Three reasons explain the dominant role of the political parties. Firstly, both ND and 
PASOK represented clearly different ideological platforms. For example, they had 
completely different views regarding the entry of Greece into the European 
Community. Konstantinos Karamanlis, the founder of ND and the first Prime Minister 
of the Third Greek Republic in the aftermath of regime change, advocated the 
introduction of Greece into the European Community (EC) because as Kazakos has 
suggested, he ‘considered membership as an additional instrument to consolidate the 
1974 restored democracy and as best serving the long-term security interests of 
Greece. He also linked membership to the survival of the economic model of market 
economy in the country’ (2012: 3). Eventually Karamanlis managed to secure 
Greece’s entry to the EC in May 1979. In contrast, Andreas Papandreou, founder of 
PASOK and leader of the main opposition party, had turned against the European 
project (Kazakos, 2001: 337–340). He argued that participation in the European 
Community would ‘consolidate the peripheral role of the country as a satellite in the 
capitalist system; will render national planning impossible; will seriously threaten 
Greek industry; and will lead to the extinction of Greek farmers’ (Lyrintzis, 1984: 
111). 
Second, the role of political parties and consequently party identification in Greece 
were reinforced by the fact that the partisan debate took place in a context of highly 
hostile political environment, characterised by ideological polarisation, partisan 
extremism, intense populism and constant accusations over alleged scandals. In 
particular, the Greek political culture is rooted to historical divisions caused by past 
regime crises, the civil war between the left and right and in parallel influenced by 
existing clientelist relations (Featherstone, 2005: 229; Legg and Roberts 1997: 142) 
leading to the creation of ‘highly durable parallel networks of “left” and “right” 
political blocs’ (Teperoglou & Tsatsanis, 2014: 224). In particular, politicians in 
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Greece have traditionally engaged in clientelist relationships by offering jobs in the 
public sector to citizens in exchange for their votes (Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 51; 
Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2013: 526).  
 
Third, party preferences in Greece are shaped also by the structure and function of the 
electoral system, which allows voters to choose their own parliamentarian, and as a 
result to have strong motives to participate or at least develop political connections 
and clientelist relations with party’s candidates. In particular, the electoral system that 
foresees: 
‘the party announces the list of candidate MPs, but those who will be elected for a seat in the 
Parliament depend on the preferences of the voters. The voters put a cross on the candidates 
they prefer from the party list on Election Day. This forces candidates of the same party to 
seek individual votes from the voters who vote for their party’ (Papathanassopoulos, 
2001:21).   
 
However, from 1990 onwards the political parties in Greece have seen their strength 
and influence to decline gradually. One indication of the decline is the falling numbers 
of party membership. For example, as the relevant data has shown, from 1985 to 1995 
political parties’ membership decrease to 42 per cent making hard for the political 
parties to mobilise public support at the grassroots level (Teperoglou & Tsatsanis, 
2014). More specifically, as Papathanassopoulos has suggested ‘decreasing party 
alignment, diminishing participation in party events, and the fact that the electorate 
has become more volatile all highlight the decline of parties as mechanisms for 
political organisation’ (2000: 58). In parallel, the falling numbers of party membership 
in recent years go hand in hand with the fact that citizens express less trust in the 
political system in general and they feel increasingly reluctant to support a political 
party. For instance relevant research of the polling firm Alco has shown that ‘in the 
period 1990-1995, more and more voters came to believe that today’s political parties 
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neither “express their views” nor “have a vision” for the future’ (cited in 
Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 51-52). 
Another indication of the weakening of the Greek parties is the gradual decline of 
party identification over the years. Teperoglou & Tsatsanis have illustrated this point 
by comparing evidence provided research conducted by the EKKE Institute in 1985 
and the polling organisations Opinion and MRB in 1993 and 2011 respectively (2014: 
229). More specifically, party identification has decreased significantly in the age 
group 18-34 years old, from 80 per cent in 1985 to 75 per cent in 1993 falling further 
below 60 per cent in 2011. Furthermore, in the age group 35-54 years old, party 
identification rose from around 83 per cent in 1985 to 88 per cent in 1993 but since 
then it is in continuing decline falling well below 70 per cent in 2011. In the age group 
55+ years old, partisanship was over 80 per cent in 1985, increased in 1993 reaching 
almost 90 per cent before being in decline falling below 75 per cent until 2011.   
There are three reasons about the weakening of political parties in Greece. One of the 
reasons is that from 1990 onwards the ideological cleavages and policy differences 
between the two parties of government have been narrowed. As Papathanassopoulos 
has pointed out: 
‘from about the late 1980’s, there has been congruence among the leading political parties (..) 
the entry of Greece into the European Union (EU), the internationalisation of the economy and 
the changes in the international political order have led the two leading political parties to 
adopt similar, if not identical, policies’ (2007: 128). 
 
More specifically, within the EU context, both PASOK and ND had to promote a 
policy mix of fiscal consolidation and structural changes in order to enter and remain 
in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Thus, it can be argued that the 
consensus over the policy goals of the country has shifted the focus of voters from the 
ideology to the capacity of parties and party leaders to deliver (Papathanassopoulos, 
2000: 50-51). As a result, partisanship has been weakened.  
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Another reason, of the apparent parties’ decline, is related to the policy limits imposed 
by the EMU context. The need to bring down the public deficit by applying spending 
cuts and tax increases constrained the ability of the political parties to satisfy their 
constituencies’ demands by using clientelist means like the recruitment of the party’s 
supporters in the public sector. It is characteristic that in ‘1994, the government passed 
a law - the so-called “Peponis law,” named after the minister of the interior and public 
administration - to restrict clientelist practices such as providing public jobs for 
supporters’ (Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 51).  
 
In this context, alterations within the parties have gone hand-in-hand with alterations 
in Greek political culture. Middle-ground voters have increased in number to become 
a critical part of the electorate, weakening any former ideologically driven 
identification between voter and party. In particular, as Pappas and Dinas have 
suggested: 
 
‘one could identify five major changes in Greek public opinion around that time: (a) a marked 
decline of statism, most notably in the belief that economic growth should not be left entirely 
to the state; (b) the ascendancy of political pragmatism over the radicalism and ideologization 
that had prevailed in the past; (c) the growth of the centre vote and the dramatic reduction in 
voters placing themselves on the left; (d) a widespread disillusionment with politics, which 
resulted in the tendency of the electorate to vote, not for the ‘best’ party, but for the ‘least bad’; 
and (e) a high vote volatility, which severed past electoral alliances and caused significant 
shifts in political allegiances from one election to the next’ (2009: 483). 
 
As a result, the percentage of undecided or floating voters has increased, widening the 
middle ground of the political spectrum. According to the polling data of the MRB 
polling firm, at the end of 1980s the number of centrist voters had increased from 16 
to 30 per cent of the electorate (cited in Loulis, 2007: 280). In addition, an increasing 
number of voters feels reluctant to identify itself in the left-right axis compared to the 
onset of the democratic regime and to what happened in other countries in South 
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Europe (Freire, 2006).  As Teperoglou & Tsatsanis, based on the studies of EKKE and 
the polling firm MRB, ‘[in 1985] an overwhelming majority (91 per cent) of the 
sample selected a position on the left-right axis. This declined to around 80 per cent by 
2000 (..) where it continued to hover for the rest of the decade (..) By 2011 it had 
dropped again, with only 74 per cent (..) declaring a left–right position’ (2014: 229).  
 
Therefore, there has been a significant shift to the centre of the political spectrum on 
the part of the electorate and consequently the parties of government have positioned 
themselves within the middle ground, transforming from guardians of a certain strict 
political ideology to new age ‘catch-all’ parties (Loulis, 2003: 47). Their main 
objective has become the gathering of the majority of votes, abandoning past practices 
that created a strong ideological connection with voters. Thus, it is reasonable to 
assume that due to this ideological convergence ‘the leading political parties [in 
Greece] have faced considerable difficulties in getting their agendas placed before the 
public, since they are less able to differentiate themselves and Greek citizens have 
become less supportive of  the political parties’ (Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 16). At 
this point  it is important to note that the expansion of the ‘middle ground’ and the 
consequent decline of the appeal of traditional ideologies were the logical result of the 
expansion of the middle class as a consequence of economic and social developments 
like the  economic growth and of the enhancement of the welfare state (Alexandrou, 
2007; Voulgaris, 2008). These social changes influenced the political parties in 
Greece, which in their turn began adapting to the new era.  
 
The emergent pressing questions on which voters are called to pronounce and on 
which the parties target their communication mechanisms have to do with choosing 
the party with the most competent leader, or choosing the party that is best to govern, 
or selecting the leader that is more likely to become a successful Prime Minister. As 
Loulis has put it: 
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‘Particularly, our political leaders are judged by how engaged they seem in three critical areas. 
The sense of efficiency, they create, which in turn enhances confidence in their face. The sense 
of responsibility they exude, which strengthens their credibility. The sense they are socially 
sensitive, even if the circumstances deemed do not allow them to prove it in practice’ (2007: 
361).      
 
In this context, the parties have seen their positions to decline ‘within the political 
process – e.g. voters are no longer “aligned”, they no longer have access to their 
“own” media – which has made them even more dependent on the media’ 
(Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 17). As a result, it could be argued that the role of 
political leaders in influencing voting preferences has been strengthened over time 
leading to the rise of candidate-centered rather than party-centered campaign. Of 
course ‘identification with political parties is still quite significant’ (Negrine, 
2006:167), yet their role from 1990 onwards  is weaker than in the past and therefore 
parties and party leaders co-exist in political communication terms. The increasing 
importance of leadership, in influencing voting behaviour as well as in political 
communication terms, is reinforced further by the rise and development of private 
television, which in turn has given rise to the personalisation of the political process 
(Papathanassopoulos, 2000:58). Next section considers the modernisation of the media 
system of Greece.  
 
5. 3.B The modernisation of the Greek media system 
By the end of 1980s, the winds of change in the broadcasting sector became visible 
with the initiatives of three politicians from the major opposition New Democracy 
party who were elected mayors of the three most important Greek cities in the 1986 
local elections: Athens, Thessaloniki and Piraeus (Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 128; 
Leandros 2000; Yannas 2002). The first three non-state radio stations Athens 98.4, 
Thessaloniki 100 and Station 1 of Piraeus were operated after 1987 by the municipal 
authorities of these three cities, ‘ruled by other parties than the PASOK then in power 
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in Athens’ (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 125). The same year, law no.1730 permitted the 
private sector to own and operate local radio stations provided their owners were 
Greek citizens. The law had such an immediate and profound impact on the 
broadcasting market that within a four-year period (1987 - 1991). 1200 new private 
local radio stations sprung up all over Greece. Sotiris Kouvelas, then mayor of 
Thessaloniki, founded the first local non-state TV station called TV 100 
(Papathanassopoulos, 2005: 286-287). 
Since 1989, the Greek Parliament has passed legislation legalizing private 
broadcasting in both the radio and television sectors granted licenses to private 
interests for the ownership and operation of television channels (Alexandrou, 2007: 7).  
From the late 1980s onwards, the number of private television networks and radio 
stations has increased significantly. In the period 1989-1993, in addition to the three 
state-run television channels, two private channels, Mega Channel and Antenna TV, 
came on stream; and a few years later three more private nationwide television 
networks were established like Skai TV and Star Channel  (Papathanasopoulos, 2000: 
49). From 1993 onwards, specifically, there was a steady increase in the number of 
private television channels, with at least three networks reaching a nationwide 
audience and many more transmitting to local audiences. As a result, privately owned 
television became the public’s principal source of information (Negrine and 
Papathanassopoulos, 1996; Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 48-49).  
 
With the deregulation of the broadcasting, private television has adopted the 
commercialised logic of the marketplace. According to Papathanassopoulos (1997), 
‘the level of sensationalism is extremely high in the Greek commercial television’. In 
parallel, similarly with commercial television networks elsewhere, privately owned 
television channels in Greece put more emphasis on personalities and images rather 
than policies and ideas (Deligiaouri, 2011:64; Papathanassopoulos, 2000). The 
practice of the private television channels has also affected public broadcasting. For 
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example, public television networks, traditionally the mouthpiece of the government, 
have appeared to be more objective and more commercial after the emergence of 
privately owned television, though they have remained politically friendly to the 
governing party (Leandros, 2000).  
 
Moreover, the explosion of private electronic media has created challenges for 
newspapers, First it has contributed to the further decline of newspapers’ circulation 
(Papathanassopoulos, 2004: 43). Second, it has exerted pressure to the Greek press to 
be modernised by using new technologies like websites (Psychogios, 1992: 11-35; 
Zaharopoulos and Paraschos, 1993: 67). In response, newspapers have focused on the 
analysis and interpretation of events as well as starting to exploit the possibilities of 
the new technologies (Leandros, 2000). Furthermore, a lot of them became less 
partisan in order to attract a wider readership and others more, ‘indulging in fanaticism 
and exaggeration to appeal more strongly to the supporters of a particular party’ 
(Kotzaivazoglou and Zotos, 2007: 11).  
 
The rapid development of the mass media and in particular the explosion of private 
broadcasting has had a considerable impact on the Greek political process and the 
implementation of campaigning. As Papathanassopoulos has put it, ‘in Greece the 
modernisation of the political campaigning and marketing has changed as a result of 
the arrival, the development and the dominance of private television in the 
communication landscape’ (2007: 22). The media have moved centre stage in election 
campaigning and they have gradually assumed a central role in the day-to-day practice 
of the government and the political parties. Political debate has moved from public 
gatherings to television talk shows and roundtables. In other words, ‘television has 
become a significant, if not indispensable, medium for political parties and politicians 
in their efforts to communicate with the public’ (Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 127).   
 165 
Since the parliamentary elections of 1990, and especially since the 1993 national 
elections, ‘there has been a greater degree of professionalisation in the use of the 
media in order to get the message across to the voters’ (Negrine, 2008: 167). Political 
parties have concentrated their campaigns around television news programming, 
television political advertising, television debates and appearances by candidates on 
television talk shows. In the early elections of 1996, television had shifted to centre 
stage. According to Papathanassopoulos ‘the 1996 national elections were coined as 
the first “TV Elections” and “the elections on the couch” while the growing 
importance of TV was confirmed in the coming national elections of 2000 and 2004’ 
(2007: 132).  
At the same time, the media environment was becoming increasingly pressing and 
demanding, given that the number of television networks increased. For instance, six 
private nationwide television stations were in operation during Karamanlis’ tenure, 
almost all the newspapers had created digital editions, making a 24/7 news cycle 
possible, and blogging was also becoming highly popular. Moreover, the media 
‘conduct their own polls - as they do in other countries. This means that, far more than 
just locating and reporting the “news” itself, they can then comment on it, often with 
their own political ends in view’ (Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 137).  
In particular, news bulletins and newspapers very often publish opinion polls, 
highlighting not only the figures of voting intention, party preferences and government 
popularity, but also the leaders’ assessment data, including ‘best prime minister’ and 
‘satisfied/dissatisfied with the prime minister’ (Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 47). As a 
result, they project the daily political battle in a campaign-like mode as a horse race, 
by putting emphasis on leaders’ personalities and sound bites (Papathanassopoulos, 
2000: 57) and hence reinforcing to some extent the personalisation of the political 
process. An indication of the personalisation of Greek politics is, as Alexandrou has 
put it,  ‘the emergence of television broadcasting made its appearance at a later stage, 
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imposing a slower start of the professionalisation of political campaigns which 
emphasize the image of party leaders during election campaigns’ (2007: 2).  
Furthermore, the model adopted on news reporting by the major networks, with 
political commentators who interpret and criticise the government’s positions made it 
very challenging and complicated for the government to impose its issue-framing in a 
hostile communication environment (Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 57). As Antonaros  
argues, ‘it is not easy for the agenda to be controlled in the current media landscape, 
especially since every newscast includes two or three political commentators who 
express views on almost all issues, bring their own agenda and promote their own 
interpretations’ (2012b: interview with the author). 
From the middle 2000s onwards, apart from newspapers, radio stations and national 
television networks, the 24/7 news websites and political blogs increased in number as 
well. Particularly with all the leading newspapers had their own digital editions as well 
as the number of websites and on-line forums constantly increases (Alexandrou, 2007: 
17; Kotsikopoulou, 2002). Social media like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube were 
becoming increasingly popular, attracting the interest of the youth and contributing to 
the speedy transmission of news (Deligiaouri, 2011: 65-66). In addition, from the end 
of 2009 the media landscape facing political parties and government in Greece has 
been broadened. The reason was that Greece was in the spotlight, due to the Eurozone 
debt crisis, was attracting the focus of foreign media from all over the world. 
Consequently, Prime Minister Papandreou for example, had to deal not only with 
Greek but also with international media. He had to invest considerable time and 
energy in enhancing the way Greece was perceived by the media, journalists and 
public opinion, given that the member-states of the euro zone and the member-states 
of the International Monetary Fund were financing the bail-out package for Greece.   
Overall, the modernisation of the Greek media system with the advent of private 
television has contributed to the modernisation of the political communication 
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practices adopted by the political parties and in parallel has contributed to the 
personalisation of politics by focusing particularly on the role of party leaders and 
consequently on the prime ministers. Both party leaders and the prime ministers have 
sought to collaborate with communication professionals in order to deliver to the 
needs created by the current political communication environment. Next section 
analyses the rise of the new political technologies in Greece in recent decades.  
 
5.3. C  The rise of new political technologies 
From 1990 onwards, in parallel with the decline of the political parties and the advent 
of television, a new industry of communication professionals has risen in Greece 
providing its expertise to parties, leaders and politicians contributing not only to the 
modernisation of the election campaigning, but also to the development of the 
permanent campaigning. The New Democracy party collaborated with the strategists 
Lefteris Kousoulis, John Loulis and George Flessas.   Loulis as a professional political 
strategist, he has held the post of the director of the Center for Political Research and 
Information, a political think tank of the conservative wing. He also has served as a 
political advisor to a certain number of New Democracy party leaders. 
(Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 131). Flessas founded and has been the head of the 
political communication and public relations company Civitas, the first company ever 
to conduct this kind of business in Greece, and he has provided his services to 
candidates at the local, national and European election scale. During the 2000 national 
elections, he worked alongside the leader of New Democracy, Kostas Karamanlis 
(Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 131).  
 
The founder, owner and head of the Saying and Doing public communications 
company, Lefteris Kousoulis, has been perhaps one of the few political operatives in 
Greece to have provided his services to both the major political parties. He became 
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more broadly known for his work alongside the former leader of New Democracy, 
Konstantinos Mitsotakis, for the 1993 national elections and then continued with the 
former Mayor of Athens and later the former leader of the ND, Miltiades Evert. 
However, his major success is considered his work alongside the PASOK leader and 
[current] Prime Minister Simitis during the 2000 national elections (Yannas, 2001: 6). 
According to Papathanassopoulos ‘he had the idea of focusing on the 2000 election 
campaign more on Costa Simitis (..) and less on PASOK itself’ (2003: 131).  
 
Apart from Kousoulis, who corresponds to the model of a communication 
professional, the other political analysts and pollsters have been affiliated for a long 
time with either ND or PASOK, indicating that party loyalty does play an important 
role in the selection of advisors. As Yannas has suggested ‘this observation is 
consistent with other findings from the United States and other European countries 
that support a positive relationship between the previous party background and 
ideological position of the consultants on the one hand and the parties they are likely 
to consult as clients’ (2001: 6).   
 
In parallel, political parties have cooperated with professional advertisers and 
advertising agencies as well. According to Yannas: 
 
‘The governing socialist party, PASOK, has been collaborating closely since 1992 with a 
Greek firm called Mass Team Athens. [From 1990 onwards] the major opposition party, New 
Democracy (..) has contracted out in different election periods the services of a number of 
Greek companies affiliated with foreign multinationals like Spot Thompson, BBDO, Bold, 
McCan Erickson, Leo Burnett etc. Political advertising is not limited to the two major parties. 
Other smaller parties as well employ advertising agencies subject to their own budgetary 
constraints. For example, in the October 1993 national elections, the Coalition of the Left 
employed the services of the advertising agencies Odeon and Diabolo and the Political Spring 
party started out with Spot Thompson and finished the campaign with Komvos’ (2001: 5). 
 
 169 
Political parties and politicians have also used opinion polls in order to shape electoral 
strategy, select party leaders and measure candidates’ popularity. In particular, parties 
use ‘their own polls and their own internal information, not as a means of getting 
objective information but rather as just another weapon in the political campaign. 
Most of the times, the opposition party, using the evidence of the polls, accuses the 
government of inefficiency in dealing with the day-to-day problems of the citizens’ 
(Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 137). Several polling firms have provided their research 
data and advice to political parties. The restoration of democracy in 1974 provided the 
necessary condition for their emergence. More than ten Greek polling firms comprise 
the Greek Association of Public Opinion and Market Research. Among the most 
prominent polling companies are MRB, V-PRC, Kappa Research, ALKO and Metron 
Analysis (Yannas, 2001: 4) 
 
The significant impact of opinion polls on the political process is evident in several 
cases. According to Papathanassopoulos: 
 
‘an example that illustrates [this] point is when Dimitris Avramopoulos, in his second term as 
the Athens Mayor, announced on 18 December 2000, on TV the creation of a new party which, 
three months later (on March 6, 2001), he called the ‘Movement of Free Citizens’. Fifteen 
months later, he announced that his decision to suspend the operations of KEP was due to the 
‘excessive economic demands…and our refusal to depend on powerful economic interests’. In 
fact, it was a party based, either in its formation or in its demise, on the results of the pollsters. 
He received a strong start in the opinion polls, but, despite the heavy promotion of the media, 
his party never received more than 16 per cent in the polls while in 2001 it slipped below 5 per 
cent’ (2007: 137).      
 
Since the early 1990s the involvement of the media in the political and social 
landscape has grown stronger and stronger and ultimately the media became the major 
platform presenting and at the same time influencing political matters. It is only 
logical then that alongside the explosion of the Greek media, including the electronic 
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media, an explosion of political advertising was evident and this gradually became a 
dominant characteristic of Greek political communication. Television in particular, but 
also radio, newspapers websites and the new media in general became an advertising 
arena for the parties and individual candidates in their effort to carry their message to 
the broader public. The political communication staffs were enhanced by the presence 
of professional advertisers and media consultants, who were in charge of campaign 
spots and political commercials on television, as well as special advertisements 
targeted to special demographics. They were also in charge of highlighting significant 
issues, analyzing poll ratings and selecting the appropriate media for message 
distribution. It is easy to identify the growing impact of political advertising by just 
taking a simple look at the share of the television advertising budget in the general 
advertising election budgets of PASOK and ND during the campaigns.  
 
During the 1990 national elections, the television advertising budget of New 
Democracy absorbed 46.4 per cent of the party’s advertising budget. A few years later 
in the run-up to the 1993 general election and particularly in October of that year, the 
share of television advertising almost doubled for ND to 83.8 per cent and for PASOK 
erupted from a modest 6.7 per cent to an astonishing 75.7 per cent of the party’s 
advertising budget. The data from 1993 and onwards indicate that the two major 
parties have spent over 80 per cent of their advertising budget on television spots. 
Therefore, political advertising in Greece has grown immensely (Yannas, 2001: 4). As 
Yannas has illustrated, ‘for the 1999 European Parliament elections, the advertising 
expenditure of PASOK totaled €4.5 million including taxes. For the final forty days 
prior to the 9 April 2000 election, PASOK exceeded €3 million in media expenditure 
and New Democracy spent over €2.2 million (2001: 7). 
  
Regarding the campaign messages, the two major parties chose to place ads with 
positive future-oriented messages for the April 2000 election. The ruling party of 
PASOK focused its advertising on mottos projecting the future, such as ‘we all create 
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the New Greece, the future has begun’ or ‘Development and a better life for all, the 
future has begun’. The emblem of the party was located on the bottom left part of each 
ad and on the bottom right corner of each ad the name of the leader, Kostas Simitis, 
could be found. ‘The rising green sun of PASOK signified continuity with the past and 
was placed on the left corner to win over  the traditional left-wing supporters of the 
party who might have been tempted to vote for smaller parties (e.g. Coalition of the 
Left) ideologically placed to the left of PASOK’ (Yannas, 2001: 6). The name of the 
Prime Minister, Kostas Simitis, was placed on all ads in order for the voter to be able 
to connect him to the party and to enhance the party’s overall performance, based on 
the primeministerial high popularity ratings and the Prime Minister’s high job 
approval ratings. The core message of New Democracy was that ‘there is a better 
Greece and we want it’. The party’s name signed the ad with a call for a ‘new 
beginning’ (Yannas, 2001: 6). 
 
Negative political advertising was also apparent in Greek elections. Since the 1993 
election, a major part of the campaign strategy has been based on negative political 
television. One example that illustrates this point is the campaign of New Democracy 
in the European election of 1999. The New Democracy party launched a new negative 
television advertisement, which illustrated Costas Simitis’ head painted green floating 
in a virtual reality environment. At the same time, it illustrated real images of street 
confrontations between the police and various social groups that resisted the 
promotion of policy reforms in education and social security, to which images the 
floating head was indifferent. According to Yannas, ‘the effectiveness of the negative 
ad was undisputed: 55.8 per cent of Greeks could recall the negative ad of New 
Democracy and only 17.5 per cent the positive ads of PASOK’ (2001: 7).  
 
The 1996 general election is a good example of the use of negative advertising in a 
campaign for office (Papathanassopoulos, 2002: 80-81). Just two hours after Prime 
Minister Kostas Simitis had called a snap election, the opposition party of New 
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Democracy broadcast the first negative ad on television. The clip portrayed Simitis 
stating firmly in various speeches that the election would be held in September of the 
same year. Towards the end of the ad a ‘voice-over asked: Elections on September 22. 
Can we trust him?’(Yannas, 2001: 8). Its role was to shed doubt on the credibility of 
Simitis and of the ruling party of PASOK by pointing out their inconsistency to their 
prior claims that the PASOK government would serve out the full four-year term of 
office. As Papathanassopoulos has put it ‘in effect, both parties were accusing each 




All the factors mentioned in this chapter appear to have contributed significantly to the 
modernisation of the political communication context and the development of the 
permanent campaign trend in contemporary Greece. First, the decay of political parties 
and particularly the decline of ideologies have resulted in the broadening of the voters 
of the middle ground. Those voters are not ideologically oriented, so political parties 
and political leaders need sophisticated communication strategies to reach them. Those 
strategies appear to rely on leaders’ personal qualities. 
Second, the development of private broadcasting networks has altered the Greek 
political landscape covering the political process as a continuing horse-race and hence 
motivating parties and political leaders to apply modern communication techniques in 
order to get their messages across. Third, the need for both political parties and 
politicians to reach floating voters through the mass media and especially television 
has increased the use of new political technologies, such as advertising, polling, public 
relations and image making. This has in turn reinforced the notion of the permanent 
campaign era. Having analysed the factors that contributed to the emergence of the 
permanent campaign era in Greece, the following summarises the main conclusions, 
compares the permanent campaign of the three Greek premiers and discusses the 
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The Permanent Campaign in Greece Revisited 
 
So far the permanent campaign strategy has been implemented by executives in the 
US, Australia, Latin America and Europe (particularly the UK and Italy). Using the 
contemporary Greek political environment as a case study, this thesis has contributed 
to the ongoing research on the permanent campaign issue. In particular, it has 
concentrated on the terms of office of three recent Greek Prime Ministers: Costas 
Simitis (centre-left), Kostas Karamanlis (centre-right) and George Papandreou (centre-
left). It attempted to provide answers to the following three questions: whether these 
Prime Ministers exercised a permanent campaign strategy, what led them to this 
strategy, and finally to what extent did the permanent campaign have on their 
popularity. The conclusion is that, due to political and technological factors, which 
altered the political communication environment in Greece, all three did indeed adopt 
a permanent campaign strategy in order to sustain their popularity, yet the impact on 
their public approval was weak. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section one compares the permanent 
campaign strategy of the three premiers under consideration highlighting similarities 
and differences. Section two, taking as its starting point the finding that the 
campaigning style of governing hardly affected the primeministerial popularity, 
analyses the factors influencing the primeministerial approval and considers the 
question of what would have happened if the Greek premiers had not followed the 
permanent campaign trend. Section three outlines the academic contributions of the 
work discussing its limitations and extensions regarding the opportunities of future 
research on the field.  
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6.1 The three Prime Ministers compared 
The thesis has showed that the three recent Greek prime ministers have brought the 
election campaign apparatus, experts, tools, techniques and tactics into governing in 
order to sustain public approval. To this end, the Greek premiers established new 
communication units in the primeministerial Office, collaborated with communication 
professionals, used private polling to shape political strategy, policy and presentation, 
formulated political messages in order to label their government plans and made 
campaign-like public appearances to get their message across.  
Comparing the campaigning style of governing across the three prime ministers, a 
number of similarities emerges. First, they have strengthened, maintained and 
expanded the communication apparatus of the primeministerial Office. Simitis 
originally created the Press Office of the Prime Minister. Karamanlis retained the 
Press Office and expanded the communication apparatus of the Maximos Mansion by 
creating the posts of the Minister of State and his deputy who replaced the Minister of 
Press and Media acting as government spokespersons. Papandreou initially maintained 
the Press Office as well as the Minister of State and his deputy, though only the latter 
acted as government spokesperson. After a year in office, Papandreou formed the 
Group of Political and Communicative Planning consisting of certain members of the 
Council of Ministers (including the Deputy Minister of State as government 
spokesman) in order to achieve a better coordination inside his government, while he 
retained the primeministerial Press Office. However, due to the Group’s apparent 
failure, Papandreou adopted the recommendations made by the Committee for the 
Reform of the Government and overhauled the Office of the Prime Minister. He 
created the post of the General Secretary to the Prime Minister responsible, among 
others, to supervise the seven units of the primeministerial Office, one of which was 
the Political and Communicational Planning Unit. In parallel, Papandreou assigned the 
responsibility of government representative to the Minister of State while he abolished 
the post of the Deputy Minister of State. Overall, from 1996 until 2011 new outreach 
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units were added in the primeministerial Office reinforcing the notion that modern 
prime ministers in Greece have engaged in a permanent campaign mentality.  
The second common trend across the compared premiers is that they collaborated with 
communication professionals like pollsters, strategists and journalists, not only in the 
election campaigns but also in the governing process, in order to improve the 
communication strategy and the news management of their administration. Simitis 
cooperated with the pollster Stratos Fanaras and from 1999 onwards with the strategist 
Lefteris Kousoulis. Karamanlis consulted with the strategist John Loulis, the pollster 
Dimitris Mavros and from 2000 onwards with the former political journalist 
Theodoros Rousopoulos. In line with his predecessors, Papandreou collaborated with 
communication experts like the former political journalist George Elenopoulos and the 
pollster Maria Karaklioumi.   
Third, the use of private (and public) polling in order to shape government policy and 
communication is another common feature of all recent Greek Prime Ministers. 
Simitis, Karamanlis and Papandreou regularly observed focus groups, opinion surveys 
on all critical issues and polling indicators like government and opposition popularity, 
the popularity of both the government and the opposition in specific policy areas, the 
voting intentions as well as the approval of the Prime Minister and of other political 
leaders. Especially Papandreou became a pioneer in this regard compared to his 
predecessors in the premiership. He established in the headquarters of his party a 
mechanism for conducting private polls since he did not trust the public opinion 
research companies.  
Furthermore, the polls influenced the decisions of Prime Ministers in certain cases. 
For instance, they consulted opinion polls to choose the candidates for the municipal 
elections. Another case of influence by the polls is the reshuffles that all political 
executives in Greece made to improve the image of their government. Regarding 
policy issues there have been cases where the Prime Ministers changed tack based on 
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opinion poll findings. For example, Karamanlis postponed his education reform until 
2006 because the findings of the polls showed that the public believed that he had not 
conducted the necessary dialogue among all of those who were involved with this 
issue. However, it should be noted there have been cases where, despite public support 
as expressed in polls, the reforms were never actually implemented. For instance, the 
privatisation of public enterprises had no actual results to present during both 
Karamanlis’ and Papandreou’s premierships. The vast majority of the public at rates of 
over 60 per cent were polarised of privatisation, but the views of the public sector 
unions had greater impact on the government. As a result, politicians treated the 
findings of opinion polls on these issues with skepticism. They believed that the 
conflict with the unions would entail tremendous political cost as the continuous and 
dynamic mobilisation might shift public opinion. 
The fourth common trend is the use of campaign-like messages. Simitis, Karamanlis 
and in a lesser degree Papandreou  attempted to formulate and communicate 
campaign-like messages, using them repeatedly and consistently as labels for their 
government plans throughout their tenures. For example, Simitis’ main political goal 
was to ‘modernise’ Greece. In particular, his electoral pledge in the election of 1996 
was the goal of securing Greece’s entry into the Economic and Monetary Union and 
the main electoral pledge in the 2000 election was the effort to achieve the 
convergence of Greece with the European standards of living. To this end, throughout 
his two terms, Simitis used repeatedly and consistently the motto of ‘Strong Greece’ in 
order to express his policy in a simple and understandable message.  
Karamanlis campaigned in the 2004 general elections stressing the need for a ‘political 
change’ after almost 20 years of PASOK’s rule. Initially, he projected his fiscal 
retrenchment program as a ‘mild’ fiscal adjustment. In parallel, he labeled his 
sweeping changes in the economy and the welfare state as ‘reforms’. The latter was 
Karamanlis’ motto throughout his governance. Papandreou campaigned in the 2009 
national elections promising to implement a plan of Keynesian expansionary policy to 
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get the economy out of the recession arguing that ‘there is money’ to finance his 
policy. The slogan ‘there is money’ followed Papandreou until the middle of January 
2010 (Pretenteris, 2012:59). However, at the beginning of February 2010, he changed 
policy course and in the face of immediate default, he adopted a plan of rapid fiscal 
consolidation and supply-side reforms. The so called ‘Memorandum’ (the bail-out 
agreement between Greece and the Troika of the EC-ECB-IMF) which followed a few 
months later forced Papandreou to alter his central message arguing that his intention 
was to ensure the ‘rescue’ of the country by averting a disorderly default.  
The fifth common feature of the Greek campaigning style of governing implemented 
by the three incumbents is the use of campaign-like tactics to get their messages 
across, even though as it has been illustrated, each of the PMs adopted a different 
campaigning style. However, apart from the campaign-like public appearances, recent 
premiers in Greece engaged in public activities in the context of parliamentary 
democracy. For example, they addressed the  Parliament and the parliamentary groups 
of their parties, gave speeches to party conventions and congresses, gave press 
conferences after the European summits in Brussels or after their official meetings 
with foreign leaders (either in Athens or abroad). More specifically, they did make 
hundreds of those public appearances exploiting the opportunity to disseminate their 
messages to the public in an unfiltered way, given the fact that all these public 
addresses received extensive (live) media coverage by TV and radio networks as well 
as websites.   
Certainly, Simitis’ predecessors, who did not engage in a permanent campaign 
process, made those public appeals to receive media coverage mainly by the public 
TV and radio networks, which had been monopolizing the media sector until the 
beginning of 1990s. Yet in the cases of Simitis, Karamanlis and Papandreou, these 
public appeals have been regarded as part of the permanent campaign because they 
differ in two respects. Firstly, they received live coverage not only by the public but 
also by the private media and websites. Secondly, they took place in a context of the 
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permanent campaign coupled with campaign-like public appearances, campaign-like 
messages and communication institutions filled with communication professionals and 
with the use of opinion polling. As a result, this study, following Kernel’s typology, 
brought together all these public appeals, dividing them at the same time into major 
and minor pubic addresses.    
At this point, it is notable that the regular governing season, in which the permanent 
campaign took place, was mediated by local/regional and European elections. So the 
question is raised whether Greek political leaders were forced to engage with a 
permanent campaign strategy given the timing of the elections. In the British context, 
as Seymour-Ure has noticed, ‘with devolution, European parliamentary elections and 
the occasional referendum, prime ministers have more opportunities than in the past 
for partisan campaigning during the course of their government’ (2001:196). There is 
no doubt that the mediated elections for the local government institutions and the 
European Parliament could be seen as motives for the prime ministers to engage in the 
notion of the permanent campaign.  
However, their influence can hardly be viewed as decisive. One of the reasons is the 
timing of these elections. In the case of Simitis, the local/regional elections were held 
two years after the 1996 and 2000 national elections, in 1998 and 2002 respectively. 
Similarly, in the case of Karamanlis they were held in 2006 while in the case of 
Papandreou they took place only a year after the 2009 general elections, in November 
2010. In addition, the elections for the European Parliament were conducted three 
times from 1996 until 2011, in 1999 (three years after the 1996 general elections), in 
2004 (three months after the 2004 national elections) and in 2009 (two years after the 
2007 parliamentary elections). Therefore, even though the political parties and the 
party leaders ran the campaign for the European elections, the timing of the latter 
hardly forced them to campaign constantly. Another reason is that the local/regional 
campaign is largely undertaken by candidates themselves, who run for mayors and 
heads of the regional government institutions, not by the political parties at the central 
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level, with the exception of Papandreou in 2010. The latter participated in person in 
the campaign in order to back his electoral strategy to turn the local elections into a 
referendum about his government, by linking the electoral appeal of the candidates 
supported by PASOK with public support to his government and the bailout package 
he had put in place.  
It is certain that the implementation of the campaigning style of governing was 
differentiated, to some extent, between the political executives under consideration. 
For example, unlike Simitis and Papandreou, Karamanlis’ permanent campaign 
appeared to exert more centralised control upon government communications having 
created within the Maximos Mansion the post of Minister of State who acted as 
government representative coordinating in parallel the heads of the ministerial press 
offices on a daily basis. In addition, unlike his center-left counterparts Karamanlis had 
more frequent and consistent consultation with communication professionals and 
relied more heavily on opinion polling and especially focus groups evidence to shape 
his political decisions.  
There are three reasons that explain these qualitative differences. First, Karamanlis, as 
opposition leader, employed a model of centralised and well-coordinated party 
communications in order to improve its efficiency given he had to deal with a hostile 
media environment because the majority of the media were left leaning and pro-
government. As a result, he continued to employ the same model once in power. 
Second, the New Democracy party had been out of office for 11 years and it had to 
transform itself in order to be electable again. The transformation resided in focus 
group data and sophisticated opinion polling, driven mainly by the strategist and 
expert on focus group analysis John Loulis. He was the one who formulated the 
middle-ground strategy arguing that ND should change its overall image from a right 
wing to a party of the middle ground. The third reason that explains the fact that the 
ND administration proved to be more poll-driven than the left-of-centre governments 
might be related to the notion that the center-right parties are ideologically more pro-
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market and consequently they are used to adopt more easily (political) marketing 
techniques rather than the socialist parties.  
Another difference between the permanent campaign strategies applied by the three 
premiers appears to be the use of particular campaign-like tactics to get their messages 
across. In the election campaigns the Greek leaders are expected to give televised, 
radio, press and web interviews, also to host press conferences, make nationwide tours 
delivering speeches to local audiences, give speeches in crowed partisan gatherings in 
Athens, make unedited televised addresses to the national audience as well as use 
mostly televised advertisements.  
In the aftermath of the election, during the ‘regular governing season’, the three Prime 
Ministers continued to use campaign-like public appearances, yet they chose those that 
were more suited to the communication capabilities of each. Simitis, for instance, had 
no particular communicative or rhetorical skills and thus gave few televised interviews 
during his tenure, while he made numerous tours of the country highlighting in that 
way the work of the government, which placed particular emphasis on upgrading the 
country's infrastructure. Karamanlis also made went on domestic political tours but, 
unlike Simitis, preferred the live televised addresses from the Maximos Mansion to 
contact the Greek people on serious political economic, social and foreign policy 
issues given the fact that he had exceptional rhetorical skills and an outstanding 
communicative presence.  
Papandreou, although his incumbency was relatively short-lived compared to his 
predecessors, showed as Prime Minister communicative hyperactivity. In the first year 
in office, he instructed that his speeches in the Cabinet would be broadcasted ‘live’.  
Moreover, he gave several televised addresses from inside the Prime Minister’s 
Office. Ιn addition, he gave numerous interviews and published many signed articles 
to a number of  Greek newspapers. Furthermore, he gave particular emphasis on the 
use of new technologies and social media such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, 
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which allowed him to have direct, unmediated contact with citizens and especially 
with the younger generation. Additionally, he made several foreign media 
appearances. The latter occurred mainly because Greece, during the tenure of 
Papandreou, was placed at the heart of the European and global economic crisis and 
the Greek state appealed to the European support mechanism that was financed by the 
member-states of the Eurozone and the International Monetary Fund. Therefore, 
Papandreou considered it necessary to inform the public of other countries about the 
effort made by Greece.  
However, in spite of some qualitative differences like the fact that they had different 
communication skills, they came from different political families or they represented 
different intraparty factions, all three premiers adopted the permanent campaign 
mentality, even though they adapted it, to some extent, to themselves.  
 
6.2 The impact of the permanent campaign  
Another common feature of the Greek permanent campaign strategy is related to its 
impact on the primeministerial popularity. The study compared the number of 
primeministerial public addresses with the primeministerial popularity ratings 
indicating that the impact was rather weak. In general, neither the major addresses nor 
the minor addresses exerted considerable influence on popularity failing consequently 
to increase, let alone retain approval ratings. For instance Papandreou, who appears to 
be the most active of the three premiers in making public addresses and particularly 
campaign-like public appeals, saw his numbers fall steadily and from a certain point 
significantly until his resignation in November 2011. Overall, irrespective of the 
particular communication skills each of the three prime ministers has, none of them, 
whether center-left or center-right, affected their popularity by adopting the permanent 
campaign strategy.  
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Given that the permanent campaign cannot affect significantly the popularity ratings, 
the question is what can exert influence on them? It is obvious that there are larger 
forces influencing leaders’ popularity (Edwards, 2003: Mueller, 1970; Ostrom and 
Simon, 1985; Jones, 1994). Of course, it has to be noted that the analysis of other 
factors affecting the Greek premiers’ approval ratings exceeds the scope of this study. 
However, this research discusses the issue to some extent assuming that the issues 
dominating the public agenda like the state of the economy, scandals, foreign policy 
issues, domestic and international crises, the way political executives respond to these 
issues and the role of the media in shaping the same agenda play a crucial role in 
influencing the premiers’ popularity ratings. 
In the case of Simitis, at the beginning of the first term, he enjoyed high popularity 
ratings between 55 and 61 per cent, confirming the honeymoon hypothesis - the notion 
that newly elected governments and newly elected prime ministers enjoy a certain 
honeymoon phase with public opinion (Wenzelburger, 2012: 1159). The honeymoon 
lasted more than a year given that from October 1997 until May 1999; the 
primeministerial approval rating was in continuing decline. Particularly from 61 per 
cent in October 1997 Simitis’ approval dropped to 50 per cent in February 1998 and to 
45 per cent in April remaining at that level until May 1999, a month ahead of the 
elections for the European Parliament.   
The reason was the discontent of powerful social groups, which had been triggered by 
the application of the fiscal consolidation program (in order to meet the fiscal criteria 
for the entry of Greece into the Eurozone) as well as the large-scale reforms in public 
sector (Hlepas, 2003; Kazakos, 2010). In addition to the social unrest was the political 
opposition of the New Democracy party and the left-wing Communist party, which 
damaged the primeministerial image even more. In addition, at the beginning of 1999, 
a foreign policy crisis produced significant negative publicity for the government. In 
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particular, the Turkish Secret Services in Kenya arrested the leader of PKK
7
 Abdulah 
Ocalan while being transferred from the Greek embassy (where he had sought refuge) 
to the international airport of Nairobi (Voulgaris, 2008: 131). The crisis caused a 
diplomatic incident with Turkey, which had branded Ocalan as a dangerous terrorist. 
On the other hand, the opposition exerted harsh criticism over the government’s 
handling of the issue, accusing the Prime Minister Simitis of handing over Abdulah 
Ocalan to the Turks.  
At this point, Simitis initiated an attempt to counter-attack criticism and restore the 
socialist government’s image as well as his own appeal by intensifying his 
communication activities, partly due to the then upcoming party congress in March 
1999 (Simitis, 2005: 508), and the European Parliament elections of June 1999 
(Loulis, 2007: 307). However, he hardly improved his personal ratings, failing to turn 
around the negative electoral prospects before the elections for the European 
Parliament in 1999. The New Democracy party under Karamanlis’ leadership defeated 
PASOK by 3 per cent (Loulis, 2011: 156).  
Yet, in the aftermath of the negative outcome of the European elections, Simitis saw 
his ratings to climb again to reach 58 per cent in September 1999 remaining close to 
the level of 60 per cent up to the parliamentary elections of April 2000. A combination 
of different factors contributed to the improvement of Simitis’ performance during that 
time, including his success in dealing with the domestic crisis caused by a strong 
earthquake, which took place in Athens in September 1999, the accomplishment of the 
introduction of Greece into the Eurozone and the achievement of high growth rates. 
Additionally, at the Helsinki Council in 1999, Simitis was successful in initiating the 
process of Cyprus’ entry into the European Union (Economides, 2005: 484-485). 
From the April 2000 elections until March 2001 Simitis’ approval ratings displayed a 
very slow decline to 54 per cent, in spite of the fact that his decision to erase the 
                                                             
7 Political Organisation of Kurdistan. 
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religious status from personal identity cards issued by the Greek state caused severe 
criticism from the Greek Orthodox Church organising massive rallies against the 
government’s decision (Loulis, 2011: 140). One of the reasons of the modest decline is 
that the segment of the population that turned against Simitis’ policy belonged largely 
to the conservative, right-wing part of the political spectrum rather than to the centre-
left, and thus it was considered of lesser importance. 
However, in March 2001 Simitis’ public approval rating dropped well below the 54 
per cent threshold (48 per cent) staying at a level below 50 per cent until September 
2001. At the time, Simitis was promoting the reform of the Social Security system. 
The policy proposal submitted by the Minister of Labour Tasos Giannitsis was 
strongly resisted by the trade unions. In particular, as Kazakos has pointed out ‘the 
General Confederation of Greek Labour (GCGL/ΓΣΕΕ), headed by representatives of 
the public sector unions, rejected any negotiation on this basis and took to the streets. 
After a massive demonstration, the largest in many years, and a general strike on May 
the 17
th
 2001, the whole process came to a halt’ (2004: 911). Furthermore, leading 
government officials and party figures began to clash over the proposed change of the 
pensions system. As Giannitsis has put it:  
‘In fact nobody inside PASOK wanted any discussion of any form. The union space attached to 
PASOK reacted with vehemence and the union bodies and individuals rejected any dialogue. 
Of course the full (..) support of this reaction from almost all government and party officials 
fueled  its intensity and its extent (..) It was obvious that PASOK and the social security issue 
ran on a divisive track’ (2007: 151–152).  
As a result, Simitis withdrew his proposal and called for a party congress in October 
2001 in order to renew his leadership mandate and reshape his falling status within the 
party. Eventually, the party congress re-elected Simitis as Chairman of PASOK who 
saw at the same time his public approval rating rise again, exceeding the 50 per cent 
mark (54 per cent) in November 2001 and remaining at that level until the beginning 
of 2002 (52 per cent). Yet, from February until July 2002, Simitis saw his popularity 
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decline to 49 per cent. Intraparty criticism by prominent political figures and the 
failure to promote health care reform due to, among other reasons, the reactions of 
powerful organised interests in the health system and the departure of the Minister of 
Health could explain the fall of his popularity (Loulis, 2004; Mossialos & Allin, 2005: 
431-432).  
However, from July onwards Simitis saw his popularity ratings climb again above 50 
per cent remaining at that level up to the summer of 2003 (51 per cent). One of the 
reasons was the arrest of members of various left-wing terrorist groups (Loulis, 2004: 
162-165). In addition, Simitis avoided the initiation of controversial reforms. Instead, 
he concentrated on the completion of public works, Greece’s European presidency in 
the first half of 2003 and the preparation of the Olympic Games of 2004. Lastly, in 
September 2003 he announced a plan of expansionary policy measures as well as a 
program aimed to raise the Greek standards of living to reach those of the people of 
the most developed members of the European Union (Karakousis, 2006; Karzis, 2006; 
Kazakos, 2010; Pantagias, 2009: memo; 2009b: interview with the author). 
In the case of Karamanlis, after eleven consecutive years of PASOK government, ND 
came to power taking 45.4 per cent of the total vote and gaining a solid majority with 
160 parliamentary seats. Thus, ND enjoyed a long honeymoon period with public 
opinion winning the elections for the European Parliament held a few after the 
national election in June 2004. In parallel, Karamanlis saw his popularity ratings 
remain at a high level, above 60 per cent, from May 2004 up to February 2005. One of 
the reasons, explaining his high approval ratings, was the successful organising of the 
2004 Olympic Games in Athens. Another reason was that, in spite of the fact he 
displayed, by revising the statistical data on public finances, that fiscal deficit and the 
public debt were higher than the previous government had admitted and hence 
initiated a fiscal consolidation program to bring the deficit down, he managed to 
blame the former PASOK government for this. He could be said to have employed a 
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tactic of blame avoidance, which has been considered as effective in the cases of fiscal 
consolidation plans promoted by newly elected governments (Weaver 1986; Vis & 
Vas Kersbergen, 2007).  
A third reason was that he promoted  a policy plan of gradual fiscal consolidation 
along with incremental reforms in the economy, public services and public 
administration, which was consistent with the image of the moderate political leader of 
the ‘middle ground’ he had projected while being in opposition  (Loulis, 2008: 120; 
Dinas, 2008: 601). Moreover, he not only managed to build a consensus with PASOK, 
the main opposition party,  in the issue of electing the new Head of State
8
 but he was 
also able to impose party discipline since he had won the election by a landslide (after 
11 years in opposition) and ND enjoyed a solid majority of 165 seats in Parliament.  
Between February 2005 and June 2007, Karamanlis’ popularity fell, yet it remained 
over 50 per cent. One of the reasons was that during this period a number of 
corruption scandals emerged generating negative publicity for the government and 
exerting negative influence on Karamanlis’ appeal. In the first months of 2006 the so-
called Vodafone scandal occurred. In particular, at the end of January 2006 three 
ministers – the Minister of Public Security, George Voulgarakis, the Minister of 
Justice Anastasis Papaligouras and the Minister of State (press spokesman) Theodoros 
Rousopoulos – gave a press conference at which they declared that during the 2004 
Olympic Games an ‘unknown centre’, situated close to the American Embassy, had 
tapped into the system of the mobile company Vodafone. The calls of more than a 
hundred mobile phones belonging to top-ranking state officials, elected representatives 
and even the Prime Minister himself had been affected (Loulis, 2008: 131; Pappas, 
2010). Τhe scandal caused damage to the image of both the government and 
Karamanlis personally, probably because the three ministers had no convincing 
                                                             
8 In Greece, the President of the Republic is elected by the Parliament. The election requires approval 
by at least 180 votes in a chamber of 300 seats (Lijphart, 1999; Makridimitris, 2003). 
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answer to the question as to why they had delayed disclosing the information (Loulis, 
2008: 133). 
 
Moreover, in the run-up to the local elections in October 2006, a new scandal
9
 
occurred concerning the function of the Hellenic Competition Commission. Opinion 
polls suggested that the new scandal caused moderate damage to the Karamanlis 
administration, yet ND managed to win the following local elections, with 
conservative candidates elected in the majority of prefectures and municipalities 
(Loulis, 2008: 159-160).  A third scandal, which came to light in 2007, was related to 
the function of the pension funds.  In particular, the heads of pension funds that had 
close links with government officials and figures of the governing party appeared to 
have invested in over-priced, high risk bonds (Loulis, 2008: 216). Karamanlis 
attempted to overcome the scandal by expelling the supervising Labour Minister, 
Savvas Tsitouridis, by changing the whole process of hiring the heads of the social 
security funds and by cancelling the particular investment in high-risk bonds (Dinas, 
2008: 602). 
Another reason explaining the decline of Karamanlis’ approval was the political cost 
accumulated by most of the promoted reforms from 2005 onwards in the economy, 
public administration and the welfare state. In particular, the trade unionists of the 
public sector turned against the government plans by staging a series of strikes 
(Loulis, 2008). According to Loulis, the demonstrations made the government’s policy 
look much more radical than it really was and, since public opinion backed the reform, 
                                                             
9 The director of the independent authority of the Hellenic Competition Commission and two other 
individuals, who were seen as having connections with government officials, had demanded a large 
amount of money from a well-known dairy company in return for their dropping the accusation that 
an anti-competitive cartel had been created in the milk industry (Dinas, 2008: 602). Karamanlis 
reacted immediately and the head of the Commission involved in the scandal was arrested. However, 
PASOK and Papandreou strongly criticised strongly the government, accusing it of corruption. 
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what the demonstrations actually did was to help Karamanlis to focus public attention 
on government policy and away from the scandal of the tapped mobile phones (2008: 
135-137).  
In addition, at the beginning of 2006 he began to promote constitutional reform 
focusing on several areas like the function of universities. Moreover, in April 2006 the 
ND government and particularly the Minister of Education, Marietta Giannakou, 
presented a draft plan for the reform of Greek universities. The proposals ‘created a 
chain of reactions among Greek students, who demonstrated in rallies and the 
occupation of the buildings of 243 (out of 258) university departments. The 
government decided to postpone the submission of the bill to Parliament until 
September, but when the issue was brought back, students resumed their protesting in 
a second wave of rallies and faculty occupations (..) that lasted until November’ 
(Dinas, 2008: 602). In March 2007, Karamanlis managed to pass through parliament 
his Education reform, which had already met with widespread student demonstrations 
throughout 2007 (Loulis, 2008: 192–193). According to Dinas, ‘given the difficulties 
encountered in pushing for educational reform, the government appeared reluctant to 
raise other important policy issues after March 2007’ (2008: 602). 
At this point, it should be noted that towards the summer of 2007, the public finances 
seemed to have been put in order, given that the deficit had been reduced below the 3 
per cent target set by the Growth and Stability Pact. However, the deficit reduction 
proved to be barely sustainable and a few months later, it began to climb once again, 
with the result that it exceeded the 3 per cent ceiling by the end of the year (Kazakos, 
2010: 142). Probably anticipating the need to introduce new austerity measures and 
aiming to exploit his lead in the opinion polls, Karamanlis called for snap elections on 
16 September 2007 (Kazakos, 2010: 162).  
From June 2007 until December, Karamanlis ratings remained unchanged at over 50 
per cent, in spite of the domestic crisis broke a few days after calling for early 
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elections in August 2007. The immense environmental, financial and human 
devastation caused by the destructive fires that broke out in the Peloponnese and 
which caused 70 deaths, led as expected to the postponement of any campaign 
activities (Dinas, 2008: 603). Initially the ND government attempted to avoid the 
blame for the catastrophe, which in retrospect was attributed to the disorganised state 
crisis mechanism. Then Karamanlis made an effort to shift public focus from the 
responsibility of his government over the inefficiency of public administration in 
dealing with the fires to the need to restore the damaged areas. In this context, he 
managed to gain ‘considerable financial support from the European Union and this 
ameliorated the image of the government. What proved much more beneficial, 
however, was the decision to provide direct financial support of 3,000 euro to 
everyone who had suffered from the fires’ (Dinas, 2008: 603). ND managed to keep 
ahead of PASOK, due to Karamanlis' restoration plan after the fires. As Loulis has 
suggested, the greatest part of the electorate blamed both ND and PASOK for the 
failure of the public administration to prevent the environmental crisis; yet ND had a 
better image than PASOK, Karamanlis enjoyed higher popularity than Papandreou and 
he was also seen as the most significant electoral asset of the governing party (2008: 
262-269). At the end, the ND party won the parliamentary elections.  
From September 2007 until the summer of 2008, Karamanlis saw his popularity 
decline further below 50 per cent. In spite of his efforts to continue the implementation 
of his reform plan, in particular the privatisation scheme, a series of corruption 
scandals
10
 attracted the public’s attention. In parallel, in the autumn of 2008 
                                                             
10 More specifically the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Culture, close ally of the Prime 
Minister, was implicated in a sex scandal, which caused him to resign his post, and even to attempt 
to commit suicide. The Minister of Labour, who was responsible for the ongoing pension reforms, 
was also forced to resign due to the revelation that he had illegally employed an immigrant Indian 
family as housekeepers. The Minister of State and spokesperson of the government along with the 
Minister of Culture also had to leave their posts, because of their involvement in a shady land-swap 
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Karamanlis announced new austerity measures and particularly tax increases that 
aimed to bring down the rising deficit (Kazakos, 2010: 163).  
However, Karamanlis’ plan was hardly credible and it failed to put the public finances 
in order. Additionally, the international financial crises broke out and affected the 
Greek economy, by degrade the banking system and consequently, threw the economy 
into recession. In an effort to avert the deeper economic downturn, the ND 
government increased public spending (Kazakos, 2010: 165). In November, 
Karamanlis saw his personal approval ratings improve because, as Kazakos (2010) has 
put it, in a time of crisis public opinion tends to back the incumbents. Nevertheless, 
the sharpest fall in Karamanlis’ popularity was evident in the period from November 
2008 until March 2009. It dropped significantly by 10 percentage points to 42 per 
cent.  In December 2008, a police officer shot down a student in downtown Athens 
initiating widespread riots all over Greece, with vandalism of public property, shops 
and violent clashes with police forces. 
In an attempt to restore his government’s image, Karamanlis undertook a reshuffle of 
the Cabinet replacing, among others, the Minister of Economy and Finance. Yet, he 
failed to restore his own and his government’s image due to the deepening of the 
economic crisis and the continuing corruption scandals. In parallel, in the second term, 
even though the New Democracy party had achieved a clear victory over PASOK with 
a lead of 4 per cent, it saw its share of the vote decline from 45.4 per cent to 42 per 
cent and won only a narrow parliamentary majority. Consequently, as Rousopoulos 
and Antonaros have noted, some MPs of the governing party frequently criticised 
government policy in order to defend the interests of their core constituencies 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
between the Greek state and the Mount Athos monastery of Vatopedi. One of the biggest corruption 
cases was the one that involved top-ranking civil servants, party members of both major parties and 
former ministers, with bribes received from the multinational corporation Siemens in return for 
favouring the company in securing lucrative public works contracts (Mavrogordatos, 2009: 968). 
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(Antonaros, 2012b: interview with the author; Rousopoulos, 2012: interview with the 
author). Additionally, due to the marginal parliamentary majority, Karamanlis was 
unable to expel the rebels because this would cause early elections, while the 
possibility of gaining more seats in Parliament was diminishing over time. The 
damage to the image of New Democracy, however, could also be explained by the fact 
that public opinion seems to have added to the scandals of the second term the 
scandals of the first term, which cumulatively operated consistently against the 
government (Loulis, 2011: 209-213).  
As a result, Karamanlis lost by 4 per cent the elections for the European Parliament in 
June 2009. Yet, the popularity of Karamanlis started to rise again towards the autumn 
of 2009   because of the activity of the government in dealing with the issues of the 
economic crisis, crime and illegal immigration. As Dinas has suggested: 
‘Karamanlis came to power as the modest politician determined to fight this phenomenon 
[corruption] and to proceed with necessary reforms. Failing in both of these aspects, he was left 
only with the effort to retain a positive personal profile, which, however, was less and less 
associated with the record of his government. People did and still do think positively of 
Karamanlis, but this positive evaluation became an increasingly weak predictor of their 
evaluations of his record as Prime Minister’ (2010: 397). 
 
In the case of Papandreou, during the first months of his premiership he was able to a 
certain extent to sustain high ratings of popularity over 60 per cent in spite of the 
deteriorated economic situation. Papandreou had managed to blame his predecessor in 
the premiership Karamanlis for the inherited economic mess revealing that instead of 
what had been stated, the fiscal deficit had reached double-digit levels. Of course, the 
revelation generated negative publicity. Greece’s European partners and the 
international markets exerted pressures on government to apply measures of fiscal 
retrenchment and form a budget plan aiming to reduce the deficit. However, 
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Papandreou was seen to keep his election commitments of implementing expansionary 
policies.   
As a result, the European Commission and the ECO-FIN assessed the fiscal 
consolidation plan of the centre-left government as unrealistic. Additionally, the 
international markets exerted pressure on the Greek economy raising the interest rates 
of Greek bonds, while the rating agencies downgraded the borrowing status of Greece 
(Kazakos, 2010: 203-204; Loulis, 2011: 277). In an attempt to respond to the various 
pressures to change policy course, Papandreou announced that he would take some 
additional austerity measures including, among others, spending cuts of the operating 
costs of the State, restriction of uncontrolled waste in pension funds, partial 
suspending of recruitment of public employees and abolishing of public sector units 
(Papandreou, 2009d). Those measures were regarded as painless by public opinion 
hardly affecting Papandreou’s popularity, which remained over 60 per cent.     
Yet, from January onwards Papandreou’s approval started to decline losing 13 per cent 
in three months until March 2010 when it stood at 49 per cent. One of the reasons was 
that the state of the economy had deteriorated further. In 
January, the European Council identified that Greece had not taken effective steps to 
reduce the deficit and in parallel, the spreads of the Greek bonds kept climbing while 
the rating agencies continued to downgrade the Greek economy (Κazakos, 2011: 
26).  Another reason was that Papandreou changed policy course. At the beginning of 
February 2010, he announced the first wave of austerity measures, including wage 
cuts and increases in indirect taxes while in March he announced the second wave of 
austerity measures deviating from the pre-election commitments. 
From March until December 2010, Papandreou’s public approval was still falling 
(from 49 per cent to 39 per cent). Two reasons explain the continuing fall. First, the 
government proved to be unable to stop the deterioration of the state of the economy. 
International markets still remained unconvinced about the will and capacity of the 
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Greek government to put its house in order and hence lowered the credit ratings of 
Greece and raised interest rates making it difficult for the country to refinance its debt 
(Loulis, 2011: 278). Then Prime Minister Papandreou faced with the possibility of an 
immediate default asked for financial assistance from its European partners. The  
European Union launched the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in order to 
bail-out Eurozone members in need on the condition of the application of a policy plan 
including austerity measures and structural changes under the supervision of the so-
called Troika.  
Second, the Memorandum was a policy package that deviated from both the pre-
election commitments and the ideology of the party causing intra-party and inter-
governmental reactions as well as strikes by the trade unions. In particular, the 
parliamentary approval of the Memorandum marked a radical reverse in Papandreou’s 
government in comparison with the core election promise of the implementation of a 
stimulus package to scale back recession.  Papandreou had now put in place a savage 
austerity package, accompanied by liberal reforms such as the liberalisation of the 
product and labour market, social security reform, the restructuring of state-owned 
corporations and the reorganisation of the public administration (Kazakos, 2011: 78-
83). The policy plan as a whole seemed to deviate from the ideological principles of 
PASOK as well, as Papandreou had recognized. 
In this context, it is easier to explain to a certain degree the intra-party reactions to the 
government’s policy. For example, during the voting process for the Memorandum in 
May 2010, three MPs from the leftist populist faction of PASOK voted against and 
consequently Papandreou had to expel them from the Parliamentary Group (Loulis, 
2011: 279). Another example is the public critique by the Minister of Labour against 
the Troika regarding its policies on the issue of labour market reform. A third example 
is  the attack by dozens of the MPs of the ruling party against the Minister of Finance 
on the issue of privatisations, which put PASOK in direct confrontation with the 
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public sector unions that were practically the backbone of the party (Kazakos, 2011: 
109-111; Pretenteris, 2012: 58). 
From the beginning of 2011 onwards, Papandreou saw his popularity ratings fall 
further. More specifically from 39 per cent in December 2010, they fell to 36 per cent 
in March 2011 while the most substantive drop took place between March and July 
when they fell well below 30 per cent (26 per cent). There are several reasons to 
explain this continuing decline in the polling figures. First, the fiscal programme failed 
to meet the targets, since the deficit was projected to reach 9.5 per cent instead of 7.5 
per cent of GDP. Therefore, the government had to proceed to take new measures in 
accordance with the Midterm Fiscal Strategy Programme in the summer of 2011 in 
order to bring the programme back on track. Second, although the reforms received 
parliamentary approval, they were not actually implemented and thus a great deal of 
criticism was generated on behalf of the Troika of Greece’s lenders.  
Third, the central theme in the media which dominated the public agenda were the 
Troika’s quarterly checks exercised on the Greek economy; these aimed to draft 
progress reports on the implementation of measures on which the disbursement of the 
loan installments depended. An example of a Troika’s intervention with a significant 
communicative impact was the issue of privatisations. At a press conference given by 
representatives of the tripartite body after completion of the evaluation in February 
2011, and after having recognized the progress made by Greece, they stressed the need 
for further efforts on expenditure and revenue issues through the speeding-up of the 
reform process. As stated by the representative of the European Commission Servaas 
Derouse, the country had until 2015 to proceed with the privatisations and sale of 
public assets of 50 billion euros instead of the 7 billion by 2013, which previously had 
been the goal. Despite the fact that this issue had been agreed with the government 
(Kazakos, 2011: 128), Ministers and prominent party figures attacked the Troika, 
while Papandreou complained to the head of the EC, IMF and ECB respectively 
(Kazakos 2011: 130). 
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Fourth, the recession had deepened more than expected and unemployment had 
increased more than estimated triggering widespread social discontent. Fifth, social 
discontent along with the continuous strikes called by the major trade unions of the 
country protesting over both the austerity measures and the reform of the government 
and state-owned enterprises, fuelled the tension among the ranks of PASOK’s 
Parliamentary Group. In particular, two PASOK MPs George Floridis and Hector 
Nasiokas resigned from their seats in parliament.  Another PASOK MP George Lianis 
resigned from the Parliamentary Group and became independent while several MPs 
speculated that they would vote against the Midterm Fiscal Strategy Programme (an 
obligation set by the Memorandum) increasing the catastrophic possibility that the 
country would not be able to receive the deposit from the loan and would be led to a 
disorderly default (Loulis, 2011: 293). At the same time, thousands of citizens, the 
Greek ‘Indignados’
11
, were protesting at the centre of Athens.   
Sixth, the situation deteriorated further due to the political maneuvering that 
Papandreou made in June 2011. More specifically, he tried to reach a consensus with 
Samaras, and in a desperate move, he even proposed resigning from the post of Prime 
Minister so that a coalition government could be formed with the participation of the 
two major parties. Yet most of the prominent party figures rejected Papandreou’s 
initiative because they were worried about losing power. This move seems to have 
brought about a fatal blow to the image of Papandreou's leadership capacity.  
Αccording to Pretenteris, ‘the Prime Minister [Papandreou] began talking to Samaras 
[leader of the main opposition New Democracy] about the possibility of forming a 
coalition government with the participation of PASOK and ND and instead he ended 
                                                             
11 Inspired by the Spanish example of the ‘Indignados’, ordinary citizens organised via social 
media such as Facebook and Twitter massive demonstrations in the major squares of all major 
cities in Greece, protesting against the austerity policy.  
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up co-governing with Venizelos [his intra-party rival] in a reshuffled PASOK 
government’ (2012: 120). 
At this point, a question is raised. If the effect of the permanent campaign is limited 
and the primeministerial popularity is shaped by other factors, then what would have 
happened if the premiers had not engaged in a permanent campaign process?  
Given the fact that the opposition and the media seek consistently to dominate the 
public agenda, it is likely that if prime ministers do not engage in communication 
activities then they might see their political position undermined, even though they 
may enjoy the primary role in setting the agenda through their governing activities.  
As Seymour-Ure has put it, if the prime minister does not use his public 
communication resources then he risks ‘losing the initiative to others, within and 
outside the core executive, who will also be using media to influence the same things 
(..)  Poor communication can positively weaken a prime minister. This disadvantage 
reinforces the fundamental importance to the prime minister of managing to keep 
control of public communication’ (2003: 52, 64). Among the other actors, who 
compete with the prime minister (in political communication terms), are the 
opposition leaders, the media and the intraparty opposition.  
In terms of the opposition leaders, one example that illustrates this point is 
Karamanlis, The latter, as it has been indicated, campaigned constantly as opposition 
leader against Prime Minister Simitis. Another example is George Papandreou who, as 
opposition leader, appeared to have adopted the permanent campaign style against 
Prime Minister Karamanlis. Therefore, if the Greek prime ministers had engaged in 
endless campaigning they might have seen their position undermined by their rivals.  
Of course, one can argue that both opposition leaders undertook the permanent 
campaign because they have to deal with prime ministers who acted as permanent 
campaigners. Therefore, if the latter had not applied this concept, the opposition leader 
would not have implemented it. Yet, the truth is that Karamanlis and Papandreou 
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campaigned in a non-stop mode not only because of the respective incumbents’ 
campaigning but also because they had to deal with pressing and hostile media.  
Karamanlis, for instance, faced harsh criticism from the mainstream media of the 
country for two reasons. First, the print and electronic media with the greatest impact 
were affiliated with PASOK and consequently they were negatively predisposed 
against him (Karakousis, 2006; Karzis, 2006; Kurtsos, 2003: 245-249). The second 
reason was that Karamanlis had accused the center-left leaning media that they were 
protecting Simitis at a communication level not due to their political positioning or for 
commercial reasons, but because the owners of these media were also business owners 
who had financial transactions with the government. In particular, he had accused the 
government of offering government contracts for public works and public 
procurements in exchange for positive media coverage and vice versa (Karakousis, 
2006: 426; Karzis, 2006: 191-193; Kottakis, 2011). Another example of a political 
leader who followed the permanent campaign trend in order to deal with hostile media 
is George Papandreou. Most of the left-leaning newspapers and television networks 
that dominate the media landscape
12
 criticised him throughout the first term of his 
party leadership from 2004 to 2007, because of his inability to improve PASOK’s 
performance (Loulis, 2008). Moreover, as it has been mentioned, when he lost the 
2007 general election, the newspapers and television stations close to his party 
strongly criticised him and held him accountable for the defeat. 
 
The above are an indication of the crucial role the media play in contemporary politics 
in Greece and their capacity to reinforce or damage the image of modern leaders. In 
particular, in line with what happens in other countries with modern systems of 
                                                             
12 Among the left-leaning media are the leading dailies Ta Nea, To Ethnos, To Vima and 
Eleftherotypia and the Sunday Vima, Sunday Ethnos and Sunday Eleftherotypia, as well as the 
television network Mega Channel (whose owners are the publishers of the left-leaning newspapers) 
(Kurtsos, 2003). 
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political communication, ‘Greek media have begun to fight with the politicians for 
control of the political agenda and have started to make themselves heard in the 
process of political communication with a constant stream of criticism of politicians 
and the actions of the parties (..) [they] have tried to create stories about political 
conflict by giving particular attention to politicians who hold controversial views or 
who oppose the actions of the government’ (Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 58). Thus, 
prime ministers and in general politicians in Greece have to compete, in setting the 
political and public agenda not only, with their political rivals, but also with powerful 
media and aggressive journalists, so they need to be active in political communication 
terms in order to, at least defend themselves.  
 
Except for the role of the opposition and the media, the prime ministers face also 
intraparty opposition, which seek to undermine their position. For instance, Simitis 
emerged from the modernising wing of his party and came to power without a strong 
party support base. When he was first elected Prime Minister, Simitis managed to 
secure only the support of 54 per cent of the votes (Featherstone, 2005: 226; Loulis, 
2007: 297). In subsequent re-elections, even whilst standing unopposed, he never 
managed to secure the support of more than 71 per cent of party members. As Simitis 
notes, ‘the electoral result meant that a significant part of PASOK would continue to 
distance itself from the government’ (2005: 508). Therefore, it may be appropriate to 
consider that if he had not engaged in a permanent campaign process in order to 
demonstrate public popularity, he would have seen his relatively weak position within 
the party weaken further.   
 
Another example is Papandreou who, in his capacity as president of PASOK, had to 
deal with significant intra-party opposition and, hence, it is reasonable to assume that 
he needed to campaign on a permanent basis in order to increase his popularity and 
strengthen his position within the party. In the intra-party elections, Papandreou’s 
main rival received 38.2 per cent of the party vote, coming from the minority faction 
 200 
within PASOK. After the electoral victory of 2009, PASOK enjoyed a solid 
parliamentary majority of 160 seats (Pappas, 2010: 280), thus it can be argued that 
Venizelos influenced a considerable number of parliamentarians who could act as 
intra-party rebels and Papandreou would see his political capital evaporate if he had 
not followed the permanent campaign trend.  
 
As a result, executive leaders may need to engage in a permanent campaign process to 
defend their image and their policy and to make their positions as well known as 
possible to the public. As Edwards has put it, explaining why the American presidents 
persist in following the permanent campaign in spite of its weak effect on their 
popularity, ‘the real public leadership may be on elite debate, journalistic coverage or 
congressional deliberation’ (2003: 244-245). Therefore, politicians recognize that 
much of what they have to do is damage limitation; they are on an electoral popularity 
treadmill, where they have to run just to stand still. Permanent campaigning is an 
attempt, among others, to keep control, to manage the agenda (political and media), to 
project a positive image. They believe in it; they also think that if they did not do it, 
things would be even worse. 
 
6.3 The Greek case in a comparative context 
From a certain point of view, the notion of the endless campaign has been considered 
as part of the post-modern election campaigning whereby the influence of the 
professional political staff consisting of pollsters, advertisers, marketing specialists 
and media strategists became as important as their employers, the politicians. 
Furthermore, these professionals became if not equal political actors, then as 
competent as politicians did and, consequently, their role inside the government was 
rapidly upgraded in a permanent campaign environment (Norris, 2000).  
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Although the concept of the  post-modern election campaigning grasps the main point 
of the permanent campaign process, mainly as a non-stop effort of elected party 
leaders to sustain public support until the next election by bringing advanced 
campaign personnel, tools, techniques and tactics into office, it misses at the same 
time the broader picture of the campaigning style of governing. The latter is evident at 
two levels. First, public support is not only a means to improve re-election prospects, 
but also a means to influence decision-making in the governing process. Second, 
participants in a permanent campaign process are not only the political executives, but 
also other various figures. In the US, where the permanent campaign firstly emerged, 
apart from presidents, other actors like congressional representatives, organised 
interests, media and journalists have engaged in campaign-like mode of doing politics.  
However, this study focuses specifically on the implementation of the permanent 
campaign by incumbent leaders to retain public approval.  So far, the permanent 
campaign strategy has been implemented by incumbents around the world in 
developed democracies in the US, Europe, Australia as well as in developing 
democracies in Latin America. In the European parliamentary context, prime ministers 
have followed the trend in the majoritarian system in the UK and the consensual 
system in Italy. Focusing on the majoritarian parliamentary systems in Europe, the 
scope of this study was to extend the research of the permanent campaign in Greece. 
This work contributes to the existing research in that it is the first study about the 
permanent campaign in Greece and it adds another national case study both on the 
permanent campaign of the prime ministers in the majoritarian systems in Europe.   
Certainly, presidents and prime ministers have always wooed public opinion by 
engaging in political communication activities. Hence, this study, based primarily on 
the US and for the European parliamentary part on the UK literature on the permanent 
campaign, has suggested the introduction of an element of order by grouping five 
components in an effort to identify, analyse and understand how recent incumbents 
have followed the permanent campaign trend to sustain public approval. In particular, 
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it has included the creation of communication units in the premier’s office, 
collaboration with communication professionals, the use of polling to device policy 
and presentation, the formulation of campaign-like messages to label government 
policy and the making of campaign-like public appeals to get the messages across. In 
this context, the study has shown that, not only recent American presidents and British 
premiers, but also recent prime ministers in Greece have adopted the campaigning 
style of governing confirming the notion that the application of the permanent 
campaign has extended to other parliamentary majoritarian systems in Europe.  
Surely, Greek premiers have not just simply copied the permanent campaign strategy 
based on what happened in the US or in the UK. Rather they have adapted it to the 
national context. One example that illustrates this point is that the expansion of the 
Office of the Prime Minister with the creation of new public outreach units was not as 
broad as in the US or the British context. Greek premiers established new institutions 
in order to improve the coordination and the centralised control of government 
communication, yet most of them like Karamanlis and Papandreou, who had served as 
opposition leaders, in parallel maintained the communication apparatus established in 
their party’s headquarters throughout their tenures in office. Another example is that 
the Greek prime ministers continued to collaborate with communication professionals 
once in power and the latter exerted significant influence on the primeministerial 
political strategy, policy and presentation, yet their role was not as dominant as it is 
within the parties and governments in the cases of the US and the UK. A third 
example is related to the public appeals the Greek prime ministers have made to get 
their messages across. All of them invested more time and energy addressing party 
conventions and delivering public speeches in Parliament, which receive live televised 
coverage, than their British counterparts.    
Two reasons explain why the Greek permanent campaign differs from the other two 
countries. The first is that the Greek permanent campaign process, similarly to the UK 
but opposed to the US case, takes place in a parliamentary context. Given the 
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institutional context, as Papathanassopoulos has observed, ‘in Greece, as in Britain for 
example, voters choose between different political parties and not between individual 
candidates for president or prime minister as in the United States’ (2000: 58), though 
the role of leadership in shaping voting behaviour has increased substantially in recent 
decades. In addition, comparing to some extent the communication behaviour of the 
American presidents with the British prime ministers, Seymour-Ure (2003: 198-199) 
has suggested that the American presidents lack the opportunity to use Congress as a 
public forum to disseminate their messages (with the exception of the State of the 
Union Address). Hence, they have adopted other communication tactics like the 
regular monthly press conferences in the White House. On the contrary, in the 
parliamentary majoritarian context British prime ministers have the opportunity to 
make numerous public appearances in Parliament disseminating their messages to the 
public especially since parliamentary debates were given live televised coverage. 
Given that, the UK and the Greek political systems strike as the most representative 
examples of the parliamentary majoritarian democracies in Europe
13
 (Gallagher et al, 
2006; Lijphart, 1999), it is possible to claim that the argument about the British 
premiers applies to the Greek context as well.  
The second reason explaining the differences considering the implementation of the 
campaigning style of governing in Greece is that, unlike the United States and to a 
lesser degree the United Kingdom, within the Greek political context the political 
parties play a comparatively stronger role. In particular, following Hallin & Mancini’s 
typology  about the three models of politics, Greece belongs to the Mediterranean or 
Polarised Pluralist Model which is, among others, characterised by late 
democratization, polarised pluralism, weaker development of rational-legal authority, 
clientelism and a strong role of political parties, while the US and the UK belong to 
                                                             
13 The Greek system is unicameral wjile the British one bicameral, yet as Lijphart (1999) has noted, 
the House of Commons, and not the House of Lords, possesses almost all the legislative power.    
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the North Atlantic or Liberal Model which is, among others characterised by early 
democratization, moderate pluralism, comparatively stronger development of rational-
legal authority  and comparatively weaker party organisations (2004: 68).   
However, the institutional, historical, cultural and political differences between Greece 
and the US as well as the UK, hardly prevented the Greek prime ministers from 
adopting the permanent campaign. Furthermore, the fact that current political 
executives in different countries with different institutional, historical, cultural and 
structural backgrounds have implemented the permanent campaign suggests that the 
permanent campaign is a reaction to broader and more powerful political and 
technological developments that have taken place in all these countries. While the 
relevant literature in the US has analysed various factors contributing to the rise of the 
permanent campaign era, this study has indicated that three of them have come up as 
the most important: the decline of political parties, the rise of television and more 
recently the internet as well as the proliferation of new political technologies.  
In addition, the thesis, based on the relevant UK and Greek literature, has indicated 
that these factors have emerged as contributing to the rise of the permanent campaign 
both in the UK and in Greece. Therefore, Greece offers another example of how 
political and technological developments affect the conduct of the primeministerial 
political communication. To this end, the permanent campaign is considered not just 
as a description of what political executives are doing, but more than that, it is a 
theoretical concept about the nature of political communication, which appeared at a 
certain point in the development of media and politics in advanced democracies.  
Of course, there are differences regarding the form of these factors. For instance, in 
the United States the particular erosion of the parties’ strength is related, among 
others, to the adoption of primaries as a method to select the candidates running for 
the presidency ahead of the presidential race. In contrast, in the UK and Greece, the 
adoption of primaries is a recent phenomenon (Scarrow 1996: 169-170; Seyd, 1999: 
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385) (in 1994 and 2004
14
) which usually takes place as an intraparty event  in the 
aftermath of an electoral defeat (in 2007 in the case of PASOK and in 2009 in the case 
of ND).   
Another difference relates to the nature of the media systems. Following Hallin & 
Mancini’s typology about the models of politics and media, the United States and the 
United Kingdom belong to the North Atlantic or Liberal Model, which is, among 
others, characterised by a politically neutral, strongly professionalised and market-
oriented media system. In contrast,  Greece belongs to the Mediterranean or Polarised 
Pluralist Model which is, among others, characterised by a highly politicised and 
financially dependent on a clientelist state media system (2004: 67-68). In particular, 
the political and economic evolution of the European South differs from the political 
and economic evolution in the rest of Western Europe and North America, where the 
development of the market economy has led to the development of the media market 
and subsequently to the development of a mass circulation press and commercial 
media.  
However, in spite of these differences, these three factors remain strong enough to 
motivate the rise of the permanent campaign in Greece. Firstly, as Negrine has put it, 
‘the television services have been commercialised and deregulated with consequences 
for both the conduct and the practice of political communication’ (2006: 167). Second, 
the combination of the decline of political parties - as is evidenced by the weakening 
of party identification, as well as by the gradual erosion of political polarisation and 
the subsequent deep ideological cleavage – with the advent of television have 
contributed to the increasing personalisation of the political process which reinforces 
the role  of leadership in shaping voting behaviour. Of course, the role of political 
                                                             
14 PASOK was the first political party adopting the primaries in selecting its leader ahead of the 2004 
general election, though Papandreou ran unopposed for the post (Dinas, 2008:607).   
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parties remains significant. Yet parties and party leaders co-exist within political 
communication terms in Greece.   
All these are related to the notion that Greece has been part of the modernisation of 
political communication, a term that is used to describe a process of rapid changes in 
both the media and politics over recent years (Swanson, 1993). In particular, it 
suggests that there are  growing similarities in political communication practices 
across many countries  ‘despite great differences in political cultures, histories, and 
institutions of the countries in which they have occurred’ (Mancini & Swanson, 1996 
p. 2). These developments in Greece are a part of a changing wave over the modus 
operandi of the media system as well as the structure of the political environment, 
including the parties, in line with other developed democracies (Papathanassopoulos, 
2000: 58). Thus, modern prime ministers in Greece had strong motives, as their 
counterparts in the UK, to engage in a permanent campaign.  
In parallel, the research has found that the impact of the permanent campaign upon the 
premier’s popularity is weak confirming the vast amount of empirical studies, most of 
them applied in the US. In other words, the case of Greece provides additional 
evidence for the argument that the endless campaigning hardly improves the premiers’ 
approval ratings.   
Apart from the contribution of the study to the broad context of the permanent 
campaign literature, it also contributes to the Greek political communication literature 
in many respects. Firstly, it enriches a field of scientific interest that has never been 
analysed in Greece whereas in other countries the results of the studies have been 
presented years ago. So far, the existing Greek literature has concentrated on the 
election campaigning of parties and party leaders and the factors that have transformed 
the election campaigning landscape from the restoration of democracy in 1974 until 
nowadays (e.g. Alexandrou, 2007; Demetzis, 2002; Heretakis, 2002; Kotzaivazoglou 
& Zotos, 2007; Pappas, 2010; Papathanassopoulos, 2000; 2007). In contrast, the post-
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election political communication era had largely been neglected. This study has 
concentrated on the post-election political communication of the incumbent parties 
and party leaders and particularly on the political communication of the modern prime 
ministers in Greece. Secondly, in methodological terms, this research is the first that 
employs the method of elite interviewing in order to gather data and analyse in-depth 
the function of the primeministerial political communication. So far, to the best of my 
knowledge, no other study has carried out and used interviews with prime ministers, 
ministers and primeministerial consultants on the political communication field.  
Thirdly, in this context, the study contributes to our knowledge on the permanent 
campaign in Greece. Research findings suggest that the three modern PMs - Simitis, 
Karamanlis and Papandreou - undertook the permanent campaign strategy. The fact 
that - although they had different communications skills or they came from different 
political families or they represented different intraparty factions - they adopted the 
campaigning style of governing allows us to safely assume that the modern Greek 
PMs have engaged in a permanent campaign process. Yet, future research should 
examine whether the results hold for their successors in the premiership. 
Fourth, this thesis has advanced our understanding of the nature of the political 
communication of recent Greek premiers at a certain point in the development of 
media and politics in the country. It is the first study that shows that political and 
technological developments, which have taken place in a context of modernisation of 
the political communication landscape of Greece in recent decades, have transformed 
not only the election campaigning of party leaders but also the political 
communication of the prime ministers. More specifically, it has shown that the Greek 
premiers have been motivated to engage in a non-stop campaigning process by 
bringing in campaign-like personnel, tools, techniques, methods and tactics into office 
in order sustain pubic approval as a means to improve re-election prospects. Lastly, 
this is the first study that explores the impact of the primeministerial communication 
activities on the premier’s popularity, actually finding that the effect is hardly 
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important, which suggests that other factors have greater explanatory power on what 
shapes public attitudes against the prime ministers in Greece and therefore setting the 
basis for future research in that direction.   
In terms of the limitations of the research, as it has already been said on numerous 
occasions, the existing literature on primeministerial communications and in general 
on government communications is limited. So it was not feasible to analyse in great 
depth the political communication of Greek prime ministers in order to highlight the 
point at which the lines between election campaigning and governing become blurred, 
the point just before the permanent campaign takes the place from the election 
campaigning. Moreover, the study has discussed to some extent (without exploring in 
detail since this analysis exceeds the scope of this study) the impact of other 
determinants of primeministerial popularity given the inability of the permanent 
campaign to exert significant influence.  
Nonetheless, this study will encourage further studies on political communication and 
permanent campaign in Greece as well as studies in a comparative perspective. One of 
the directions would be to compare the permanent campaign concept in different 
political settings and political cultures. In addition, future research on the factors that 
exert influence on incumbents’ popularity should shift its attention from leaders’ 
communication activities to other factors. The latter include  the state of the economy, 
foreign policy and domestic issues, foreign domestic crises, scandals or the particular 
political reactions and policy decisions taken by the political leaders or even the 
timing, the place and medium they choose to make their public announcements.  
 
A third direction should be towards the examination of the primeministerial permanent 




. Another direction should be to explore the political 
communication operated by the Greek Prime Ministers before the emergence of the 
permanent campaign era, in particular from 1974 until 1996, in order to identify the 
developments of the incumbency communications. A fourth direction could focus on 
whether other political as well as non-political actors have engaged in a permanent 
campaign mentality. To take one example, this study has analysed to some extent the 
permanent campaign process in which Karamanlis and Papandreou engaged as 
opposition leaders in the periods 1997-2004 and 2004-2009 respectively.  
Future studies should explore further the permanent campaign of each main opposition 
party as well as the permanent campaign followed possibly by the minor opposition 
parties. Another example is whether, apart from the Prime Ministers, Ministers have 
also followed the campaigning style of governing within the current political 
communication environment, either to promote their policy plans or to increase re-
election prospects since most of them run for a parliamentary seat.  
Other political actors who might have been motivated to adopt a permanent campaign 
concept are parliamentarians. Even though their resources compared to the resources 
of the prime ministers and ministers are limited, they may have followed the 
permanent campaign trend either because they are interested in entering the Council of 
Ministers or being re-elected. In addition, due to the nature of the Greek electoral 
system, they have to compete with other candidates of their own party in order to get 
elected. Therefore, they may have the incentive to adopt a form of permanent 
campaign at least at local level. The last direction is towards in-depth examination of 
                                                             
15 The rise of the coalition governments was due to the political turmoil and the subsequent 
unprecedented fragmentation of the Greek political landscape caused by the protracted economic and 
resulted in the successive national elections of May and June 2012 (Pretenteris, 2012).  In spite of the 
fact that the Greek electoral system favours one-party government given that the party-winner receives a 
bonus of 50 seats in a 300-seat Parliament.     
 
 210 
the factors influencing primeministerial popularity given the limited impact of the 
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Major addresses – Minor addresses 
Summary of Kernell’s typology 
Presidential Public Activities 
Activity Explanation 
Major public addresses Addresses broadcast on radio or television in 
which president speaks more than 1,000 
words 
Minor public addresses Non-major addresses in which the president 
speaks more than 1,000 words 
 
Primeministerial Public Activities 
 
Activity Explanation 
Major public addresses Speeches or interviews on TV, on radio and 
national newspapers as well as signed 
newspaper articles by the prime ministerof 
more than 1,000 words. 
Minor public addresses Public addresses to specific groups or 
community events that took place inside or 
outside Athens and include primeministerial 
statements more than 1,000 words. Brief 






Major Addresses (presented in chronological order) 
Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 8 October 1996 
Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 10 October 1996 
Second speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 12 October 1996 
Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 16 October 1996 
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Speech in Parliament regarding the Intergovernmental Summit, 9 December 1996 
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Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 02 April 1997 
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Interview in national public broadcasting network ‘NET’, 01 June 1999 
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Interview in national broadcasting network ‘Alpha’ on journalist Manolis Kapsis, 20 
March 2000 
Press conference on local media, 23 March 2000 
Televised press conference in the European Council in Lisbon, 23 March 2000 
Televised press conference after the end of the European Council in Lisbon, 23 March 
2000 
Interview in ‘Flash 96, 1’ radio, 28 March 2000 
Speech and press conference in Zappeio Mansion on ‘Foreign Policy in the new Four-
Year Term’, 29 March 2000 
Interview in national broadcasting network ‘Mega Channel’ on reporter Stavros 
Theodorakis, 02 April 2000 
Interview in national broadcasting network ‘Star Channel’ on reporter Theodoros 
Rousopoulos, 05 April 2000 
Interview in national public broadcasting network ‘NET’, 06 April 2000 
Online press conference, 06 April 2000 
Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 20 April 2000 
Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 22 April 2000 
Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 12 May 2000 
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Speech in Parliament on ‘The Hour of the Prime Minister’, 24 May 2000 
Speech in Parliament on the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, 31 May 2000 
Signed article in ‘To Vima’ newspaper, ‘For a progressive governance’  28 May 2000 
Press conference in Porto, Portugal on the admission of Greece in the Eurozone, 19 
June 2000 
Televised press conference after the end of the European Council, 20 June 2000 
Speech in the 65th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 01 September 2000 
Televised press conference in the 65th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 03 
September 2000 
Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 04 October 2000 
Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 06 October 2000 
Speech in Parliament on a special session honoring the 2000 Greek Olympics Team, 
11 October 2000 
Televised press conference during the European Council, 13 October 2000 
Speech in PASOK National Summit, 03 November 2000 
Press conference at the Foreign Correspondents Association, 14 December 2000 
Speech on the Introduction of Greece in the Eurozone, 04 January 2001 
Speech in Parliament on a motion of no-confidence to the Minister of Economics 
submitted by ND, 02 February 2001 
Speech in Parliament on the new International Airport of Athens ‘Eleftherios 
Venizelos’, 16 February 2001 
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Speech in Parliament on a special session celebrating the International Women’s Day, 
08 March 2001 
Signed article in ‘Ta Nea’ newspaper , ‘The creation of powerful Europe’, 19 March 
2001 
Speech in Parliament on the Constitutional Reform, 06 April 2001 
Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 02 May 2001 
Second speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 02 May 2001 
Speech in Parliament on ‘The social and financial state of the country’, 10 May 2001 
Speech in PASOK Political Youth Open Air Convention, 11 May 2001 
Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 01 June 2001 
Interview in national public broadcasting network ‘NET’ on journalist Stavros 
Theodorakis, 05 June 2001 
Speech in Parliament on Social Policy, 11 June 2001 
Televised press conference before the Heads of Government EU Summit, 14 June 
2001 
Televised press conference after the end of the Heads of Government EU Summit, 16 
June 2001 
Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 09 July 2001 
Second Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 09 July 2001 
Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 31 August 2001 
Televised press conference in the 66th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 09 
September 2001 
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Speech in Parliament on ‘The Hour of the Prime Minister’, 09 October 2001 
Speech in PASOK 6th National Convention, 13 October 2001 
Second Speech in PASOK 6th National Convention, 13 October 2001 
Speech in PASOK 6th National Convention after being reelected as leader of the 
party, 14 October 2001 
Televised press conference during the Informal European Council in Gand, 19 
October 2001 
Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 22 October 2001 
Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 09 November 2001 
Televised press conference in Maximos Mansion, 13 November 2001 
Speech in Parliament on ‘The Hour of the Prime Minister’, 16 November 2001 
Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 20 November 2001 
Second Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 20 November 2001 
Speech in Parliament on ‘9/11 and its Consequences’, 27 November 2001 
Press conference at the Foreign Correspondents Association, 04 December 2001 
Press conference after meeting with the President of the U.S G.W. Bush, the Secretary 
of State Powell and the Secretary of Defence Ramsfeld in Washington D.C, 10 
January 2002 
Speech in Parliament on the 2004 Athens Olympics, 16 January 2002 
Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 18 January 2002 
Second Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 19 January 2002 
Speech in PASOK 5th Political Youth Convention in Athens, 08 February 2002 
 252 
Speech in Parliament on ‘The Hour of the Prime Minister’, 15 February 2002 
Signed article in ‘Ta Nea’ newspaper , ‘The euro and the future’, 21 February 2002 
Speech in Parliament on ‘The Hour of the Prime Minister’, 01 March 2002 
Televised press conference before the end of the European Council in Barcelona, 15 
March 2002 
Televised press conference after the formal dinner of Heads of Governments and State 
in Barcelona, 15 March 2002 
Televised press conference after the end of the European Council in Barcelona, 16 
March 2002 
Speech in Parliament on the ratification of the Nice Pact, 19 March 2002 
Televised cross-national broadcasting networks press interview, 08 April 2002 
Speech in Parliament on changing the electoral system, 09 April 2002 
Second Speech in Parliament on changing the electoral system, 09 April 2002 
Speech in Parliament on ‘The Hour of the Prime Minister’, 12 April 2002 
Speech in Parliament on ‘The Hour of the Prime Minister’, 12 April 2002 
Speech in Parliament on ‘The Hour of the Prime Minister’, 17 May 2002 
Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 22 May 2002 
Second Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 22 May 2002 
Televised address after the Meeting with the Opposition Leaders on the Cyprus Issue, 
24 May 2002 
Speech in Parliament on the State of the Economy, 29 May 2002  
Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 14 June 2002 
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Second Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 15 June 2002 
Televised press conference after the end of the morning session of the European 
Council in Sevilla, 21 June 2002 
Televised press conference after the end of the European Council in Sevilla, 22 June 
2002 
Signed article in PASOK Political Youth online site, 30 June 2002 
Speech in PASOK National Summit, 05 July 2002 
Speech in PASOK National Local Government Convention, 07 July 2002 
Speech in the 67th International Thessaloniki Exposition, 06 September 2002 
Televised press conference in the 67th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 08 
September 2002 
Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 08 October 2002 
Televised press conference after the end of the first session of the European Council 
and after meetings with UK Prime Minister Blair, 28 October 2002 
Televised press conference after the end of the session of the European Council, 29 
October 2002 
Televised press conference at NATO Heads of Governments Summit, 22 November 
2002 
Televised press conference after the formal dinner of the European Heads of 
Government, 13 December 2002 
Televised press conference after the end of the session of the European Council, 13 
December 2002 
Speech in Parliament on the Cyprus issue, 17 December 2002 
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Televised press conference for the Extraordinary European Heads of Government 
Summit on the Iraq War, 17 February 2003 
Televised press conference after the Spring Session of the European Heads of 
Government, 21 March 2003 
Televised press conference after the end of the session of the European Council on the 
results of the session and the Iraq War, 26 March 2003 
Speech in Parliament on the results of the Spring Session of the European Heads of 
Government and the War in Iraq, 27 March 2003 
Televised address on the Telemarathon for the Children in Iraq, 31 March 2003 
Joint televised press conference with Romano Pronti and Tassos Giannitsis on the 
results of the EU Heads of Government Summit, 17 April 2003 
 
Minor Addresses (presented in chronological order) 
Speech in Elefsina, 16 December 1996 
Speech in Elefsina, 14 January 1997 
Speech in Thessaloniki, 01 February 1997 
Speech in Ano Liosia, 11 February 1997 
Speech on the launching event for the ‘European Year against Racism’, 26 February 
1997 
Speech in Larisa, 01 March 1997 
Speech in Volos, 02 March 1997 
Speech to farmers in Athens, 05 March 1997 
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Speech in Athens, 04 April 1997 
Speech in Thessaloniki, 05 April 1997 
Speech at the Economist conference for the Greek Economy, 09 April 1997 
Speech in the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 23 
May 1997 
Speech in Arta, 01 June 1997 
Speech in Athens, 30 June 1997 
Speech at the ‘IΣTAME’ international meeting, 03 July 1997 
Speech at the Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference, 25 November 1997 
Speech in the International Airport of Athens, 10 January 1998 
Speech in Zappeio Mansion, 08 May 1998 
Speech in the Center of Substitute Drugs, 19 May 1998 
Speech in the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 20 
May 1998 
Speech at the Annual Local Government convention, 22 May 1998 
Speech in Ancient Olympia, 20 June 1998 
Speech in the headquarters of Greek Petroleum Group, 24 June 1998 
Speech in Attiko Metro-Athens, 02 July 1998 
Speech in Lamia, 04 July 1998 
Speech in Lefkada, 18 July 1998 
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Speech in the launching day of the construction of the Rio-Antirrio Bridge, 19 July 
1998 
Speech in Argolida, 23 July 1998 
Speech in Kallithea, 22 September 1998 
Speech in the launching day of the new independent administrative authority 
‘Ombudsman’, 24 September 1998 
Speech in Agrinio, 26 September 1998 
Speech at the Center of European Constitutional Law convention-Athens, 01 October 
1998 
Speech in Lavrio, 06 October 1998 
Speech at the international seminar with title ‘Seeking the European Identity’, 14 
November 1998 
Speech in PASOK Local Government Department in Athens, 27 November 1998 
Speech on Youth Issues in Athens, 30 November 1998 
Speech at the 9
th
 Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference, 08 December 1998 
Speech in Kilkis, 14 February 1999 
Speech in Ano Liosia, 1 March 1999 
Speech in the Ministry of Economics, 04 May 1999 
Speech in Elefsina, 06 May 1999 
Speech in Krustallopigi - Athens, 09 May 1999 
Speech in the Attica PASOK Election Committees, 12 May 1999 
Speech in Komotini, 15 May 1999 
 257 
Speech in Kalamata, 16 May 1999 
Speech at the ‘Ylikon’ S.A. in Mandra-Athens, 20 May 1999 
Speech in Patra 23 May 1999 
Speech in Heraklion of Crete, 24 May 1999 
Speech in Larisa, 27 May 1999 
Speech in Korinthos, 30 May 1999 
Speech in Naxos Island, 06 June 1999 
Speech in Thessaloniki, 08 June 1999 
Speech in Athens, 11 June 1999 
Speech in the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 21 
June 1999 
Speech in an event for young citizens in Athens, 22 July 1999 
Speech at the international Scientific Conference honoring the memory of the leftist 
intellect Nikos Poulantzas, 29 September 1999 
Speech in Helioupoli, 29 September 1999 
Speech in PASOK National Local Government and Regroup Convention, 09 October 
1999 
Speech in Lesvos Island, 21 October 1999 
Speech in the University of Aegean, 21 October 1999 
Speech in Arkadia, 30 October 1999 
Speech at the Hellenic-American Chamber, 20 November 1999 
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Speech on the opening of the new Ministry of Transportation and Communications 
building, 23 November 1999 
Speech on the offices of the Personal Data Protection Authority, 01 December 1999 
 Speech at the Hellenic-American Chamber, 07 December 1999 
Speech in the University of Athens, 10 January 2000 
Speech in Aigio, 15 January 2000 
Speech in Achaia, 15 January 2000 
Speech on the National Committee for the Human Rights, 20 January 2000 
Speech at the 3
rd
 National Industrial Conference, 21 January 2000 
Speech at the 1
st
 National Meeting of the Elderly, 22 January 2000 
Speech at the Center of Maritime Affairs of the ‘Ethniki Trapeza’ (National Bank), 25 
January 2000 
Speech on the launch of Attiko Metro, 28 January 2000 
Speech in Prespes, 02 February 2000 
Speech in PASOK Political Views Conference, 05 February 2000 
Speech in the new Judiciary Building of Athens, 16 February 2000 
Speech in the Port of Piraeus, 17 February 2000 
Speech in Xanthi, 19 February 2000 
Speech in Hemathia, 26 February 2000 
Speech at the ‘Athlete’s Festival’, 29 February 2000 
Speech at the University Hospital of Western Athens, 06 March 2000 
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Speech in Volos, 16 March 2000 
Speech in Ikaria, 18 March 2000 
Speech in Fournoi, 18 March 2000 
Speech in Samos, 18 March 2000 
Speech in Heraklion, 19 March 2000 
Speech in Patra, 21 March 2000 
Speech in Larisa, 26 March 2000 
Speech in Rhodes, 28 March 2000 
Speech in Ioannina, 31 March 2000 
Speech in Agrinio, 01 April 2000 
Speech in Nikaia, 03 April 2000 
Speech in Thessaloniki, 04 April 2000 
Speech in Kozani, 05 April 2000 
Speech in Helia, 06 April 2000 
Speech in Athens, 07 April 2000 
Speech in the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 24 
May 2000 
Speech in the University of Athens on the Euro, 23 June 2000 
Speech in a PASOK event on ‘Progressive Governance’, 06 July 2000 
Speech in Hepiros, 04 November 2000 
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Speech at the 11
th
 Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference, 05 December 
2000 
Speech in PASOK Local Government Department, 21 February 2001 
Speech in the opening ceremony of Evinos River Dam, 20 July 2001 
Speech in Gyaros Island, 24 July 2001 
Speech in Argos, 25 August 2001 
Speech at the European group ‘Notre Europe’ conference, 05 October 2001 
Speech in the opening of ‘Sovel’ new factory in Volos, 26 January 2002 
Speech to entrepreneurs in Volos, 26 January 2002 
Speech during inspection on the construction site of the Olympic Village in Athens, 29 
January 2002 
Speech at the Station of Liquified Natural Gas in Crete, 09 February 2002 
Speech at the Local Government Conference in Athens, 15 February2002 
Speech in Hemathia district, 22 February 2002 
Speech in Pella, 23 February 2002 
Speech in Kefalonia, 06 April 2002 
Town-hall meeting in Nikaia City Hall, 15 April 2002 
Speech in Rhodes Island, 06 May 2002 
Speech in Kastelorizo Island, 07 May 2002 
Speech in an event on ‘Dialogue for the future of Europe - Political and Institutional 
Changes’, 15 May 2002 
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Speech in Lamia, 25 May 2002 
Speech in Karpenisi, 26 May 2002 
Speech in Preveza, 28 June 2002 
Speech in Arta, 29 June 2002 
Speech in PASOK National Local Government Convention, 07 July 2002 
Speech in former political prison in Oropos, 24 July 2002 
Speech in Heraklion-Crete, 11 September 2002 
Speech in the construction site of the Olympics International Broadcast Center, 13 
September 2002 
Speech in Tripoli, 20 September 2002 
Speech in Kalamata, 21 September 2002 
Speech in Aulaki village, 26 September 2002 











Major Addresses (presented in chronological order) 
Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 20 March 2004 
Second Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 21 March 2004 
Interventional Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 21 March 
2004 
Closing Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 22 March 2004 
Speech in ND. Parliamentary Group, 23 March 2004 
Press televised conference in Brussels after the first European Council session, 25 
March 2004 
Televised press conference in Brussels after the end of the European Council, 26 
March 2004 
Speech in Parliament on Briefing of the Parliament concerning the Cyprus issue, 02 
April 2004 
Second Speech in Parliament on Briefing of the Parliament concerning the Cyprus 
issue, 02 April 2004 
Televised address in Maximos Mansion after the Meeting with the Opposition leaders 
under the President of the Greek Republic on the Cyprus Issue, 15 April 2004 
Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 23 April 2004 
Joint televised press conference with the President of the Republic of Cyprus 
Papadopoulos, 28 April 2004 
 263 
Televised address on the introduction of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU, 30 April 
2004 
Joint televised press conference with the Prime Minister of Turkey Erdogan, 07 May 
2004 
Speech in Parliament on the Economy, 12 May 2004 
Second Speech in Parliament on the Economy, 12 May 2004 
Televised press Conference in Greek and foreign journalists in New York after 
meeting with the U.N General Secretary, 18 May 2004 
Televised press conference after the meeting with the President of the U.S George W. 
Bush, 20 May 2004 
Speech in ND presentation of the European Election Party Declaration, 27 May 2004 
TV Interview in the national broadcast network ‘Antenna TV’, 10 June 2004 
Televised address in Zappeio Mansion on the European Election, 13 June 2004 
Televised press conference during European Council’s Summit first day, 17 June 2004 
 
Televised press conference after the end of the session of the European Council 
Summit, 19 June 2004 
Press conference at NATO Heads of Governments Summit, 28 June 2004 
Speech at ND 6th Party Convention Opening Day, 23 July 2004 
Speech at ND 6th Party Convention Closing Day, 25 July 2004 
Speech in the Opening Day of the 69th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 10 
September 2004 
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Speech in the 69th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki to Business 
representatives, 11 September 2004 
Televised press conference in the 69th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 12 
September 2004 
Speech at an event for the 30 years Anniversary of ND’s Foundation, 01 October 2004 
Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 14 October 2004 
Speech in the Parliament on a special session honoring the 2004 Olympics Greek 
athletes, 19 October 2004 
Televised press conference at the European Council Summit, 05 November 2004 
Speech in Parliament on Education, 8 November 2004 
Second speech in Parliament on Education, 8 November 2004 
Joint press statement with Cyprus President Papadopoulos in Maximos Mansion, 12 
November 2004 
Speech in Parliament on honoring Greek athletes who competed in the Special 
Olympics 2004, 24 November 2004 
Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 4 December 2004 
Speech in ND Central Committee, 10 December 2004 
Televised Press Conference after the end of the European Council session, 17 
December 2004 
Speech in Parliament on the 2005 Budget, 22 December 2004 
Speech in ND Parliamentary Group on the election of the President of the Greek 
Republic, 08 February 2005 
Speech in Parliament on Agricultural Issues, 18 February2005 
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Second speech in Parliament on Agricultural Issues, 18 February 2005 
Third speech in Parliament on Agricultural Issues, 18 February 2005 
Press conference at NATO Heads of Governments Summit, 22 February 2005 
Press conference at the Foreign Correspondents Association, 08 March 2005 
Speech in Parliament on ‘Health and Social Solidarity’, 18 March 2005 
Second Speech in Parliament on ‘Health and Social Solidarity’, 18 March 2005 
Third Speech in Parliament on ‘Health and Social Solidarity’, 18 March 2005 
Press televised conference in Brussels after the European Council session, 23 March 
2005 
Speech in Parliament on Ratification of the European Constitution, 15 April 2005 
Joint televised address and press conference with the President of the European 
Commission Manuel Barozo, 18 April 2005 
Speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 13 May 2005 
Second Speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 13 May 2005 
Third Speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 13 May 2005 
Speech in Parliament on the 60th Anniversary of the End of World War II, 17 May 
2005 
Speech in Parliament on Growth, Employment and Social Coherence, 08 June 2005 
Speech in Parliament setting a Trust Motion to Government, 08 June 2005 
Speech in Parliament on the closing of the Trust Motion to Government session, 12 
June 2005 
Speech in Parliament commenting the speech of the Opposition leader, 12 June 2005 
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Press televised conference in Brussels after the European Council session, 18 June 
2005 
Speech in Parliament on Women’s Employment, 22 June 2005 
Second speech in Parliament on Women’s Employment, 22 June 2005 
Speech in Parliament on Public Administration, 28 June 2005 
Second Speech in Parliament on Public Administration, 28 June 2005 
Speech in ND Central Committee, 26 August 2005 
Speech at the opening of the 70th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 10 
September 2005 
Speech in the 70th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki to Business 
representatives, 11 September 2005 
Televised press conference during the 70th International Exposition in Thessaloniki, 
12 September 2005 
Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 03 October 2005 
Second Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 03 October 2005 
Answer in Parliament on Question to the PM by the leader of the Synaspismos party 
Alekos Alavanos, 14 October 2005 
Second answer in Parliament on Question to the PM by the leader of the Synaspismos 
party Alekos Alavanos, 14 October 2005 
Answer in Parliament on Question to the PM by the Synaspismos party MP Nikos 
Konstantopoulos, 14 October 2005 
Second speech in Parliament on Question to the PM by the Synaspismos party MP 
Nikos Konstantopoulos, 14 October 2005 
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Speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 01 November 2005 
Second speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 01 November 2005 
Speech in Parliament on the Ratification of the Admission in the E.U. of Bulgaria and 
Romania, 02 November 2005 
Speech in ND Parliamentary Group on ‘Economy and Growth for the present and the 
future’, 08 December 2005 
Speech in ND Central Committee, 10 December 2005 
Speech in Parliament on the 2006 Budget, 22 December 2005 
Speech in ND Parliamentary Group on the ‘Constitutional Reform’, 17 January 2006 
Speech in ND Central Committee, 29 January 2006 
Speech   in ND Parliamentary Group, 24 February 2006 
Speech in Parliament on ‘Youth Unemployment and measures on their Social 
Protection’, 27 February 2006 
Second speech in Parliament on ‘Youth Unemployment and measures on their Social 
Protection’, 27 February 2006 
Third speech in Parliament on ‘Youth Unemployment and measures on their Social 
Protection’, 27 February 2006 
Speech in Parliament on the 50th Anniversary of the Women Voting Act, 08 March 
2006 
Speech in Parliament on a special session dedicated to the memory of former PM 
Rallis, 22 March 2006 
Televised press conference after the European Council session, 24 March 2006 
Speech in Parliament on ‘Developing the District’, 29 March 2006 
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Speech in Parliament on the ‘Economic Policy of the Government’, 13 April 2006 
Second speech in Parliament on the ‘Economic Policy of the Government’, 13 April 
2006 
Third speech in Parliament on the ‘Economic Policy of the Government’, 13 April 
2006 
Speech in Parliament on Education, 26 May 2006 
Second speech in Parliament on Education, 26 May 2006 
Third speech in Parliament on Education, 26 May 2006 
Speech in Parliament on ‘The Function of the State and Institutions’, 22 June 2006 
Second speech in Parliament on ‘The Function of the State and Institutions’, 22 June 
2006 
Third speech in Parliament on ‘The Function of the State and Institutions’, 22 June 
2006 
Speech in Parliament on a special session honoring the Air Force pilots fallen on duty, 
28 June 2006 
Speech in Parliament on the Constitutional Reform, 29 June 2006 
Speech in the 71st International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki to Business 
representatives, 09 September 2006 
Televised press conference during the 71st International Exposition in Thessaloniki, 
10 September 2006 
Speech in ND Central Committee, 17 September 2006 
Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 04 October 2006 
Speech in Parliament on ‘Foreign Policy’, 02 November 2006 
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Second speech in Parliament on ‘Foreign Policy’, 02 November 2006 
Third speech in Parliament on ‘Foreign Policy’, 02 November 2006 
Speech in Parliament during a session on the issue of contract staffers, 17 November 
2006 
Second speech in Parliament during a session on the issue of contract staffers, 17 
November 2006 
Speech in Parliament on Education, 24 November 2006 
Second speech in Parliament on Education, 24 November 2006 
Third speech in Parliament on Education, 24 November 2006 
Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 07 December 2006 
Televised press conference after the European Council session, 15 December 2006 
Speech in Parliament on the 2007 Budget, 21 December 2006 
Speech in ND Central Committee, 20 January 2007 
Speech in Parliament on the motion of no-confidence to the Government submitted by 
PASOK, 04 February 2007 
Speech in Parliament on the proposals for the Constitutional Reform, 14 February 
2007 
Televised address in Maximos Mansion for the promotion of the Educational Reform, 
20 February 2007 
Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 07 March 2007 
Televised press conference after the European Council session, 09 March 2007 
Speech in Parliament on the Economic Policy of the Government, 22 March 2007 
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Second speech in Parliament on the Economic Policy of the Government, 22 March 
2007 
Speech in the ONNED (ND Political Youth) Central Committee, 15 April 2007 
Speech in Parliament on Agricultural Policy, 03 May 2007 
Second speech in Parliament on Agricultural Policy, 03 May 2007 
Third speech in Parliament on Agricultural Policy, 03 May 2007 
Speech in the 7th ONNED Annual Convention, 08 June 2007 
Televised press conference after the European Council session, 23 June 2007 
Speech in Parliament on ‘Family Economics’, 03 July 2007 
Second speech in Parliament on ‘Family Economics’, 02 July 2007 
Speech at the end of the 7th Regular Convention of ND, 08 July 2007 
Speech in ND Central Committee, 13 July 2007 
Televised Address from the Office of the Prime Minister to call early national 
elections, 17 August 2007 
Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 18 August 2007 
Speech in ND Central Committee, 23 August 2007 
Televised Address from the Office of the Prime Minister to announce extraordinary 
measures to deal with the destruction caused by the forest fires in Peloponnese and 
Euboea, 25 August 2007  
Speech at the 72nd International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki to Business 
Representatives, 08 September 2007 
Interview in the national broadcasting network ‘Alpha’, 12 September 2007 
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Interview in the national broadcasting network ‘Ant1’, 12 September 2007 
Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 28 September 2007 
Second speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 28 September 2007 
Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 03 October 2007 
Speech in ND Central Committee, 20 October 2007 
Speech in Parliament on ‘Ecological Policies in Greece’, 01 November 2007 
Second speech in Parliament on ‘Ecological Policies in Greece’, 01 November 2007 
Third speech in Parliament on ‘Ecological Policies in Greece’, 01 November 2007 
Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA MP Fotis Kouvelis on student upheaval, 
09 November 2007 
Answer in a Question to the PM by PASOK MP Charis Kastanides on VAT increase, 
09 November 2007 
Answer in a Question to the PM by PASOK MP Nikitas Kaklamanis on the Telephone 
Hacking Scandal Committee, 09 November 2007 
Answer in a Question to the PM by leader of the LAOS party Georgios Karatzaferis, 
16 November 2007 
Answer in a Question to the PM by KKE (Greek Communist Party) MP Spuros 
Chalvatzis on flood victims compensation and anti-flood infrastructure measures, 23 
November 2007 
Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA MP Fotis Kouvelis on changing the 
electoral law, 23 November 2007 
Speech in ND Parliamentary Group on ‘Challenges and Prospective on Greece’s 
Growth’, 29 November 2007 
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Televised press conference after the European Council session, 14 December 2007 
Speech in Parliament on the 2008 Budget, 20 December 2007 
Speech in Parliament on ‘Reform for a Modern, Just and Viable Social Security’, 16 
February 2008 
Answer in a Question to the PM by the LAOS leader Georgios Karatzaferis on 
Government’s position concerning the independence of Kosovo, 22 February 2008 
Answer in a Question to the PM by the Opposition leader of PASOK Papandreou on 
high prices and the protection of low-income families, 22 February 2008 
Answer in a Question to the PM by the Opposition leader of PASOK Papandreou on 
Public Education, 29 February 2008 
Answer in a Question to the PM by the KKE General Secretary Aleka Papariga on 
Civil Aviation Authority and airports, 29 February 2008 
Second answer in Parliament on Question to the PM by the leader of SYRIZA Alekos 
Alavanos on Ministry of Culture issues, 29 February 2008 
Answer in a Question to the PM by the LAOS leader Georgios Karatzaferis on 
FYROM, 29 February 2008 
Speech in special parliamentary session dedicated to Greek Women Farmers, 05 
March 2008 
Televised press conference after the European Council session, 14 March 2008 
Speech in Parliament on ‘The Rights of Youth in Education and Culture’, 21 March 
2008 
Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 27 March 2008 
Speech in Parliament on the motion of no-confidence, 29 March 2008 
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Televised Address from the Office of the Prime Minister on the foreign policy of the 
introduction of FYROM in the NATO, 03 April 2008  
Press conference at NATO Heads of Governments Summit, 04 April 2008 
Speech in Parliament on FYROM, 10 April 2008 
Second speech in Parliament on FYROM, 10 April 2008 
Speech in ND Central Committee, 12 April 2008 
Speech in Parliament on the Economy, 17 April 2008 
Speech in Parliament on Constitutional Reform, 06 May 2008 
Answer in a Question to the PM by the LAOS leader Georgios Karatzaferis and 
PASOK leader George Papandreou, 09 May 2008 
Answer in a Question to the PM by the SYRIZA leader Alekos Alavanos, 16 May 
2008 
Answer in a Question to the PM by the PASOK leader Papandreou, 1 May 2008 
Answer in a Question to the PM by the PASOK leader Papandreou on NHS, 30 May 
2008 
Answer in a Question to the PM by KKE leader Aleka Papariga and SYRIZA leader 
Alekos Alavanos on Education, 30 May 2008 
Speech in Parliament on the Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, 11 June 2008 
Televised press conference after the European Council session, 20 June 2008 
Speech in Parliament on high prices, 27 June 2008 
Second speech in Parliament on high prices, 27 June 2008 
Third speech in Parliament on high prices, 27 June 2008 
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Speech in ONNED Political Festival, 18 July 2008 
Speech at the 73rd International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki to Business 
Representatives, 06 September 2008 
Televised press conference during the 73rd International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 
07 September 2008 
Speech in Parliament on celebrating International Democracy Day, 15 September 
2008 
Speech in ND Central Committee, 26 September 2008 
Second speech in ND Central Committee, 26 September 2008 
Speech in ONNED Central Committee, 04 October 2008 
Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 06 October 2008 
Speech in Parliament on the International Financial Crisis, 31 October 2008 
Second speech in Parliament on the International Financial Crisis, 31 October 2008 
Third speech in Parliament on the International Financial Crisis, 31 October 2008 
Televised press conference after the Extraordinary European Council session, 07 
November 2008 
Answer in a Question to the PM by the SYRIZA leader Alekos Alavanos, 14 
November 2008 
Answer in a Question to the PM by KKE leader Aleka Papariga, 14 November 2008 
Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 19 November 2008 
Speech in Parliament honoring the 2008 Olympics Greek athletes, 19 November 2008 
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Answer in a Question to the PM by the LAOS leader Georgios Karatzaferis, 21 
November 2008 
Answer in a Question to the PM by the SYRIZA leader Alekos Alavanos, 21 
November 2008 
Answer in a Question to the PM by the PASOK leader Papandreou, 28 November 
2008 
Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA MP Fotis Kouvelis, 28 November 2008 
Answer in a Question to the PM by the LAOS leader Georgios Karatzaferis, 28 
November 2008 
Speech in Parliament on the Economy and Labor Reform, 05 December 2008 
Second Speech in Parliament on the Economy and Labor Reform, 05 December 2008 
Third Speech in Parliament on the Economy and Labor Reform, 05 December 2008 
Televised Address from the Office of the Prime Minister on the killing of a Greek 
student by a police-officer, 08 December 2008  
Televised Address from the Office of the Prime Minister on the riots taking place in 
Athens and other Greek cities, 09 December 2008  
Televised Address from the Office of the Prime Minister on the measures taken by the 
Government to deal with the damages caused by the riots in Athens and other Greek 
cities, 10 December 2008  
Televised Press Conference after the end of the European Council session, 12 
December 2008 
Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 16 December 2008 
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Televised Address from the Office of the Prime Minister to announce extraordinary 
measures to deal with the consequences caused by the international financial crisis, 18 
December 2008  
Speech in Parliament on the 2009 Budget, 21 December 2008 
Answer in a Question to the PM by the LAOS leader Georgios Karatzaferis, 16 
January 2009 
Answer in a Question to the PM by the SYRIZA leader Alekos Alavanos, 16 January 
2009 
Speech in Parliament on Education, 23 January 2009 
Answer in a Question to the PM by the LAOS leader Georgios Karatzaferis, 06 
February 2009 
Answer in a Question to the PM by the SYRIZA leader Alekos Alavanos, 06 February 
2009 
Speech in Parliament on the Economy, 12 February 2009 
Second Speech in Parliament on the Economy, 12 February 2009 
Third Speech in Parliament on the Economy, 12 February 2009 
Answer in a Question to the PM by the LAOS leader Georgios Karatzaferis, 20 
February 2009 
Televised Press Conference after the end of the European Council session, 01 March 
2009 
Televised Address from the Office of the Prime Minister after the convocation of the 
Political Leaders Board chaired by the President of the Greek Republic on the issue of 
the economic crisis, 05 March 2009  
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Answer in a Question to the PM by the PASOK leader Papandreou, 06 March 2009 
Speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 12 March 2009 
Second speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 12 March 2009 
Third speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 12 March 2009 
Televised Press Conference after the end of the European Council session, 20 March 
2009 
Speech in Parliament on ‘Voting rights for Greeks living abroad’, 02 April 2009 
Press conference at NATO Heads of Governments Summit, 04 April 2009 
Speech in Parliament on Public Security, 08 April 2009 
Second speech in Parliament on Public Security, 08 April 2009 
Third speech in Parliament on Public Security, 08 April 2009 
Speech in Parliament on ‘Youth Rights in Education, Culture and Sports’, 08 May 
2009 
Second speech in Parliament on ‘Youth Rights in Education, Culture and Sports’, 08 
May 2009 
Third speech in Parliament on ‘Youth Rights in Education, Culture and Sports’, 08 
May 2009 
Speech in ND Central Committee, 09 May 2009 
Televised Press Conference after the end of the European Council session, 19 June 
2009 
Televised press conference after meeting with NATO Secretary General, 27 August 
2009 
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Televised Address from the Office of the Prime Minister to call early national 
elections, 02 September 2009  
 
Minor Addresses (presented in chronological order) 
Speech at the Economist 8th Roundtable Discussion on ‘Leadership Strategy for 
Security and Prosperity in an Era of Uncertainty’, 05 May 2004 
Speech at the Hellenic-Turkish Business Forum, 07 May 2004 
Speech in the Hellenic-American Business Council on ‘Greece: Ideal Business Partner 
in Southeastern Europe’. 19 May 2004 
Speech in the 10th Annual Thessaloniki Forum hosted by Northern Greece Industry 
Association and the Hellenic-American Chamber, 25 May 2004 
Speech in the opening of the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of 
Enterprises, 26 May 2004 
Speech in the 12th Annual Convention of the Greek Tourism Enterprises Association), 
02 June 2004 
Speech in Thessaloniki on European Elections, 05 June 2004 
Speech in the 6th Annual ONNED, 25 June 2004 
Speech in ND Pre-Convention in Thessaloniki, 16 July 2004 
Speech in ND Pre-Convention in Patra, 17 July 2004 
Speech at the International Herald Tribune Symposium for the Greek Economy in the 
Aftermath of the Olympics, 11 October 2004 
Speech at the 8th Dialogue between the Greek-Orthodox Church and the EPP, 21 
October 2004 
 279 
Speech at the 15th Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference with topic ‘The 
Hour of the Greek Economy’, 02 November 2004 
Speech in an event on ‘Polythecneio’ hosted by ONNED, 14 November 2004 
Speech in the Athens Symposium on ‘Issues of International and Greek Economy’, 19 
November 2004 
Speech in a formal dinner hosted by the Ioannina District Chancellor, 19 November 
2004 
Speech in an event on ‘Post-Olympics Use of Infrastructure’, 07 December 2004 
Speech in Karpathos Island, 05 January 2005 
Speech at the Opening of the National Discussion on Education, 21 January 2005 
Speech in ND Women Department, 26 January 2005 
Speech in Samothraki Island, 19 February 2005 
Speech on the Memorial of Eleftherios and Sofoklis Venizelos, 27 March 2005 
Speech in the 13th Annual Convention of the Greek Tourism Enterprises Association, 
11 April 2005 
Speech at the Economist 9th Roundtable Discussion, 19 April 2005 
Speech at the Signing of the Agreement for the ENISA Headquarters in Heraklion city 
of Crete, 22 April 2004 
Speech at the Executive Committee of the International Democratic Association in 
Athens, 27 April 2004 
Speech in the opening of the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of 
Enterprises, 26 May 2005 
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Speech in an event celebrating the 50th Anniversary of Thessaloniki Technical 
University, 27 May 2005 
Speech in an event celebrating the 10th Anniversary of the National Judiciary School, 
27 May 2005 
Speech in an event for the opening of a World War II Memorial Monument in 
Kaisariani, 24 June 2005 
Speech in an event for the beginning of the construction of the Hellenic-Turkish Oil 
Tube in Alexandroupolis, 03 July 2005 
Speech in an event for the beginning of the construction of the Hellenic-Turkish Oil 
Tube in Gefira Kipon, 03 July 2005 
Speech in an ONNED event in Limnos Island, 15 July 2005 
Speech in dinner to the members of the European Central Bank Board of Directors, 06 
October 2005 
Speech at the 16th Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference with topic ‘The 
Hour of the Greek Economy’, 08 November 2005 
Speech in working dinner hosted by Japan Industry Association (Keindaren), 11 
November 2005 
Speech in Grevena on business issues, 19 November 2005 
Speech in an event celebrating the 30th Anniversary of the Centre for Political 
Research and Communication, 29 November 2005 
Speech in ND Women Department, 25 January 2006 
Speech at the Economist Convention on ‘Priorities in A Changing World’, 04 April 
2006 
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Speech at the ND National Convention for Local Governance, 07 April 2006 
Speech in Kilkis, 14 April 2006 
Speech in Sparta, 05 May 2006 
Speech in Messinia on Entrepreneurs, 06 May 2006 
Speech in the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 16 
May 2006 
Speech in the International Convention in Delphoi on ‘Local Governments: 
Instruments of Democracy, Social Change and Growth’, 19 May 2006 
Speech in an event celebrating the 25th Anniversary of the Admission of Greece to the 
E.U, 28 May 2006 
Speech in Fthiotida on Entrepreneurs, 02 June 2006 
Speech in the Economist Three-Party Summit (Greece-Bulgaria-Romania), 28 June 
2006 
Speech at the ONNED Political Festival in Lefkada Island, 08 September 2006 
Speech in an event for World Peace Day, 24 September 2006  
Speech in the opening day of the first International Forum for the Internet 
Governance, 30 October 2006 
Speech at the 17th Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference, 05 December 
2006 
Speech at the 6th Regular Assembly of the Greek Immigrants Association (S.A.E.) in 
Thessaloniki, 08 December 2006 
Speech in the ND Regional Organisations Conference, 19 January 2007 
Speech in ND Women Department, 22 January 2007 
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Speech in the Second Two-Year Symposium of Stock Markets, Investments, Energy 
and Maritime, 16 April 2007 
Speech at the Economist 11th Roundtable Discussion, 24 April 2007 
Speech at the convention hosted by the Ministry of Economics on ‘Which model we 
want for Europe?’, 26 April 2007 
Speech in Kassos Island, 01 May 2007 
Speech in the 15th Annual Convention of the Greek Tourism Enterprises Association, 
08 May 2007 
Speech in an event honoring Greek National Contributors, 15 May 2007 
Speech in the conference of the Institute of International Finance in Zappeio Mansion, 
31 May 2007 
Speech in ND Pre-Convention in Thessaloniki, 03 June 2007 
Speech in the 11th ‘Thessaloniki Forum’ on ‘International Markets: Position of 
Thessaloniki and Northern Greece’, 04 June 2007 
Speech in the International Conference hosted by the ‘Konstantinos Karamanlis’ 
Institute on ‘Konstantinos Karamanlis in the 20th century’, 05 June 2007 
Speech in ND Pre - Convention in Cental Greece-Thessalia, 10 June 2007 
Speech in an event hosted by the Trade and Industry Chamber of Athens), 12 June 
2007 
Speech in an event hosted by the ‘Konstantinos Karamanlis’ Institute on Climate 
change, 13 June 2007 
Speech in ND Pre - Convention in Crete, 17 June 2007 
Speech in ND Pre - Convention in Patra, 25June 2007 
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Speech in ND Pre - Convention in Epeiros & Ionian Islands in Ioannina, 01 July 2007 
Speech in an event host by the Hellenic-German Trade and Industry Chamber 
honoring Chancellor Merkel, 20 July 2007 
Speech in the opening of the European Cultural Centre convention in Delphoi, 23 July 
2007 
Speech in the ceremony of Appointing New Firemen, 26 July 2007 
Speech in Drama, 19 August 2007 
Speech in Keratsini, 05 September 2007 
Speech in Kozani, 07 September 2007 
Speech in Grevena, 07 September 2007 
Speech in Serres, 07 September 2007 
Speech in Heraklion, 10 September 2007 
Speech in Agrinio, 11 September 2007 
Speech in Mitilini, 12 September 2007 
Speech in Thessaloniki, 13 September 2007 
Speech at the launch of the Hellenic-Turkish Oil Tube in Kipoi, Evros, 18 November 
2007 
Speech at the 18th Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference with topic The 
Hour of the Greek Economy’, 04 December 2007 
Speech in an event hosted by the NGO ‘Transparency International’, 14 January 2008 
Speech in the Women Issues Secretariat, 21 January 2008 
 284 
Speech in an event celebrating the 50th anniversary of the National Research 
Institution, 19 March 2008 
Speech in the opening of the 4th Plenary Session of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Parliamentary   Conference, 28 March 2008 
Speech at the 6th Forum of the ‘International Coalition of Cities against Poverty’, 28 
March 2008 
Speech at the Economist 12th Roundtable Discussion, 08 April 2008 
Speech in an event hosted by the European Bank in Zappeio Mansion, 08 May 2008 
Speech in the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 14 
May 2008 
Speech in the 16th Annual Convention of the Greek Tourism Enterprises Association, 
22 May 2008 
Speech in an event hosted by ‘Konstantinos Karamanlis’ Institute, 24 May 2008 
Speech in the 1st Symposium of the International Greek University, 24 June 2008 
Speech in the European Economic and Social Committee Summit, 08 September 2008 
Speech in an event hosted by the Ministry of Maritime Issues on the International 
Maritime Day, 19 September 2008 
Speech in the 13th International Conference against Corruption, 30 October 2008 
Speech on the 50th anniversary of the European Investment Bank, 10 November 2008 
Speech at the 19th Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference, 25 November 
2008 
Speech at the E.P.P Youth Convention, 24 January 2009 
Speech in the presentation of the Cultural Centre ‘Stavros Niarchos’, 24 January 2009 
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Speech in the Women Issues Secretariat, 26 January 2009 
Speech in the Insurance Companies Annual General Assembly, 16 February 2009 
Speech in ONNED Central Committee, 22 February 2009 
Speech in Agrinio Trade Chamber, 14 March 2009 
Speech in Zante Island, 28 March 2009 
Speech in an event hosted by the Research General Secretariat, 01 April 2009 
Speech in Pella, 11 April 2009 
Speech in the General Assembly of the Western Macedonia Industry Association, 26 
April 2009 
Speech in a European Commission conference on ‘Protecting Biodiversity beyond 
2010’, 27 April 2009 
Speech in Argolida on Business Representatives, 03 May 2009 
Speech in the 17th Annual Convention of the Greek Tourism Enterprises Association, 
05 May 2009 
Speech in ONNED District Convention, 10 May 2009 
Speech in Arta, 17 May 2009 
Speech in the 4th International Convention of the Hellenic Telecommunications and 
Post Commission, 20 May 2009 
Speech in an ND event on Small and Middle Enterprises, 20 May 2009 
Speech in an event hosted by the ‘Konstantinos Karamanlis’ Institute on the 30th 
anniversary of the Admission of Greece to the European Economic Community, 21 
May 2009 
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Speech in Larisa, 23 May 2009 
Speech in Tripolis, 24 May 2009 
Speech in Aspropurgos, 25 May 2009 
Speech in the Economist conference, 26 May 2009 
Speech in Markopoulo, 29 May 2009 
Speech in the launching ceremony of the Egnatia Road in the Venitco Bridge, 30 May 
2009 
Speech in Lamia, 31 May 2005 
Speech in the International Convention on ‘Climate Change’, 02 June 2009 
Speech in Thessaloniki, 03 June 2009 
Speech in Athens, 05 June 2009 












Major Addresses (presented in chronological order) 
Speech in the first session of the newly elected Council of Ministers (Greek Cabinet), 
07 October 2009 
Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 14 October 2009 
Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 16 October 2009 
Second Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 18 October 2009 
Speech in PASOK National Council, 23 October 2009 
Televised press conference after the European Council session, 30 October 2009 
Joint press address after Meeting with Secretary General of the United Nations in 
Maximos Mansion, 04 November 2009  
Speech in the Council of Ministers, 05 November 2009 
Answer in Parliament on Question to the PM by the leader of the SYRIZA party 
Alexis Tsipras, 13 November 2009 
Answer in a Question to the PM by leader of the LAOS party Georgios Karatzaferis, 
13 November 2009 
Answer in a Question to the PM by the KKE leader Aleka Papariga, 13 November 
2009 
Speech in the Council of Ministers, 18 November 2009 
Speech at the Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference with topic ‘The Hour 
of the Greek Economy’, 30 November 2009 
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Speech in 17th Ministerial Council of the OSCE, 01 December 2009 
Speech in Parliament on the Extraordinary Financial Aid of Social Solidarity, 01 
December 2009 
Press Conference of the OSCE Troika in Hellinikon Complex, Fencing Center, 02 
December 2009 
Speech in the Council of Ministers, 03 December 2009 
Speech in the Council of Ministers, 09 December 2009 
Televised press conference after the European Council session, 11 December 2009 
Speech in the Council of Ministers, 14 December 2009 
Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 19 December 2009 
Speech in Parliament on the 2010 Budget, 23 December 2009 
Speech in the Council of Ministers, 10 January 2010 
Speech in Parliament, 22 January 2010 
Speech in Parliament, 01 February 2010 
Speech in Parliament, 08 February 2010 
Televised press conference after the European Council session, 11 February 2010 
Speech in the Council of Ministers, 12 February 2010 
Speech in Parliament, 26 February 2010 
Speech in the Council of Ministers, 01 March 2010 
Speech in Parliament, 02 March 2010 
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Speech in the Council of Ministers, 04 March 2010 
Speech in the Council of Ministers, 18 March 2010 
Speech at PASOK National Council in Thessaloniki, 20 March 2010 
Speech in Parliament, 22 March 2010 
Televised press conference after the European Council session, 26 March 2010 
Signed article in ‘O Kosmos tou Ependuti’ newspaper, 27 March 2010 
Interview on ‘To Vima’ newspaper, 11 April 2010 
Speech in Parliament, 14 April 2010 
Answer in a Question to the PM in Parliament, 16 April 
Speech at the Council of Ministers in Kastellorizo Island, 23 April 2010 
Answer in a Question to the PM in Parliament, 30 April 
Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 27 April 2010 
Speech in the Council of Ministers, 28 April 2010 
Speech in the Council of Ministers, 02 May 2010 
Speech in Parliament, 05 May 2010 
Speech in Parliament, 06 May 2010 
Joint televised press conference with Prime Minister of Turkey Tayyip Erdogan, 14 
May 2010 
Speech in Parliament, 21 May 2010 
Speech in Parliament, 25 May 2010 
Speech in Parliament, 04 June 2010 
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Speech in Parliament, 25 June 2010 
Speech in Parliament, 30 June 2010 
Interview on ‘Sunday Eleftherotypia’ newspaper, 04 July 2010 
Speech in Parliament, 07 July 2010 
Speech in Parliament, 09 July 2010 
Signed article in the website of the government, 23 August 2010 
Speech in PASOK 9th National Council, 03 September 2010 
Speech in PASOK 9th National Council closing day, 05 September 2010 
Speech in the Council of Ministers, 10 September 2010 
Speech in the 75th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 11 September 2010 
Televised press conference in the 75th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 12 
September 2010 
Televised press conference after the European Council session, 16 September 2010 
Televised press conference after the Europe-Asia Summit in Brussels, 05 October 
2010 
Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 07 October 2010 
Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA, 15 October 2010 
Answer in a Question to the PM by LAOS, 15 October 2010 
Answer in a Question to the PM by KKE, 15 October 2010 
Televised press address in the Maximos Mansion on the Unemployment, 19 October 
2010 
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Signed article in ‘Sunday Vima’ newspaper, 24 October 2010 
Televised cross-national broadcasting networks interview, 25 October 2010 
Televised press conference after the European Council session, 29 October 2010 
Interview in ‘Real News’ newspaper, 31 October 2010 
Town hall meeting hosted with young citizens broadcasted online, 05 November 2010 
Interview in ‘Ta Nea Weekend’ newspaper, 06 November 2010 
Interview in ‘Sunday Ethnos’ newspaper, 07 October 2010 
Interview in ‘To Proto Thema’ newspaper, 14 November 2010 
Answer in a Question to the PM by LAOS, 26 November 2010 
Interview in ‘Kathimerini’ newspaper, 28 November 2010 
Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA, 10 December 2010 
Answer in a Question to the PM by LAOS, 10 December 2010 
Answer in a Question to the PM by KKE, 10 December 2010 
Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 18 December 2010 
Interview in ‘Sunday Eleftherotypia’ newspaper, 19 December 2010 
Speech in Parliament, 22 December 2010 
Interview in ‘Sunday Ethnos’ newspaper, 31 December 2010 
Answer in a Question to the PM by KKE, 14 January 2011 
Speech in Parliament, 24 January 2011 
Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 26 January 2011 
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Televised press conference after the European Council session, 04 February 2011 
Speech in the Council of Ministers, 09 February 2011 
Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA, 11 February 2011 
Answer in a Question to the PM by LAOS, 11 February 2011 
Answer in a Question to the PM by LAOS, 25 February 2011 
Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA, 25 February 2011 
Speech in PASOK National Council, 04 March 2011 
Televised press conference after the Informal Heads of Government Summit of the 
member-states of the Eurozone, 12 March 2011 
Speech in the Council of Ministers, 13 March 2011 
Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 15 March 2011 
Speech in Parliament, 16 March 2011 
Speech in Parliament, 22 March 2011 
Televised press conference after the European Council session, 25 March 2011 
Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA, 01April 2011 
Answer in a Question to the PM by LAOS, 01April 2011 
Answer in a Question to the PM by ND, 01 April 2011 
Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 15 April 2011 
Speech in the Council of Ministers, 15 April 2011 
Speech in the Council of Ministers, 28 April 2011 
Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA, 06 May 2011 
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Answer in a Question to the PM by LAOS, 06 May 2011 
Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA, 10 May 2011 
Answer in a Question to the PM by LAOS, 10 May 2011 
Speech in the Council of Ministers, 11 May 2011 
Speech in the Council of Ministers, 16 May 2011 
Interview in ‘Sunday Ethnos’ newspaper, 22 May 2011 
Signed article in ‘Kathimerini’ newspaper, 29 May 2011 
Speech in the Council of Ministers, 06 June 2011 
Speech in PASOK Political Council, 08 June 2011 
Interview in ‘Sunday Vima’ newspaper, 12 June 2011 
Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 16 June 2011 
Speech in the Council of Ministers, 17 June 2011 
Speech in Parliament on the motion of no-confidence, 19 June 2011 
Televised press conference after the European Council session, 24 June 2011 
Speech in Parliament on a special session on Special Olympics, 27 June 2011 
Speech in Parliament, 29 June 2011  
 
Minor addresses (presented in chronological order) 
Speech in Ancient Olympia, 11 October 2009 
Speech in the 11th Annual Conference of the Greek ICT Forum, 04 November 2009 
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Speech at the Global Forum for Immigration and Growth, 04 November 2009  
Speech on the ‘Kallikratis’ bill, 18 January 2010 
Speech in Economist Discussion and Debate on ‘In or out of the economic crisis?’, 02 
February 2010 
Speech in the 34th National ΓΣΕΕ (General Confederation of Greek Labour), 19 
March 2010 
Speech in an event hosted by Transparency International Greece, 19 April 2010 
Speech in the 18th Annual Convention of the Greek Tourism Enterprises Association, 
21 April 2010 
Speech in the Financial and Social Committee of Rhodes Island, 23 April 2010 
Speech in an Economist event, 28 April 2010 
Speech at the ‘digital economy forum’ of the Greek Association of Computing and 
Communication Enterprises, 03 May 2010 
Speech in the opening of the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of 
Enterprises, 11 May 2010 
Speech in the Financial and Social Committee of Fthiotida, 13 May 2010 
Speech in the Hellenic-Turkish Business Forum, 14 May 2010 
Speech at the 3rd Annual Conference for Climate and Energy Security in  
Southeastern Europe, 19 May 2010 
Speech in the Financial and Social Committee of Rodopi, 28 May 2010 
Speech in the Financial and Social Committee of Arkadia, 10 June 2010 
Speech in Ilion on the Drug Problem, 06 July 2010 
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Speech on the Opening Ceremony of the Symi’s Symposium in Symi Island, 12 July 
2010 
Speech in the Closing Ceremony of Symi’s Symposium in Symi Island, 15 July 2010 
Speech in National Center of Public Administration, 28 July 2010  
Speech at the International Cretan Conference in Crete, 30 July 2010 
Speech in PASOK Commerce Department, 10 September 2010 
Speech in a discussion on Education in Delphoi, 26 September 2010  
Speech during a meeting with the National Exporters Federation, 14 October 2010 
Speech during a meeting with young and innovative entrepreneurs, 20 October 2010 
Speech in the Mediterranean Initiative for Climate Change, 22 October 2010 
Speech in the Green Investment Mediterranean Forum, 23 October 2010  
Speech in Corfu Island, 10 October 2010 
Speech in Larisa, 17 October 2010 
Speech in Peristeri, 21 October 2010 
Speech in Alexandroupolis, 23 October 2010 
Speech in Agioi Anarguroi, 30 October 2010 
Speech in Kozani, 31 October 2010 
Speech in Thessaloniki, 01 November 2010 
Speech in Ioannina, 02 November 2010 
Speech in Patra, 04 November 2010 
Speech in Athens, 05 November 2010 
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Speech in the ‘News Xchange 2010’ Conference, 11 November 2010 
Speech in an event for Educating the new Local Authorities, 24 November 2010 
Speech in the 21st Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference, 30 November 
2010 
Speech in an event hosted by the Ministry of Development and Competiveness, 08 
December 3010 
Speech in Crete, 12 December 2010 
Speech at an event hosted by the General Secretariat of Communications for the heads 
of the Press Secretariat abroad, 17 January 2011 
Speech in Kozani, 20 January 2011 
Speech in Thessaloniki, 21 January 2011 
Speech at the Conference of the Chairmen of the American-Jewish Organisations, 10 
February 2011 
Speech in Samothraki, 17 February 2011 
Speech in Komotini, 18 February 2011 
Speech in Dimario village in Xanthi, 18 February 2011 
Speech at the Founding Convention of ‘Dimokratiki Aristera’ party, 31 March 2011 
Speech in Meganisi Island, 07 May 2011 
Speech at the Transparency International Greece conference, 09 May 2011 
Speech in the 19th Annual Convention of SETE (Greek Tourism Enterprises 
Association), 04 May 2011  
Speech at the Economist Conference, 17 May 2011 
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Speech in Argolida, 20 May 2011 
Speech in the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 24 
May 2011 


















List of Interviewees 
1. Simitis, Costas: Prime Minister 1996 - 2004 
2. Fanaras, Stratos: Pollster, Head of the Metron Analysis survey organisation 
3. Kousoulis, Lefteris : Strategist, Head of the Saying and Doing political 
communication agency 
4. Pantagias, George : Simitis press advisor 1996-2003 
5. Paschalidis, George : Deputy Minister without portfolio 1996-2000 
6. Reppas, Dimitris: Minister of Press and Mass Media 1996-2001 
7. Protopapas, Christos: Minister of Press and Mass Media 2001-2004 
8. Hitiris, Tilemahos: Deputy Minister of Press and Mass Media 2000-2004  
9. Rousopoulos, Theodoros: Minister of State 2004 - 2008 
10. Antonaros, Evaggelos: Deputy Minister of State 2004 – 2008 (Minister of State 
2008 – 2009) 
11. Elenopoulos, George: Head of Press Office 2009 – 2011 









The Conduct of Interviews 
All of the interviewees were interviewed during the time between October 2009 and 
July 2012 and all the interviews were conducted in a face-to-face basis apart from one 
with Rousopoulos, a small part of which was conducted by phone due to shortage of 
time on his behalf in the day of the scheduled meeting. In the majority of the 
interviews, the use of tape-recorder was permitted with the exception of the interviews 
with former Prime Minister Simitis, the Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister George 
Paschalidis and Papandreou’s press spokesperson George Elenopoulos.  The 
interviewees were informed that their names would be mentioned in a doctoral thesis. 
The respondents were also informed that their answers would be ascribed to them in 
the thesis and they complied with it.  With the two exceptions of when the respondents 
requested for the tape-recorder to turn off near the end of the interview in order to 
make some off-the-record comments, a request which was granted and respected later 
when the data was used. The size of the interviews varies from 40 to 50 minutes each, 
while in some cases there had to be a follow-up interview in order for all the 
objectives of the thesis to be discussed. After the completion of the interviewing 
process, the interviews were transcribed and the data was analysed, their findings were 
assessed and attributed accordingly to the five components of the permanent 








List of government communication documents  
1. Prime Minister’s image: Problems and Communication Proposals, 11 
November 1998 
2. Communication  initiatives for the next three months, 5 January 1999 
3. The problematic points of the government image and how to deal with, 20 
January 1999 
4. Communication proposals for the Olympic Games of 2004, 15 July 1999 
5. From the first to the second 4-year term: Proposals to improve the 
communication policy, 12 December 1999 
6. Key-points, January 2000 
7.  Communication support, January 2000 
8. Model of electoral behaviour focusing on the Prime Minister, February 2000 
9. Three-month plan of prime  ministerial communication activities, 12 May 2000 
10. A realistic strategy for the Olympic Games of 2004, 24 January 2002 
11. Review of the communication and image  of Government, 3 April 2002   
12. The political and communication problems of the Third European Community 
Support Framework, 23 May 2002 








   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
